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Abstract 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation aims to inform theories of conflict and International Relations 
(IR) by using modified social psychological models of identification and leadership in 
which needs fulfilment plays a central role. The main hypothesis is that identification 
with groups and leaders is flexible on the lower needs levels and more lasting on the 
higher needs levels, and that leadership, to be adaptive, must on the lower needs levels 
be action-oriented and on the higher levels be relations-oriented. This hypothesis is used 
to inform group- and system-level theories. On the group level, the hypothesis reads that 
due to this pattern of individual identification, cohesive collective action and violence in 
physiological deprivation requires coercive leadership to make up for the absence of 
unity, while on the higher needs levels collective violence necessitates manipulative 
leadership to make up for the absence of real deprivation. On the system level, the 
hypothesis reads that since the dynamics of collective action depend on the level of 
needs fulfilment and identification, change in the system can only be understood by 
examining all three levels of analysis. The first two hypotheses (on the individual and 
group level) are developed and demonstrated through qualitative case studies on the 
conflicts of the Sudan/South Sudan and between the former Yugoslav republics. These 
hypotheses are then used to reconcile the various conflicting theories on each level of 
analysis as well as to create a comprehensive framework through which the various 
theories and concepts of IR can be seen as connected to a certain level of needs security/ 
development, and thus as historically and regionally specific. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation has been motivated by three major concerns which arose during the 
author’s previous studies in International Relations (IR). The first of these relates to the 
slack use of the concept of collective identity, or sometimes its exclusion, in IR theories. 
Although group identification has been found to be a cause of such transformational 
large-scale phenomena as the rise and fall of nations,
1
 collective identity is often seen as 
something fixed and ever-present; it is a kind of black box which is often mentioned yet 
eludes investigation in the international context. The second, equally serious problem, 
directly connected to the first, is the exclusion of individual agency, in both IR and 
various conflict theories, of state and other group leaders who constitute international 
society. Leader personality does not generally fit into structural theories, nor does the 
very real capacity of some leaders to manipulate the masses into believing in either the 
flaws or flawlessness of certain ingroup or national structures, and to mobilise those 
masses accordingly. 
  
The third issue of concern relates to both IR theory and the social sciences more 
generally. The hierarchy of basic human needs is a well-known idea, yet has remained 
one of the least investigated and theorised concepts. This is possibly a consequence of 
the needs hierarchy, as originally devised by Maslow
2
 and expounded upon by many 
others, being a concept based more on human intuition than on any falsifiable empirical 
findings. As Chapter 1 will make clear, the various theoretical models on the needs 
hierarchy are not especially revealing, although the concept itself can hardly be 
overlooked. The incapacity to create a convincing framework of needs or a thorough 
explanation of their practical effects has led to the withering of the entire concept, 
rendering it an interesting but largely abandoned theoretical fancy. As a result, questions 
such as how human needs motivation translates into collective action and how the needs 
hierarchy manifests itself in IR have remained unanswered. The idea of a needs 
hierarchy must thus be expanded upon in a novel manner so as to give it a new lease on 
life. 
                                                          
1
 For such a use of identity, see for example Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity: Social 
Constructs and International Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
2
 Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality (2nd Edition, NY: Harper & Row, 1970). 
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The abandonment of the needs hierarchy as well as the neglect of collective identity in 
IR theory is unfortunate, for this has meant the exclusion of a major theory of human 
motivation in the field of IR. Motivation and the ways in which it is transformed into 
collective action, however, cannot be investigated by looking at only one (needs) or the 
other (identity). This thesis links motivation and collective action through a simple 
innovation: the unification of the needs hierarchy with theories of collective identity and 
leadership. Such a merger, as will be seen, leads to an understanding of identity and 
motivation that is more flexible and illuminating than the ones used thus far in the social 
sciences. This connection is essential, for only after motivation on different levels of 
needs fulfilment is understood can one investigate how the various combinations of 
needs, identities, and leadership styles are likely to result in various types of collective 
action in real intergroup relations. Equally importantly, only after understanding the 
power dynamics of the group can one begin to talk about how these collective 
mechanisms function on the systemic, international level. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is thus to integrate social psychological knowledge into 
IR theory in a more comprehensive manner than has thus far been done. As opposed to  
political psychologists, who investigate leader decision-making in the international 
context (characterised by uncertainty and misperceptions),
3
 the present approach seeks 
to integrate also collective identity and mass mobilisation into IR theory. Instead of 
using needs and identity only to formulate theories of collective violence (as in Chapter 
2), these elements are also used to inform system-level theories. Consequently, instead 
of only suggesting partial solutions, the present thesis proposes a theoretical framework 
made up of three levels of analysis. The first level investigates the rules of identification 
and motivation present in the minds of each individual human. The second level 
explores how these psychological predispositions function in the ingroup context and 
give rise to various types of collective action. The third level examines how ingroup 
dynamics and interaction between groups give rise to systemic structures and structural 
evolution. It is hoped that such a tripartite model will provide a novel lens through 
which to view large-scale mechanisms of change and collective violence, and thus yield 
new insights for both conflict and IR theorists. 
                                                          
3
 For a recent review, see J. M. Goldgeier and P. E. Tetlock, "Psychology and International Relations 
Theory," Annual Review of  Political Science 4 (2001): 67–92. 
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Initial Ontological Assumptions 
Given that the framework developed here is based on the needs hierarchy, it accepts 
some ontological assumptions pertaining to needs theories as well as to socio-biology 
and evolutionary psychology. The most important assumption is that although most 
human behaviour is learnt, certain behavioural models or mechanisms are innate and 
have a genetic basis.
4
 These natural patterns ultimately derive from and are conditioned 
by the need to survive in an environment of life-threatening scarcity. Evolutionary 
psychology argues, in particular, that the various psychological adaptations – connected 
to, for example, leadership and aggression – that evolved in the evolutionary setting 
continue to direct human behaviour and often result in maladaptive outcomes. The 
present thesis, however, develops this supposition by studying how the functioning of 
such mechanisms may be influenced by present environmental factors. It is assumed 
that scarcity, or needs deprivation, causes psychological adaptations such as identity and 
leader-follower relations to function in different ways on different levels of needs 
fulfilment. In the present framework, identity and leadership are, therefore, not seen as 
fixed “rights” or “needs,” as they are often perceived to be by social psychologists, but 
as flexible mechanisms furthering collective survival. 
 
Looking at the relationship between needs fulfilment and psychological mechanisms is 
an essential step forward in psychology as well as in the social sciences in general. As 
McDermott points out in the context of evolutionary psychology, not much has been 
done to determine how people choose, transform, and abandon their identities, or how 
“changes in the external environment precipitate shifts in identity” and thus in collective 
behaviour.
5
 The question, however, is crucial, because the relationship between the 
environment and the hu an  ind    bet een the real and ideational aspects of reality    
is a contentious issue throughout the social sciences. As will be seen, on the individual 
level, in social psychology, a debate exists between realistic and cognitive explanations 
of collective identification; on the group level and in theories of collective violence, 
between economic/class versus ideational explanations of conflict; in IR and on the 
                                                          
4
 The most significant sociobiologist writing in this vein is Edward O. Wilson, in Sociobiology: The New 
Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), whose hypotheses evolutionary psychologists 
largely follow. Regarding the latter, see for example Charles Crawford and Dennis L. Krebs, Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology: Ideas, Issues, Applications (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), or 
the more popular Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (NY: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
5
 Rose McDermott, "New Directions for Experimental Work in International Relations," International 
Studies Quarterly 55 (2011), 503–520: 512. 
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systemic level of analysis, between realistic and constructivist (liberalism residing in 
between) descriptions of the international system. Although these debates are called by 
different names, they all boil down to the same issue: whether realistic or ideational 
factors matter more for collective behaviour – whether interests are ontologically prior 
to identities or identities prior to interests. 
 
Such debates, it is argued, can be tackled through the use of the needs hierarchy and by 
abandoning the often unarticulated but widespread assumption that group behaviour 
follows the same patterns irrespective of the level of deprivation experienced by the 
group. Even if basic needs are ontologically prior to the mechanisms of identity and 
leadership, this does not mean that the latter are of no importance. Quite the opposite, 
the environment or the level of deprivation may both constrain and enable the use of 
identity and leadership and thereby result, depending on the needs level, in either weak 
or persistent social constructions such as ideas, values, and identities, as well as weak or 
persistent group structures (in particular politico-economic structures, hereafter called 
"needs strategies"). Basically, the level of deprivation or needs fulfilment determines 
whether needs or identities are regarded as ontologically paramount. Thus, as 
evolutionary psychologists would argue, human beings are not rational actors: they are 
not only or always concerned with purely material, and personal, interests, and often act 
irrationally and based on group opinion. In addition, however, patterns of adaptive 
rationality may exist in the ways in which identities and cognition work, and in the 
types of behaviours and structures that arise as a result. 
 
Given that one of the main purposes of the present thesis is to reconcile the various 
opposing theories of identity, conflict, and IR by linking them to different levels of 
needs fulfilment, its ontology naturally contradicts the ontological suppositions of all or 
most of the theories discussed in the various chapters. Especially in the field of IR, 
where the distance between psychological and systemic considerations is the greatest, 
many theorists might be averse to linking the structures of the international environment 
to some evolutionary premises of human existence. However, it should be noted that the 
present work is hardly the first to do so. In the field of conflict resolution, John Burton 
has argued that the universal necessity of needs fulfilment underlies all collective action 
and change, both in the domestic and international arenas, for individuals are driven to 
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satisfy their needs regardless of structural constraints imposed upon them.
6
 Evolutionary 
psychologists, again, have for some time argued that the demands of the evolutionary 
environment explain the persistence of phenomena such as aggression and coalitional 
behaviour even in the modern system.
7
 To convince the reader of the importance of 
further developing such a research agenda, one must do what Burton and evolutionary 
psychologists have not: to specify the mechanisms linking the various levels of analysis 
from the individual to the international system. 
 
The Three Levels of Theory 
The theoretical framework is set out in three chapters (1, 2, and 7), the first addressing 
the question of motivation and identification (in other words the changing nature of 
individual agency), the second addressing collective action and violent mobilisation (the 
changing nature of ingroup power and empowerment), and the third addressing the 
evolution of the system structure (or the changing nature of intergroup hegemony). The 
entire framework is ultimately based on the remodelled needs hierarchy, set out in 
Chapter 1, which consists of physiological, security, and status needs only, as well as on 
the basic hypothesis that the nature of identity and leadership depends on and changes 
according to the level of needs fulfilment. 
 
Chapter 1, in addition to developing the remodelled needs hierarchy, uses the needs-
identity nexus to reconcile theories found in social psychology and sociology that treat 
identity and leadership as fixed concepts. It is suggested that on the physiological and 
security needs levels, stress and anxiety have the effect of making identification 
dependent on the realistic benefits provided by the group, and identification thus 
changes along with the material perks offered by the environment. On the status level, 
on the other hand, existential threats are absent and the individual’s attention is turned 
towards finding suitable status roles through inter-individual competition. On this level, 
collective identities have proven their worth and thus provide persuasive categories 
through which to perceive the world, leaving more space for ideational elements and 
manipulation. Leadership can be seen to have a similar dual nature: on the lower levels, 
                                                          
6
 John Burton, Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political 
Problems (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979). 
7
 See in particular Anthony C. Lopez, Rose McDermott, and Michael Bang Petersen, "States in Mind: 
Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics," International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 
48–83; for a review on aggression see Russill Durrant, "Collective Violence: An Evolutionary 
Perspective," Aggression and Violent Behavior 16 (2011): 428–436. 
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only action-oriented leaders capable of addressing existential threats will be of any use, 
while on the status level leaders must be relations-oriented and respect existing identity 
categories if they are to be seen as acceptable. 
 
Chapter 2, in turn, examines the rules of collective mobilisation. Mobilisation is shown 
to be a more complex phenomenon than identification due to free leader-agency and 
because, contrary to identification, the ease of mobilisation diminishes as one moves 
onto the higher levels of needs fulfilment.
8
 Indeed, as stability and needs fulfilment in 
the group increases, identities gain power while, at the same time, mobilisation becomes 
less rational. One can thus perceive of conflict as a continuum where at one end (low 
needs), mobilisation is easy to achieve but unity is not, and at the other end (higher 
needs), unity is easy to achieve but mobilisation is not. Thus, at the lower end of the 
continuum, cohesive, large-scale violence can be achieved only by coercive leaders 
while at the higher end, it can be achieved only when manipulative leaders manage to 
create an illusion of existential threat. By integrating the synthesis of Chapter 1 into 
theories of conflict, therefore, the various types of conflict can be integrated into one 
framework of perceived relative deprivation (PRD), where deprivation (the realistic 
aspects) and perception (the cognitive aspect) vary in importance. At the same time one 
can reconcile the apparently contradictory economic/class theories and ideational/ 
cultural theories of conflict found in the conflict literature. 
 
The theoretical framework set out in Chapters 1 and 2 is further developed in the case 
study Chapters 3-6 (described in the section below). Chapter 7, however, constitutes the 
highest level of the theoretical model and applies the findings of the previous chapters 
to IR theory. If the framework of Chapters 1 and 2 is correct in that individual agency as 
well as group empowerment indeed changes according to the level of needs fulfilment, 
in essence moving from materialism and coercion towards an increasing reliance on 
structure and ideational techniques, then inevitably also the nature of the intergroup 
system and intergroup hegemony must evolve in a similar manner as the groups in the 
intergroup context develop in terms of needs security. The different levels of evolution 
of the international system are in this chapter linked to the broad IR theories of realism, 
                                                          
8
 Although the words "lower," denoting the physiological/security levels, and "higher," denoting the 
security/status levels are used here, these refer to the needs' positions in the needs hierarchy rather than 
their importance. On this point, see further Chapter 1.1. 
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liberalism, and constructivism, whose implicit assumptions about the nature of agency 
and power neatly correspond with the dynamics suggested in the previous chapters. 
 
It should be noted that the purpose of this last chapter is not to reiterate all the important 
debates found in the various fields of IR theory, but only to show how the needs-PRD 
approach developed in the previous chapters can inform IR theory, and in particular 
provide a way of understanding the evolution of the international structure. Indeed, by 
linking the different dynamics of agency, power, and hegemony to the physiological, 
security, and status levels of needs fulfilment, realism, liberalism, and constructivism 
can be made historically and regionally specific. As with Chapters 1 and 2, the purpose 
is not to reject or supplant the alternative theoretical positions, but merely to reconcile 
the alternative models by limiting their supposed universal applicability. 
 
Case Study Methodology 
While Chapter 7 is wholly theoretically deduced and based on the findings of the 
previous thesis chapters, the theory of Chapters 1 and 2 is based on existing theory but 
is also further developed through the comparative case studies found in Chapters 3-6. 
Two cases are examined – the Sudan, with an emphasis on the Southern Sudanese 
peoples, and the former Yugoslavia, with an emphasis on the Serbs. The hypotheses of 
Chapter 1, on the nature of collective identity, are developed through Chapters 3 and 5, 
which study the power of collective identity in physiological deprivation (Sudan) and 
status deprivation (former Yugoslavia) respectively. The hypotheses of Chapter 2 on 
mobilisation, in turn, are developed through Chapters 4 and 6, which examine the nature 
and prerequisites of large-scale mobilisation in physiological deprivation (Sudan) and in 
status deprivation (among the Serbs) respectively. 
 
Since the theoretical framework developed in this thesis is mostly based on theoretical 
literature in various fields, for the sake of clarity and to avoid repetition Chapters 1 and 
2 have been written so as to describe not only the hypotheses based on theoretical 
deduction but also the theoretical end result which has come about in the course of the 
case study process. Chapter 1, which concentrates on social psychology, is more clearly 
theory-based and therefore only intermittently refers to chapters 3 and 5. Indeed, 
Chapters 3 and 5 should be seen as descriptive examples of how the nature of collective 
identity varies depending on the level of needs fulfilment, rather than as a means of 
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“testing” Chapter 1 hypotheses. Chapter 2, while also largely based on a new reading/ 
converging of social psychological and conflict theory, relies somewhat more on the 
case study findings, which is reflected in the chapter's more frequent references to the 
case study findings. 
 
The qualitative case studies have been chosen in accordance with the demands of the 
theory, which distinguishes between identification and mobilisation and between 
different levels of needs fulfilment. Firstly, they have been chosen on the dependent 
variable or the outcome. For the purposes of Chapter 1, the dependent variable is large-
scale identity change, which might be best examined, for example, in the context of 
secession or independence. For the purposes of Chapter 2, the dependent variable is 
large-scale conflict. Secondly, the cases have been chosen on the intervening variable, 
namely the level of deprivation/ needs fulfilment. Given the needs approach of the 
theory, the cases obviously must represent the different levels of deprivation/ needs 
fulfilment, and preferably be cases at the two extremes of severe and mild deprivation 
that constitute so-called “crucial” or “most likely” cases which should most strongly 
point to a particular outcome.
9
 By comparing cases of physiological and status 
deprivation one can thus best investigate the question of whether the nature of 
identification and mobilisation indeed varies with the level of needs fulfilment. 
 
The Sudan and Yugoslavia/ Serb cases obviously fit the “crucial case” demands 
perfectly, given that both the former Sudan and the former Yugoslavia are countries 
which have experienced a visible change in collective identity (secession in the case of 
the Sudan and disintegration in the case of the former Yugoslavia) as well as large-scale 
collective violence. Using these two cases allows one to examine the Chapter 1 and 2 
hypotheses through the same historical events, rather than in the context of disparate 
events of collective violence and /or secession in different countries. It is also worth 
noting that since the historical record suggests that large-scale conflict is relatively 
infrequent in societies suffering of status deprivation only, the Serbian case is one of 
very few alternatives at the “high needs” end, albeit a very interesting one. Although 
alternative cases were also studied, the present ones were chosen for practical purposes 
                                                          
9
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 121. 
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and because they were sufficiently recent to be on particular interest to the author as 
well as potential readers. 
 
The method of inquiry in the case studies is that of within-case process tracing, which 
“attempts to empirically establish the posited intervening variables and implications that 
should be true in a case if a particular explanation of that case is true,”10 and cross-case 
comparison. According to George and Bennett, within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparison together constitute the “strongest means of drawing inferences.”11 The 
intervening variables under particular scrutiny here are the processes connected to 
identity and leadership and their persuasiveness on different needs levels. Although 
such cognitive and identity-related elements are very difficult to measure and have been 
characterised as problematic for theory evaluation,
12
 examining these processes are 
essential for developing the present theory. It is thus hoped that, despite the difficulty of 
measuring motivation, the great variance in the intervening variable on which the cases 
have been chosen (the needs level) will allow some of the potential differences in the 
leader/identity processes to become visible through process-tracing. 
 
For various reasons the analysis of the two cases is based exclusively on secondary 
sources. Most important is the fact that the ultimate purpose of the present work is to 
advance theory and to create bridges between various levels of analysis and fields of 
social scientific inquiry, rather than to add to the particular knowledge about the two 
cases. Extensive theoretical research thus has been and remained the point of departure, 
and is indeed seen as sufficient for introducing a novel way of perceiving identity, 
conflict, and social change. Also, the general relationship between identity and needs is 
well demonstrated through the historical events themselves (in Chapters 3 and 5). With 
regard to Chapters 4 and 6 on mobilisation, fieldwork and interviews may have 
provided added value, and it is of course hoped that the validity of the suggested 
framework will in the future be verified through such activities. The present thesis, 
however, must maintain some limits and thus excludes work that further tests or 
develops only one level of analysis of the overall framework. Other reasons for relying 
on secondary sources only include language considerations and the limited availability 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., 147. 
11
 Ibid., 18. 
12
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 109. 
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of primary (NGO-generated or other) sources, especially pertaining to the Sudanese 
case study. 
 
The Sudan: Identity and Mobilisation 
Chapter 3 examines the nature of collective identity and its power to direct collective 
behaviour in countries characterised by a low level of development, especially among 
groups suffering from physiological deprivation. The chapter examines the evolution of 
a Northern Sudanese identity before and after Sudanese independence in 1956 and the 
use of Islamic and pan-Arabic ideology by elites after independence and up to the 
1990s. The development of a Southern Sudanese group identity is also examined, from 
the pre-independence era to the first (1955-1972) and second (1983-2005) North-South 
civil wars. The particularities of the second civil war are described as central to the 
development of a Southern Sudanese identity. Indeed, as will be shown, it was the 
second North-South war which eventually led to Southern Sudanese independence in 
2011 and thus crystallised the creation of a new ingroup.  
 
The purpose of the chapter is to show that because of clear class differences in Sudanese 
society, Sudanese identity has remained indefinite. It will be shown that instead of 
relying on constant definitions of collective identity, the Sudanese elites have used 
various readings of Islam and Arabism as ideological tools to justify their relative 
gratification vis-à-vis the peripheral tribes, and that the extent to which elite-created 
ideologies were adopted by peripheral tribes correlates with their class position in the 
overall structure. Since the peripheries of the Sudan have not benefited from the 
national needs strategy, tribes have largely retained their traditional strategies for needs 
provision and thus also their traditional identities, or in cases where traditional strategies 
have collapsed altogether, looked for new, alternative identities. The continuous 
physiological deprivation experienced by the Southern peoples in particular compelled 
them to mobilise against the North and look for alternative group affiliations capable of 
addressing the cause of deprivation. Sudanese history thus suggests that on the lower 
needs levels, collective identities do not have the power to direct collective action. 
Instead, collective identities are adopted and abandoned depending on whether they are 
experienced as helpful or unhelpful from the perspective of collective survival. 
 
11 
 
Chapter 4 subsequently describes the dynamics of mobilisation for collective violence 
in physiological/security deprivation. The chapter concentrates on describing the nature 
of mobilisation of rebel groups during the second North-South civil war, in particular 
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) led by John Garang and the 
rival rebel movement SPLA-United led by Riek Machar. The leadership styles of the 
respective leaders will also be studied so as to determine which leadership type is 
conducive to cohesive collective action in physiological and security deprivation. As a 
comparison, the mobilisation of government troops is also examined. While not enough 
data is available on the behaviour of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the chapter will 
briefly examine the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and tribal militias, both of which 
fought against the South in the second civil war and against other African tribes in the 
Darfur conflict (from 2003 onwards). 
 
The chapter describes the mobilisation of the Southern rebels as a natural and automatic 
response to the absence of functioning needs strategies in the South. As rebel 
testimonies and the intertribal war between the two sections of the SPLA attest, people 
suffering from physiological deprivation tend to be unconcerned with political ideology, 
and their primary aim is to guarantee continued needs fulfilment through collective 
violence if necessary. It will be shown that since physiological deprivation predisposes 
individuals to accept various leaders and group affiliations based on their capacity to 
further needs fulfilment, the difficulty lies not in mobilising people but in forcing their 
attentions towards a particular opponent. A cohesive collective movement can 
consequently be built only by leaders who possess superior coercive and material 
capabilities. The behaviour of the PDF and the tribal militias also suggests that 
relatively gratified groups participating in violence are mainly motivated by needs 
fulfilment, although justificatory ideologies are more likely to be used. The nature of 
mobilisation thus seems to change slightly as one moves from physiological deprivation 
to higher levels of needs fulfilment. 
 
Yugoslavia and the Serbs: Identity and Mobilisation 
Chapter 5 examines the nature of collective identity and its power to direct collective 
behaviour in countries characterised by a relatively high level of development and 
among groups suffering primarily from status deprivation. The chapter describes the 
history of Yugoslavism and Serbian identity, and also, briefly, the development of 
12 
 
Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian identities in the early 1990s when these peoples 
declared independence. Since only the mobilisation of the Serbs will be investigated in 
chapter 6, Serbian history is the focus. The aim is to show that in status PRD, collective 
identity has much persuasive power and can be used by leaders to define mass interests, 
although it can be used only temporarily to prevent the masses from achieving the status 
level. For example, the history of Yugoslavism shows how national identity and 
(Communist) ideology could both be used to define collective interests, but also 
demonstrates that national identity prevailed because it offered superior opportunities 
for status fulfilment. 
 
The goal of the chapter is to show that in status deprivation, the nature of change and 
intergroup relations depends on the interaction between leader personality and the 
history of collective identity. The capacity to manipulate the masses seems strongest in 
groups  ith a history of conflict and violence  ith ‘Others,’ as  as the case  ith 
Serbia. The past experience of physiological and security PRD when a group has 
already been in existence for some time provides ample material for leader manipulation 
even after a desired status level has been achieved. With such historical material, 
leaders can create an illusion of continued existential threat and hide real class relations 
from sight – and thus justify their continued authoritarianism. It will be shown that in 
the case of Serbia and Croatia, such historical material was ample, causing leaders to 
promote competitive rather than cooperative intergroup relations. In the case of 
Slovenia on the other hand, such material was limited, which may have persuaded the 
Slovenian leadership to respect the desire of the masses to move onto achieving status 
level needs through independence and cooperation with Western Europe. 
 
The power of historical identity to direct perceptions regarding group interest does not, 
however, mean that it also has the power to mobilise people into collective violence. 
Chapter 6 seeks to clarify this by examining the behaviour of Serbian, Croatian, and 
Bosnian Serbs from the late 1980s until the end of Yugoslav wars (1991-1995). It 
explores the behaviour of Serb politicians in Serbia (especially Slobodan  Milošević), 
Croatia (Jovan Rašković and Milan Babić), and Bosnia (Radovan Karadžić); of the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the various paramilitary groups; and the masses. 
The aim of the chapter is to illustrate that triggering collective violence in the context of 
status deprivation is difficult indeed. Violence on this level cannot be said to be 
13 
 
objectively rational since it tends to erode the existing needs strategy and thus decrease, 
rather than improve, the chances of needs fulfilment. This explains why violence tends 
to be a top-down process triggered by elites interested in clinging onto relatively 
gratifying status roles. Despite the manipulation carried out by the elites, voluntary 
mobilisation among the masses remained low well into the conflict and violence was 
initially carried out only by individuals directly benefiting from it. Even on the higher 
levels of needs fulfilment, therefore, collective violence can be said to be a largely 
rational and material pursuit, albeit for a limited number of people. 
 
Summary 
Since the thesis of this dissertation addresses various levels of analysis – the individual, 
the group, and the system – it inevitably investigates various hypotheses. However, 
since the purpose is to link the various levels of analysis, the group and system-level 
hypotheses depend on the individual-level hypothesis. The main hypothesis is thus that 
individuals' identification with groups and leaders is flexible on the lower needs levels 
and more lasting on the higher needs levels, and that leadership, to be adaptive, must on 
the lower needs levels be action-oriented and on the higher levels be relations-oriented. 
On the group level, the hypothesis reads that due to this pattern of individual 
identification, cohesive collective action and violence in physiological deprivation 
requires coercive leadership to make up for the absence of unity, while on the status 
level collective violence requires manipulative leadership to make up for the absence of 
real deprivation. On the system level, the hypothesis reads that since the dynamics of 
collective action depend on the level of needs fulfilment and identification, change in 
the system can only be understood by examining all three levels of analysis. Using these 
hypotheses as a basis, conflicting theories on each level of analysis will be reconciled 
and comprehensive frameworks of identification, collective mobilisation, and systemic 
evolution created. 
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1. Needs, Identity, and Leadership: The Synthesis 
 
 
This chapter presents some of the theoretical literature regarding needs, identity, and 
leadership and suggests a novel framework for understanding the relationship between 
these concepts. The nature of collective identity and leadership, it is argued, tends to 
change according to the needs level as a result of the psychological mechanisms 
connected to collective and individual survival. On the lower needs levels, identity 
tends to be more immediate and flexible in nature, while leadership tends to be action-
oriented. When deprivation occurs at the higher needs levels, identification with groups 
and leaders depends more on tradition and ideology. The focus of this chapter is to 
present collective identity not as a fixed concept but as a mechanism which varies 
according to collective perception regarding environmental threat and scarcity. While 
the chapter is largely based on psychological and sociological theoretical deduction, it 
can be read together with the case study Chapters 3 and 5, which further illustrate the 
differences in identity and leader processes in societies characterised by low and high 
needs fulfilment respectively. 
 
The first section of this chapter tackles the question of how basic human needs are 
defined according to different versions of needs theory. More importantly, it challenges 
a hierarchy that includes “needs”  hich can better be understood as  echanis s or as 
feelings. It thus proposes a simple three-level hierarchy stripped of complex and 
misleading concepts. The second section unites theories of basic needs with theories of 
identity found in social psychology, suggesting a model that gives ontological priority 
to needs and challenging the inclusion of belonging and group identification as a need. 
As will be shown, identification is primarily concerned with perception and 
categorisation, while the level of needs fulfilment (the realistic aspect) affects the 
individual and collective readiness to adopt new perceptions through the creation of 
stress. The third section proposes a similar theoretical correlation between needs levels 
and types of leadership. It is important to note that the aim of the chapter is only to 
present a framework of identification. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the synthesis does 
not directly translate into a theory of collective behaviour, although it can serve as a 
foundation. 
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1.1. The Hierarchy of Human Needs 
 
While many versions of a needs hierarchy have been postulated throughout the past 
century, the  ost  idely applied continues to be Maslo ’s universal needs hierarchy.1 
According to Maslow, humans must satisfy their basic physiological needs, such as 
eating and sleeping, before they can concentrate on fulfilling their safety needs 
(stability, freedom from fear) and subsequently their needs for belonging and love, then 
self-esteem, and ultimately self-actualisation (acquiring knowledge and understanding), 
as well as aesthetic needs. In this theory, one needs level must be mostly satisfied before 
the individual’s cognitive capacities and attention can turn to the fulfil ent of the next 
need on the hierarchy. According to Maslo , the higher needs are “less urgent” and 
“less perceptible, less unmistakable,  ore easily confounded  ith other needs.”2 
Although Maslow recognizes that most action is motivated by several needs 
simultaneously, one will be dominant.
3
 
 
Universal Needs and Cultural Wants 
Maslo ’s theory has been  idely criticised yet is also  idely used. In psychological 
circles, debates regarding the importance and location of various needs within the 
hierarchy continue unabated, without firm or verifiable conclusions being reached.
4
 One 
can, however, detect in the various applications and elaborations of the hierarchy a 
series of problems. Perhaps most fundamental is the continuing confusion between 
needs and wants.
5
 This dissertation adopts the position that needs are universal, 
applicable to all human beings in all cultures, while wants are culturally determined 
means of fulfilling basic needs. As an example, Western women wanting slim bodies 
and Hawaiian women wanting heavier ones are cultural wants serving the universal 
(though perhaps evolving) need of attracting men (or need to procreate).
6
 Similarly, 
accumulating money constitutes one of the prevailing global wants serving the need for 
                                                          
1
 Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 2
nd
 ed.  (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
2
 Ibid., 57. 
3
 Ibid., 29. 
4
 For recent debates, see for example Douglas T. Kenrick, Vladas Griskevicius, Steven L. Neuberg and 
Mark Schaller, “Renovating the Pyra id of Needs: Contemporary Extensions Built on Ancient 
Foundations,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5, no. 3 (2010), 292-314, as well as responses in the 
same issue. Various criticisms and expansions of the needs hierarchy exist, developed mostly in the 
1980s, but they are too narrow to be relevant for this study. 
5
 This aspect of need theories is extensively discussed in Katrin Lederer, ed., Human Needs: A 
Contribution to the Current Debate (Cambridge, MA: Oegelschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980). 
6
 R. Murray Thomas, Human Development Theories: Windows on Culture (London: Sage, 1990), 70. 
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status, as well as being the means toward obtaining other safety and physiological 
needs. Few theorists distinguish between needs and wants, which thus confuses the 
universal with the cultural. 
 
The confusion between needs and wants has led to the following inaccuracy: that 
because needs are not constant across cultures, human development can be categorised 
as either “advanced,” having reached higher levels of the needs hierarchy, or 
“pri itive.” In this vein, both Marx and Parsons famously assumed that through 
socioeconomic development, needs multiply.
7
  However, both men are actually talking 
about wants rather than needs. Their confusion, and resulting conclusions, has  impeded 
a proper understanding of universal human needs. As Galtung wrote in 1980, 
“develop ent, then,  ould be seen as a process of progressively satisfying human 
needs,  here the  ord ‘progressively’  ould stand for both ‘ ore and  ore needs 
di ensions’ and ‘at higher and higher levels.’”8 This idea is firmly rejected here: 
whatever human needs are, they can by definition be fulfilled in any functioning society, 
 hether  odern or “pri itive.” Development does not amount to advancement on the 
needs hierarchy but rather to an increase in the efficiency of fulfilling needs on all 
levels. This confusion is one of the major flaws of both needs and development theories, 
and has probably been a major source of the arrogance seen in the some Western 
theories of modernisation.
9
 
 
Various hierarchies 
The second major problem of needs theories is the continuing assumption that if a 
hierarchy exists, a complex set of different kinds of needs can be placed within that 
same hierarchy. Most importantly, needs for love and sex, serving the reproductive 
mechanism, are combined with needs for security and status or esteem, which serve 
group survival in general. The rather personal desires for (romantic) love and sex (the 
intensity of which largely varies between individuals) simply cannot be located within 
                                                          
7
 See in particular  Ra ashray Roy, “Hu an Needs and Freedo : Liberal, Marxist, and Gandhian 
Perspectives,” in Katrin Lederer, Human Needs, 191-212; also, Parsons talks about specialised needs, 
 hich could be understood as  ants: Leon H. Mayhe , “Introduction” in Talcott Parsons, ed.d. Leon 
Mayhew, On Institutions and Social Evolution:  Selected Writings (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1982), 44. 
8
 Johan Galtung, “The Basic Needs Approach,” in Lederer, Human Needs, 58. 
9
 Maslo  hi self argued that “higher needs require better outside conditions to  ake the  possible.” 
(Maslow, Human Needs,  99). This statement, of course, can be interpreted in both a culturally arrogant 
and a neutral manner. 
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the same hierarchy as collective security and status needs. The reason is their different 
purposes: the sexual needs further the survival of the species through time by giving rise 
to reproduction,  hile security and status needs are the prerequisites of a ‘good life.’ 
The same mislabelling applies to developmental and constant adult needs. Parental love 
as a developmental need may be essential for the proper psychological development of a 
child, yet no such need is clearly present once a person has reached adulthood. Although 
needs theories have never been more than mere hypothetical foundations for larger 
theories and understandings of human nature, it is somewhat surprising that theorists 
continue to classify  holly disparate ‘needs’ under the sa e hierarchy  ithout 
considering the different functions they serve. 
 
Needs versus Mechanisms and Feelings 
The third major problem of the needs hierarchy is the confusion between needs and 
basic biological or psychological mechanisms serving those needs on one hand, and 
between needs and feelings, on the other. Belonging, or group identification, is accepted 
by most need theorists
10
 as well as social psychologists
11
 to be a need, even though it 
can equally be understood as a mechanism of needs fulfilment (an approach developed 
in the follo ing section). So eti es identity is considered a “higher,” “non- aterial” 
need, which is fulfilled only after basic physiological needs are satisfied.
12
 However, if 
belonging or collective identity is a “higher need,” ho  can  e explain the increased 
separation of individual human beings from the group in so-called developed societies, 
leading to  hat Durkhei  called “ano ie”13 and Marx “alienation”14? If 
belonging/collective identity is a “need,”  hy does it  ork, as is sho n belo , 
differently on different needs levels? As is explained in more detail in the next section 
of this chapter, the confusion of a mechanism with real needs may derive from the 
observable correlation between the level of needs fulfilment and the way the mechanism 
functions. As the case studies illustrate, the more efficient needs fulfilment, the less 
                                                          
10
 In Lederer (1980), every single author discussing belonging or affiliation considers it to belong into the 
needs hierarchy. One of the fe  theorists arguing against such an understanding is Paul Sites, “Needs as 
Analogues of E otions,” in Conflict: Human Needs Theory, ed. John Burton, (Hampshire & London: 
MacMillan, 1990), 7-33. 
11
 See the following section and Social Identity Theory in particular. 
12
 The distinction between material and non-material needs has been made, for example by Galtung. See 
Johan Galtung, “International Develop ent in Hu an Perspective,” in Burton, Conflict: Human Needs 
Theory, 301-305. 
13
 Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, 353-373. 
14
 See in particular Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts  of 1984 (New York: 
International Publishers, 1964). 
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volatile collective identities tend to be. It is this permanence which creates the illusion 
of identity existing on a ‘higher’ level of existence. 
 
There is also widespread confusion regarding the difference between the needs 
themselves and the feelings of satisfaction resulting from needs fulfilment. In particular, 
status needs are co  only confused  ith the  ‘need’ for  eaning and estee .15 While 
the need for status is a real need whose fulfilment enables the individual to lead a 
purposeful life, esteem and meaning only constitute feelings that result from successful 
status fulfilment. The same applies to the concept of belonging, which can be 
understood not only as the mechanism of collective identity (examined below) but also 
as a feeling. The feeling of belonging is a result of successful security-level needs 
fulfilment, which in turn is closely connected to the existence of an ingroup of some 
kind. Belonging itself, however, is not the original need. The real need is the security 
provided by the group, for it is this security, and not the feeling of belonging, which 
allows for the individual to achieve higher levels of needs fulfilment and promote group 
survival. The satisfaction brought about by feelings of belonging and meaning certainly 
drive needs fulfilment, but should not be confused with the real need for security. 
 
The difference between feeling and real need is important to grasp for one simple 
reason: concentrating on feeling rather than on need tends to emphasise the individual 
and his personal well-being over that of the group. This emphasis is invalid, for the 
whole purpose of basic needs is to ensure the survival of the human race. While feelings 
of belonging and meaning drive and motivate individual beings, they do so for the 
purpose of satisfying the various human needs, which in turn serve the entire species 
rather than the one individual. The false emphasis on individual feeling has led some 
needs and modernisation theorists to go as far as to focus only on the supposed need of 
self-actualisation,
16
 often also called the ‘need’ for freedo  or autono y,17 which 
existing structures allegedly serve. Such theories emphasising one level of needs only 
are certainly not wrong per se, but they fail to explain the dynamics of human existence 
as a whole. Concentrating on alleged ‘needs,’ such as autono y or freedo , again 
                                                          
15
 Most needs theorists use the terms interchangeably with status, including Maslow himself.  
16
 Such as Kurt Goldstein; see Oscar Nudler, “Hu an Needs: A Sophisticated Approach,” in Lederer, 
Human Needs, 141. 
17
 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human 
Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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confuses the universal and cultural aspects of needs versus wants. As we have seen, it 
can be difficult to distinguish between needs and cultural wants – so can we be sure that 
individualism is not merely a cultural manifestation of status needs rather an ultimate, 
pre-eminent need itself? If we are to believe the latter, we would move away from the 
idea of needs as tools for species survival into the realm of human emancipation, a 
different issue altogether. 
 
The Three Levels 
Following the idea that needs fulfillment serves the basic function of group survival 
rather than reifying some culturally constructed moral ideals (such as individualism), a 
three-level needs hierarchy is proposed. Like any other needs theory, it is based on 
empirical observation combined with personal intuition, yet it aims to address the 
problems stated above. Only needs serving societal survival are  included, while 
feelings and mechanisms, as well as needs pertaining to reproduction (e.g. love), are 
excluded. The first, lowest level of the hierarchy comprises the generally accepted basic 
physiological needs such as eating, drinking, and shelter – the basic prerequisites of 
survival. The second level consists of security needs, including Maslo ’s needs for 
safety, stability, and freedom from fear. This level logically supposes the existence of a 
community capable of providing feelings of security, a kind of safety net against 
environmental threats. Depending on the level of development, and to an extent on 
cultural factors, this community can be anything from a tribe to a national social welfare 
system. The third level comprises status needs, including the need for a person to 
acquire a satisfactory role in the relevant ingroup/community so as to best contribute to 
the functioning of that community.
18
 
 
As already mentioned, needs are not independent but culture-dependent, and their 
fulfilment is always connected to the surrounding societal system into which an 
individual is born. While there is little cultural variety in the fulfilment of physiological 
needs except for the types of food and habitation available, the influence of cultural and 
psychological factors increases at the higher needs levels.
19
 Many different societal 
arrangements can fulfil the felt need for security. The fulfilment of status needs too 
                                                          
18
 According to Maslow , the higher the need in question, the higher the relevance of individual 
personality; see Maslow, Motivation and Personality, Chapter 2. 
19
 See further Maslow, Motivation and Personality, Chapter 2, on the cultural specificity of needs and the 
various personal tendencies in needs fulfilment.  
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depends on the group culture, in addition to being intimately connected to individual 
personality and abilities. Physiological and security needs are relatively similar among 
all individuals, but status fulfilment depends on the ability of the individual to discover 
and develop his/her own particular abilities and these abilities to be recognized by the 
group.
20
 It is important to recognise that this applies to all societies; the Durkheimian 
division of labour
21
 may be more complex in modern societies, yet it also characterises 
pre-modern groups. Even if specialisation is not as advanced in small, secluded 
societies as in large global ones, individuals always seek to adopt a role which best 
corresponds to their abilities, whatever the type of environment in which they live. 
 
Like many other mammalian communities, human societies are made up of hierarchies 
which come into existence as individuals compete for social status roles.
22
 This 
competition occurs exclusively on the status level, and in ideal circumstances, the extent 
of individual social mobility is determined according to his or her individual abilities, 
resulting in a system where the most able individuals occupy the most challenging roles 
in all fields of expertise. As already noted, although status needs are ‘higher’ needs, 
within the nature of the needs hierarchy they are inferior in importance and depend on 
the fulfilment of physiological and security needs. Thus, for example, in a developing 
country, fulfilling physiological needs may necessitate a status role shift from being a 
distinguished ethnic pastoralist to an anonymous entrepreneur in an urban centre where 
ethnicity becomes irrelevant but physiological survival is more certain. The status role 
thus follows the more basic needs: roles are chosen according to their perceived value in 
ensuring basic physical survival rather than for any ‘need’ of belonging to a particular 
group. This ontological precedence of physiological needs is essential to understanding 
the nature of identity and the primacy of needs over identities, which is discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
The needs hierarchy used in this work is presented in Table 1.1. As can be seen, while 
needs and feelings resulting from needs fulfilment are universal and absolute, and thus 
                                                          
20
 Maslo ’s “self-actualisation” can be understood as being included in the concept of status used in the 
present model. 
21
 See for example  Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society,  transl. George Simpson (Glencoe, 
Ill: The Free Press, 1935). 
22
 Maslow calls this social dominance and believes that every person should be free to become what his 
personal identity suggests – hence the demand for free competition. As Eisenstadt would argue, the 
emphasis of competition has of course changed from raw power to intelligence: S.E. Eisenstadt, 
Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 
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constitute the basis of the subsequent chapters, wants can vary significantly depending 
on the level of development and the overall nature of society. It should be mentioned 
that when discussing different levels of needs, ‘higher’ or ‘lo er’ needs are often 
referred to. Given that the requirement of fulfilling a lower need before a higher is not 
absolute, there can be situations which are difficult to define strictly by needs fulfilment 
of one or the other level. Consequently, “higher needs levels” should be understood as 
co prising the area bet een security and status needs, and “lo er needs levels” as 
comprising the area between physiological and security needs fulfilment.  
 
Table 1.1: Human Needs and Corresponding Wants and Feelings 
 
NEEDS WANTS, 
developing society 
(narrow division of 
labour) 
WANTS, 
modern society 
(complex division of 
labour) 
Feelings 
resulting 
from needs 
satisfaction 
Physiological 
Needs 
food, shelter food, shelter (often of a 
rather elaborate level) 
Basic 
physiological 
satisfaction 
Security 
Needs 
efficient food 
production, territorial 
and natural resources, 
tribal defence 
functioning welfare 
system and national 
defence  
Belonging 
Status Needs 
(largely 
culturally 
determined) 
One of few 
agricultural or 
pastoral roles, 
accumulation of 
cattle/money 
One of several working 
roles depending on 
personal ability; 
accumulation of money 
and possessions 
Meaning, 
Esteem 
 
 
1.2. Identification and the Needs Levels 
 
Although scarcity is often taken as the basis for human behaviour,
23
 identification as a 
tool for agency capable of rectifying experienced scarcity has hardly been examined. 
Relatively simple and contradictory accounts of identity still govern the theoretical 
literature, describing identity either as a functional ability subject to rational choice or as 
a means of categorising the self in the world, often leading to an illusion of some innate 
“need” to distinguish oneself fro  others (the tendency of course exists, but it is not a 
need in the sense used in this chapter). The debate on the nature of collective identity 
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 This is especially the case in theories of conflict, see further Chapter 2. 
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exists within social psychology as well as in the social and political sciences more 
generally. To be able to address the problem in the context of conflict and IR theory 
(Chapters 2 and 7), we must first examine the psychological theories of group 
identification and find a way in which they can be reconciled. It will be argued that 
identification should be seen as a complex mechanism through which people categorise 
social reality but which also enables collective action and cooperation aimed at ensuring 
individual and collective survival, the latter being the basis of the former. In fact, these 
two aspects of collective identity, perception and function, cannot be meaningfully 
separated. Understanding identification not as a need but as a mechanism also allows 
one to perceive how it functions in different ways depending on the level of needs 
fulfilment or deprivation. 
 
The Realistic Conflict Theory 
In social psychology, two main theories address the causes of group identification and 
intergroup bias: the realistic (group) conflict theory (RCT) and the now more popular 
social identity theory (SIT), often read together with self-categorisation theory. The 
RCT advocated by Sherif
24
 is the more materialistic of the two and maintains that 
intergroup conflict is caused by the protection of and struggle for real ingroup interests. 
According to RCT, individuals form groups when they deem it useful in attaining 
objectives.
25
 Bias and conflict are most likely to be triggered when two groups compete 
over what they perceive to be limited resources. Thus, bias and conflict can be seen to 
precede and explain the creation of group identity. The argument of RCT is similar to 
that of rational action theory in sociology, which emphasises the rational and 
individualistic motivations of people, and to the arguments of various sociologists and 
conflict theorists such as Coser, who argues that group cohesion correlates with 
intergroup conflict.
26
 In the field of IR, the RCT is theoretically closest to realism, 
which tends to see cooperation, alliance-formation, and conflict as strategies chosen by 
rational actors according to real, objectively knowable group interests and values – the 
true ‘national interest.’ 
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 Muzafer Sherif, Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology (London: Routledge and 
Kegan, 1966), see also H. Blu er, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position,” Pacific Sociological 
Review 1, no. 1 (1958): 3-7; R.A. Levin and D.T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic 
Attitudes, and Group Behavior (NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1972). 
25
 Sherif, Group Conflict, 2. 
26
 Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1956). 
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RCT assumes perfect knowledge of real interests, ignoring the role of various possible 
perceptions regarding such interests within the community. However, contrary to such a 
realist position, it has been found that even imaginary inequalities can result in bias or 
violence,  hile ‘real’ conflicts of interest  ay in fact be accepted and felt to be 
justifiable by both parties.
27
 The reality of the conflict does therefore not automatically 
translate into common perceptions about a given situation. Reality, even if correctly 
perceived, does also not always result in objectively rational decision-making. Thus 
RCT cannot account for seemingly irrational decisions by group members, such as self-
jeopardising altruism or the escalation of intergroup conflict beyond what is strictly 
necessary for ensuring common interests or needs fulfilment. Group identification is 
thus undoubtedly subject to dynamics that go well beyond the understanding of any 
realist. Indeed, Sherif eventually concedes that the mere perception of a competitive 
situation may suffice to strengthen group cohesion and intergroup prejudice, eventually 
leading to hostility.
28
 Although Sherif fails to explain how such a perception may come 
into being, this concession suggests that RCT need not be as rational or realistic as 
originally intended. 
 
Social Identity Theory and the Functions of Identity 
Social Identity Theory (SIT), created by Tajfel and Turner
29
 and further defined by 
Hogg and others,
30
 is wholly opposed to the idea that intergroup bias requires anything 
resembling a real conflict of interests to come into being. As SIT theorists point out, 
small group experiments have established that intergroup bias is immediate as soon as 
individuals have been separated into groups and after having been given tasks related to 
resource allocation. Although groups with some alleged common trait show stronger 
intergroup bias, even groups defined randomly allocate more resources to the ingroup 
than to the outgroup. This, for the SIT theorist, proves that identification and bias are 
innate and automatic. In addition, groups do not seek the absolute maximum profit for 
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 H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict” in The Social Psychology of 
Intergroup Relations, eds. W.G: Austin and S. Worchel , (Monterey, CA: Brooks/ Cole, 1979). 
28
 Sherif, Group Conflict, 13. 
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 Tajfel and Turner, “An Integrative Theory.”  
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 See for example Michael A. Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to 
Social Identity (He el He pstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); Hogg, “Social Identity and Social 
Co parison” in Handbook of Social Comparison: Theory and Research, eds. J. Suls and L.Wheeler, 
(New York: Kluwer/Plenum, 2000); Hogg, “Social Identity and the Sovereignty of the Group: A 
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the ingroup but rather the maximum difference in allocations. The SIT thus brings in the 
dynamics of Otherness into the picture, where merely belonging to a group perceived to 
be different, rather than actual differences, has an independent effect on group 
 e bers’ behaviour. 
 
According to SIT, individuals identify with groups and exhibit intergroup bias due to 
their need to establish or maintain a positive self-concept through belonging to groups, 
allowing for feelings of positive distinctiveness. SIT is the most widely applied theory 
of identity in modern social psychology, yet like the RCT, it can be seen as theoretically 
problematic. First, the functional aspects of identification cannot be ignored. The fact 
that all small group experiments include an element of function underlines this idea: in 
all experiments, there is present either the function of allocation of resources or the 
expectation of some function when the test objects are divided into groups. Without 
being prompted, individuals do not generally create biased collective identities, and will 
instead react to others on an individual, personal basis. The function-aspect of collective 
identity is also reflected in Tajfel’s argu ent that a particular group identity  ill be 
maintained only for as long as it provides feelings of belonging and value.
31
 Thus, it is 
possible that some identities do not provide such value, and that the individual 
sometimes has a choice in adopting identities. In fact, choosing identities according to 
their material, functional benefits is the norm rather than the exception. 
 
Tajfel also addresses the question of the personal-collective continuum of action, where 
at one end reigns personal identity and the free competition for roles through social 
mobility, and at the other end social identity, deindividuation, and collectively initiated 
social change dominate. The continuum clearly points towards the importance of 
identity serving  ultiple hu an needs rather than only a ‘need’ for belonging. If needs 
of any level cannot be achieved through an individual effort, group identification and 
collective action comes into play. People tend to rely on their ingroup especially when 
basic physiological needs fulfillment is so challenging as to necessitate continuous 
collective action or when the group comes under threat. Identification creates a feeling 
of security through increasing the individual’s faith in the possibility of effectively 
addressing potential threats to needs fulfillment on various levels. Thus, although SIT 
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theorists often equate identification  ith the ‘need’ to belong, the ulti ate source of 
identification is needs fulfillment. 
 
Categorisation and Culture 
Unlike SIT originally suggested, group identification seems to be a mechanism rather 
than a need. Nevertheless, the SIT is of value in pointing out the importance of 
categorising the self and the world, issues that have also been developed by self-
categorization theory (SCT).
32
 This aspect of collective identity highlights the value of 
ingroup unity through time. Where intergroup boundaries remain unchanged for long 
periods of time due to the success of ingroup needs fulfilment, clear group cultures and 
behavioural norms develop. In such stable conditions, group members are likely to feel 
most satisfied in terms of basic needs, belonging, and meaning. Belief in the value of 
the group's long-term collective-action strategy regarding future needs fulfilment allows 
(in the words of SCT) one to know and understand the self as well as reduce uncertainty 
relating to the self. However, given that the necessity of needs fulfilment is always prior 
to the psychological  echanis s it has given rise to, this ‘kno ing oneself’ is also 
functional, a ounting to kno ledge of ho  to best fulfil one’s basic needs. Si ilarly, if 
the group strategy collapses while the individual depends on it for survival, the 
individual will suffer not only from the uncertainty of how to survive, but also from the 
uncertainty of the self: which group one belongs to and what useful status role one 
might adopt. 
 
The knowledge of oneself, and the understanding of the world which comes into being 
in such a rewarding collective-action system, has also been called ontological security.
33
 
The downside of this culture and group-dependent ontological security and 
understanding is the tendency to attach oneself into the existing group and the solutions 
it provides. Especially successful, long-term group cultures, with clear rules regarding 
needs fulfilment, tend to influence the perceptions of group members even after the 
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given group structure no longer, objectively thinking, serves their needs. Understanding 
the categorising effect of collective identity thus brings perception into the picture. 
While the realist-oriented RCT seems to suggest that awareness of collective interests is 
automatic and corresponds to reality, this is not the case on the higher needs levels. Bias 
does not depend on real collective interests, but on their perception. Consequently, in a 
situation in which people are (traditionally, culturally) predisposed to believing in the 
value of existing borders and categories, it may be difficult to convince them otherwise. 
 
Collective identity can perhaps be best perceived as having both a cognitive and 
realistic side. The long-term cognitive side, reflected in SIT and SCT, and the needs-
serving realistic side, reflected in RCT, can be likened to core and situational 
identities.
34
 Core identities are relatively constant across time and give rise to 
understanding and feelings of security rather than to bias. Core identities come into 
being through continued categorisation, when group boundaries do not change through 
needs fulfilment and when the existing boundaries serve the individuals satisfactorily. 
The mechanistic aspects of group identification, on the other hand, can be likened with 
situational identities, which change and react to threats in the environment and can 
result in new core identities. Situational identities arise from the necessities created by 
needs deprivation (as will be further described in the case studies) and can, through time 
and common effort, surpass pre-existing core identities. Thus, having collective core 
identities merely affirms the existence of the social self, while situational identities 
explain social change. It is this i portant distinction of identification as a ‘need’ or a 
mechanism which underlies the debates between SIT/categorisation theory and RCT. 
 
The Realism of Identity: Stress 
In understanding the relationship between the rational and cognitive elements of 
collective identity, it is essential to discover the ultimate foundation of the difference. 
The foundation can be found in the mechanism of stress and anxiety. The level of stress 
can be seen to depend on the level of needs fulfilment/deprivation of the group as a 
whole, which in turn may lead to different types of identity dynamics in individuals and 
groups experiencing different levels of needs fulfilment: realistic identification on the 
lower needs levels and more permanent categorisation on the higher level. This, in turn, 
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affects group dynamics as a whole. Phenomena such as conformity to group opinion
35
 
(even against individual perception and reason), obedience to authorities (even where 
action goes against one’s o n personal convictions),36 polarisation of opinions,37 the 
rise of extremism and risk-taking behaviour
38
 within the ingroup, and scapegoating
39
 of 
outgroups may accordingly differ on the different needs levels. Although these 
phenomena are sometimes taken to constitute proof of the accuracy of SIT and SCT, 
and of the supposed ‘need’ to feel superior to others, the  ay in  hich environ ental 
factors such as severe deprivation may affect these has obviously not been examined by 
social psychologists.
40
 Indeed, given that no direct correlation between identification 
and bias has been found,
41
 one might benefit from always taking into account the level 
of stress when evaluating group dynamics. 
 
Stress has been found to have various effects on an individual’s cognitive and e otional 
state. Most importantly, it reduces the capacity for task-oriented and problem-solving 
action.
42
 It consequently makes individuals more susceptible to persuasion than the 
average person.
43
 Anxious individuals are also more inclined towards group processes 
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such as stereotypical thinking and bias
44
 and are more likely than others to accept 
immediate and simplistic solutions to their situation, accepting the solutions and 
authority offered by charismatic
45
 or authoritarian leaders
46
  simply to limit feelings of 
stress.
47
 Stress is lowered by positive group identification
48
 and therefore may lead to 
increased readiness to create groups with identity-content addressing the source of 
stress. Once a group identity has been adopted, stress also increases the strength of 
intergroup bias. Inducing stress through the manipulation of the capacities and arousal 
of participants has been found to intensify group phenomena such as compliance,
49
 
conformity,
50
 message processing,
51
 and stereotyping.
52
 Consequently, when group 
membership successfully addresses the causes of severe stress and deprivation, it tends 
to lead to a high level of deindividuation. 
 
While it seems clear that severe stress leads to easy identification, little is known about 
the effects of stress experienced on the different levels of needs fulfilment. It seems 
reasonable to assume that physiological deprivation causes more stress than security-
level or status-level deprivation and thus leads to higher susceptibility to proposed 
identities and authorities. Therefore, two hypotheses arise: on one hand, identification 
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with groups and leaders on the lower needs levels is easier compared to higher levels of 
needs fulfilment, where identification is harder to achieve; on the other, in very severe 
physiological deprivation identification may also be rather superficial compared to 
higher levels of needs fulfilment. This is because severe physical and ontological 
insecurity causes individuals to more readily seek alternative leaders, groups, and 
strategies capable of rectifying the experienced deprivation, potentially resulting in 
rapidly changing group affiliations. One can hypothesise that also at the opposite end of 
the spectrum, in the complete absence of deprivation, the power of group dynamics also 
declines. Perhaps only in the middle of the hierarchy, therefore, the balance between 
stress and perception is such that existing group boundaries are constantly reaffirmed, 
creating the illusion of an enduring collective identity and the ‘need to belong.’ 
 
Acknowledging the role of stress helps to understand the realistic aspects of 
identification and thus can fill the lacuna present in SIT. Although it is not true that real 
inequalities between groups translate directly into conflict, the realistic aspects of 
conflict do influence identification by affecting the readiness of individuals to adopt 
certain perceptions and identities. On the lowest levels of needs fulfilment, stress is 
severe and the readiness to identify is high. Likewise, the readiness declines as stress 
declines, as one reaches higher levels of the needs hierarchy. Given that “stress only 
develops into a long-term problem when a threat to self is perceived to exist in 
conjunction with insufficient coping resources,”53 stress does not have equally 
immediate or violent effects on the higher needs levels. Rather than trying to find a 
direct link between stress and behaviour (in the style of frustration-aggression theory),
54
 
one must instead investigate the link between stress and the psychological patterns it 
causes within the functioning of collective identity, which in turn determine what types 
of behaviours are likely on each level of needs fulfilment. Depending on the dynamics 
at play, the individual may or may not choose to counter the threat to survival and assert 
the self through collective action, so as to restore ontological security. 
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Identification Revisited 
One can thus conclude that neither RCT nor SIT/SCT give a complete picture of the 
relationship between needs and collective identity. There are, in fact, two aspects to 
collective identification which are reflected in the two theories. One aspect is captured 
by RCT’s e phasis on the functional, needs-serving aspect of identification, which on 
the lower levels of needs fulfilment and through stress sometimes forces individuals to 
change their group identifications. Such processes are a reality in places of low needs 
security, as in the Sudan (Chapter 3). The other aspect is captured by SIT’s e phasis on 
the long-term categorising effect taking place in relative needs security, which in turn 
gives rise to a feeling of ontological security and enables the maintenance of long-term 
group identities. These persuasive long-term effects of groupness tend to be applicable 
in more developed countries, as in the former Yugoslavia (Chapter 5). These opposite 
aspects or functions of collective identity are set out in Table 1.2 below.  
 
However, one should remember that while the two theories reflect aspects of collective 
identity, they are also to some extent erroneous: RCT assumes that bias occurs only in 
realistic conflict, although bias in reality depends on perception. SIT assumes bias has 
nothing to do with realistic conflict, although the realistic aspects (stress) affect the 
readiness of individuals to adopt certain perceptions. It is this relationship between 
stress and perception that makes collective identity a flexible, rather than fixed, concept; 
the nature of collective identity, as well as the mechanism of identification, varies 
according to the level of needs fulfilment. In environments of high stress and severe 
deprivation, identities and ideologies are easily adopted and abandoned, sometimes 
resulting in significant and volatile changes in the intergroup structure. On higher needs 
levels, identities depend more on tradition and perception, and are less easily changed 
and more readily lead to permanent group cultures as well as intergroup stability. 
 
Table 1.2: The Two Faces of Collective Identity 
 
Type Functional/ Realistic 
(applicable in needs 
deprivation) 
Categorising/Innate 
(applicable in needs 
fulfilment) 
Theory RCT SIT/SCT 
Motivation Real (material) interests  Historical perception  
Mechanisms Stress processes Habit, group processes 
Effect Change Stability 
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1.3. Leadership on Different Needs Levels 
 
The above analysis argued that perceptions are influenced to a great extent by the 
tradition of successful, needs-fulfilling groupness. An equally important source of 
perception is the stress caused by the realistic aspects of conflict, which induce people 
to evaluate reality based less on tradition and more  on the inevitable fact of deprivation. 
A third source of perception not yet discussed is leadership – often the determining 
element in the battle between traditional and realistic group perceptions and the rise of 
new identities. The power of the leader to initiate or direct collective action operates 
through two mechanisms: practical organisation – more important, as we shall see, in 
the case of physiological deprivation – and perception-creation – more important on 
higher needs levels. Perception-creation can work in two ways: through raising the 
awareness of individuals regarding real class interests (which may differ from 
traditional group boundaries), thus giving rise to new (core) identities corresponding to 
(class) reality, and through the manipulation of existing or new identities so as to retain 
perceptions that do not correspond to the reality of the equality and/or inequality of 
needs fulfilment between groups. 
 
Practically all leadership theories accept that leadership exists to enable cohesive 
collective action for the purposes of goal achievement. Here, leadership is examined 
only from the perspective of the overall needs strategy adopted by the ingroup and 
large-scale social change, rather than from a vocational organisational perspective – 
even if findings in this field can also be useful. Thus, the definition of leadership created 
by McGregor Burns is followed, according to which leadership is a situation in which 
“persons  ith certain  otives and purposes  obilise, in co petition or conflict  ith 
others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, 
engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realise goals held 
 utually by both leaders and follo ers […]”55 As will be seen, leadership, like 
identification in general, functions in diverse manners on different levels of needs to 
enable collective agency. This section concentrates on identifying what leadership is, or 
should be, like on different needs levels to truly serve the needs of both leaders and 
followers. 
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Situational versus Transformational Leaders 
Leadership theories tend to emphasise the motivations and attributes of either the leader 
or the followers, or the functional or psychological connections between the leader and 
follo ers. Early ‘Great Man’ theories concentrated on the exceptional persona of the 
leader, giving little, if any, weight to the needs and interests of the followers. Thus, the 
course of events allegedly follo s not  ass interests but the decisions of ‘superior’ 
individuals. A completely opposite approach is taken by situational theories of 
leadership. For example, economic determinists in the Marxist tradition argue that 
leaders arise where the masses and their economic circumstances so demand (in other 
words through historical necessity) and have little opportunity to act on their own behalf 
or according to their own interests. Although these relatively simplistic theories are 
today widely criticised as explaining little, if anything,
56
 they do correlate with top-
down and bottom-up conflicts (investigated in more depth in the following chapter): 
depending on the underlying needs condition, either leaders or masses can play the 
leading role in social change. 
 
Recent theories have concentrated more on the relationship between the leader and 
follo ers. Hollander’s transactional  odel of leadership stresses the i portance of 
fairness and agreement on both sides, as “the leader gives things of value to follo ers 
such as a sense of direction, values, and recognition, and receives other things in return 
such as estee  and responsiveness.”57 Like Tyler’s legiti acy approach,58  this view of 
leadership is based on the converging interests of the individual and the leader, yet 
suffers fro  the proble  of “direction” and other ele ents being again seen  ore as 
fixed needs than as flexible mechanisms. In any case, it has been argued that 
transactional leadership is often insufficient to mobilise people in difficult conditions. 
Where circumstances are especially discouraging
59
 or where the activities are of moral 
significance,
60
 as opposed to being merely instrumental, transformational or charismatic 
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leadership is supposedly required. Only transformational leadership can change the 
motivation, understanding, and behaviour of the other members within the group.
61
 
 
Transformational leadership theory is important for understanding the relationship 
between needs and leadership. Burns has argued that this type of leadership allows 
followers to transcend their self-interests relating to low-level needs by placing more 
importance on group interests and higher-level needs and  obilising the “full person” 
of the follower.
62
 Transformational leaders are not simply organisers. Instead, they can 
create a strong following through the dissemination of novel ideologies and identities, 
and by creating in the followers a belief in the possibility of surpassing themselves and 
of initiating revolutionary change. Under inspiring leaders, followers accept increased 
risks.
63
 This “full person” approach suggests a special connection bet een leadership 
and status needs. Although obviously leadership is also needed to ensure physiological 
needs fulfil ent, leaders’  anipulative and ideological capacities see  to be  ore 
relevant on the higher levels of needs. 
 
Task versus Relations-oriented Leaders 
The difference bet een transfor ational and ‘ordinary’ leadership can be linked  ith 
contingency approaches to leadership, which distinguish between task-oriented and 
relationship-oriented leaders. These approaches argue that different types of leadership 
are required in different situations. Task-oriented leaders allegedly perform better under 
conditions of stress than relations-oriented leaders, while the latter perform better in 
stable situations.
64
 It thus makes sense to link different types of leadership to different 
levels of needs: if deprivation on low needs levels is most conducive to stress, then task-
oriented leaders are better on the lower levels of deprivation. On the higher levels, 
leaders need to be more relationship-oriented and ideology-oriented – in other words, 
transformational. The higher the level of needs, the less realistic the conflict may be 
perceived to be, and manipulative identification comes into play. Conversely, on low 
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needs levels, severe stress is sufficient for triggering collective action. Thus, little or no 
manipulation is needed. 
 
Evidence has already been given on how deprivation and stress render individuals more 
susceptible to group identification and various group processes. Inevitably, therefore, 
stress renders people more susceptible to becoming followers: followership feels 
rewarding because it brings structure
65
 and purpose into peoples’ lives  here the 
obstacles to needs fulfilment have eliminated hope for survival. Fear and anxiety causes 
the follo er to concentrate on the leader’s authoritarianis  rather than on the sensibility 
of his views,
66
 and therefore extremely stressful situations may lead to the acceptance of 
charismatic leaders
67
 or aggressive and radical leaders offering rapid solutions.
68
 The 
more urgent the situation, therefore, the more decisive, radical, and task-oriented 
leadership is likely to be accepted.
69
 In severe deprivation, the characteristics followers 
look for in leaders are strength, determination, and the ability to act. Thus, as Rosen 
argues, in conditions of general instability, tyrants are more than likely to do well.
70
 In 
contrast, on the higher levels of needs, individuals are likely to hold the leaders to 
higher standards, at least as regards the content of their ideology. 
 
The division between task and relations-oriented leaders can also be analysed from the 
perspective of charisma and prototypicality. Prototypical leaders are individuals whose 
positions correspond to the majority position of the group regarding its collective needs 
and wants,
71
 and whose opinions thus have great influence on group perceptions.
72
 
According to several leadership experts, charisma resides not in the person but in 
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whatever traits the leader shares with the ingroup as a whole.
73
 Charisma can equally be 
seen to depend on perceived fairness and caring of the leader towards group members.
74
 
It is thus possible to imagine that different types of leaders are perceived as charismatic 
on different levels of collective needs fulfilment, given that the collective concerns of 
the group vary significantly according to the needs level. 
 
According to the SIT leadership approach (SITL) created by Hogg and others,
75
 
charisma boils down to the psychological aspects of group membership; the link 
between group cohesion and prototypical and/or transformational leadership can be 
explained through the identity-enhancing capacities of certain kinds of leadership. 
Because leadership is connected to the self-conception of individuals, the “ability of the 
leader to be effective [is] a function of the extent to which group members identify with 
the group as an important aspect of their self-concept.”76 The more identity-enhancing 
the content of the group identity offered by the leader, the more unlikely it is that his/her 
perceived charisma will suffer from bad performance.
77
 This may be true, but again the 
SITL, like SIT in general, describes best the dynamics on the higher levels of needs 
fulfilment. Leaders refusing to address an emerging crisis always tend to be swiftly 
replaced.
78
 The difference between the needs levels is that in relative needs fulfilment, 
manipulation can be used to remind the group members of the usefulness of the group 
identity, while in severe deprivation the bad performance of the leader cannot be easily 
hidden. Charisma thus differs according to the level of needs fulfilment. On the lower 
levels, charisma will be attributed to leaders who are action-oriented enough to be seen 
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to address the issues of deprivation, while on the higher needs levels, charisma depends 
on the ability of the leader to enhance group identity. 
 
It should be remembered that for charismatic or prototypical leadership to exist in the 
first place, a certain level of stress is required. The absence of stress denotes an absence 
of deprivation, in which case there is no need for charisma. In the absence of stress, 
completely ordinary bureaucratic or technocratic leaders will suffice to maintain the 
existing needs strategy and stable needs fulfilment. Consequently, in the absence of 
deprivation and stress, there will be no transformational leaders, no absolute 
followership, obedience, or conformity, and consequently no exceptional status rewards 
available for potential leaders. In order to promote their own status roles, leaders 
therefore may choose to increase the perception of stress or even cause it themselves, 
using group dynamics for their own ends. Indoctrination found in certain totalist 
religious groups is a revealing example of stress serving not the rectification of needs 
deprivation but rather boosting the ongoing role of the leader.
79
 Similar strategies can be 
observed in totalitarian societies and regimes aiming to retain their power position 
through intergroup war.
80
 
 
Needs Levels and Leadership 
Acknowledging the varying demands on leadership at different levels of needs is 
important given the centrality of leader personality in triggering collective agency in 
general and collective violence in particular. On all needs levels, leaders and elites have 
in common the fact that they are more inclined towards group dynamics and thus 
exhibit more intergroup bias
81
 and are more concerned about group performance
82
 and 
responsive to group threats
83
 than are peripheral members. Leaders are generally high 
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achievers.
84
 According to Burns, political leadership and leaders’ desires for estee  
(read: relative status gratification) go hand in hand,
85
 and as Maslow believes, leaders 
are the best self-actualisers.
86
 However, although leaders definitely have to be 
passionate individuals, the mere desire to achieve hardly suffices to ensure power on 
different levels. As has been argued, leadership is subject to different demands and 
constraints on different levels of needs fulfilment – a fact reflected in the seemingly 
contradictory theories of leadership described above. 
 
Table 1.3 illustrates the differing demands on leadership at different levels of needs 
fulfilment. Given that identification on low needs levels is induced by stress, leadership 
on this level tends to be awareness-raising and situational. Although leaders are 
cognitively more readily interpreted as charismatic or prototypical, they must be task-
oriented if they desire to retain group cohesion for any significant period of time. This 
fact may not be generally acknowledged by social psychologists, but can be easily 
confirmed by examining actual leadership strategies in undeveloped and war-ridden 
countries such as the Sudan (Chapter 3 and 4). On the other hand, identification on 
higher needs levels is induced less by stress and more by tradition and ideology, 
resulting in relationship-oriented and transformational leadership. The higher the needs 
level, the more leaders can afford to be enmeshed in ideological struggles rather than 
direct action, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia and Serbia (Chapter 5 and 6). 
Like identification, then, leadership is a variable concept and a group mechanism that 
enables collective action in varying ways on different needs levels. Different types of 
personalities are followed in different situations, and in this sense the followers are far 
fro  “hypnotised so na bulists” even if so eti es led by “ ad en.”87 
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Table 1.3: The Two Faces of Leadership 
 
Realistic 
(Physiological/ Security Level) 
 
Manipulative 
(Status Level) 
Awareness-raising Ideological 
Task-oriented Relationship-oriented 
Situational Transformational 
Charisma: successes in addressing real 
sources of existential insecurity 
Charisma: adhering to cultural tradition 
 
 
1.4. The Synthesis: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced a three-level needs hierarchy and the hypothesis that the 
nature of collective identity and leadership varies according to the level of needs 
fulfilment/deprivation. It has been argued that identification with a group does not 
directly correlate with needs but depends on perceptions that are both historical and 
created by competing group leaders. However, on low levels of needs fulfilment, due to 
the element of stress, the perceptions adopted by group members will more readily 
depend on the realistic aspects of the situation rather than on collective history or 
manipulation. This is because the most basic of human needs necessitates fulfilment and 
the awareness of this requirement is inescapable. On the higher levels, stress is less 
severe and individuals tend to prefer existing historical categories and identities; 
identity is more lasting and stable. The nature of purposive leadership also correlates 
with the level of collective needs fulfilment: action-oriented leaders are more functional 
on low levels of needs fulfilment, while on the status-level, relationship-oriented leaders 
tend to be respected. This overall relationship between needs, identity, and leadership is 
set out below in Table 1.4. 
 
Table 1.4: The Synthesis: Needs, Identity, and Leadership 
 
NEEDS 
 
IDENTITY LEADERSHIP 
Physiological Needs Changing Action-Oriented 
Security Needs Flexible Both Action and Ideology 
Status Needs Stable Ideology, Relations, Culture 
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2. Perceived Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence 
 
 
The interrelationship between needs, identity, and leadership described in the previous 
chapter has widespread implications for collective action. The present chapter aims to 
describe the dynamics of collective action, and in particular collective violence, based 
on the findings of the previous chapter, on elements found in theories of conflict, and on 
further information derived from the case studies. The emphasis of the present chapter is 
thus no longer on the behavioural principles of individual identification, or on the 
individual level only, but on describing the dynamics of and routes to collective 
empowerment on the group level. Accordingly, in addition to social psychology, this 
chapter examines pertinent rationalist and ideational theories of collective behaviour 
and violence found in the broader field of social sciences.  
 
The dynamics of collective action are more complex than identification as the former 
depend also on the free agency of individuals and their conflicting personal interests in 
the ingroup and intergroup context. Partially the dynamics of collective action presented 
here largely follow the synthesis presented in the previous chapter: theories of conflict 
and revolution can be categorised into realistic/materialistic and ideational/constructivist 
explanations of conflict, which are, in turn, very similar to the realist-idealist dichotomy 
found in theories of identity. However, there are other issues worth resolving in the 
conflict framework, such as the often misconceived correlation between identity and 
mobilisation, the possibility of irrational collective violence, and the historical and 
regional specificity of different types of conflict. Also, while the existing theoretical 
framework provides an important foundation for understanding the conflict continuum, 
the case studies provide further information about the actual dynamics of mobilisation 
on different levels of needs fulfilment or development. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first builds on the findings of the previous 
chapter and argues for a combination of the needs-identity-leadership synthesis with the 
concept of relative deprivation, a major motivational theory of collective violence.
1
 The 
second section links so-called “botto -up” theories of conflict based on rational action 
                                                          
1
 See section 2.1 below. 
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and economic and class considerations to the lower needs levels and complements these 
with a more thorough explanation of mobilisation in severe deprivation, largely based 
on the Sudanese case study (Chapter 4). The third section links so-called “top-do n” 
theories of conflict based on ideational and historical differences such as ethnicity, 
culture, or other identity categories, to the higher needs levels, and complements these 
with an in-depth analysis of mobilisation in status deprivation, largely based on the Serb 
case study (Chapter 6). The conclusion presents the general theoretical framework for 
understanding conflict dynamics on the various levels of needs fulfilment. 
 
 
2.1. Motivation and Perceived Relative Deprivation 
 
Strong group identification alone does not lead to collective violence: despite identity 
salience, there may be no deprivation, or the ingroup may not perceive itself to be 
deprived. In this section, it is argued that to properly understand the relationship 
between identification and collective violence, one should combine root theories of 
conflict, which emphasise the functional purpose and rationality of violence, with the 
synthesis presented in Chapter 1. In doing so, a more comprehensive model is created, 
according to which collective action and group conflict depends on perceived relative 
deprivation (PRD), a model that can better account for the various types of collective 
action and violence taking place between communities. This model acknowledges that 
collective action, in addition to not being always easily activated, is also not always 
adaptive. This is because of the free agency of leaders, who can either support or go 
against the demands of group survival. 
 
From Motivation to Mobilisation 
If one examines theories of identity alone, one could easily assume that identification 
and collective action are governed by the same psychological rules. Indeed, theories of 
identity tend to conflate issues of identification, prejudice, and mobilisation.
2
 Certainly, 
identity salience does have an important effect on collective behaviour. As Reicher and 
Hopkins argue, collective identification is a tool for collective mobilisation and strategic 
                                                          
2
 In essence, RCT seems to suggest that the need to rectify intergroup inequalities leads to bias and 
identity-creation, while the SIT seems to suggest that the need for identity automatically gives rise to 
conflict - even violent conflict. 
43 
 
action.
3
 Identities provide a  eans of e po er ent, a “social-psychological state of 
confidence in one’s ability to challenge existing relations of do ination.”4 Although 
identification can beco e an alternative source of “ eaning”5 in severe deprivation, 
ulti ately, a “successful ongoing identity is inextricably involved  ith the gratification 
of pri ary needs.”6 
 
However, violent mobilisation is far from being an automatic consequence of identity 
salience. The difference between the two is exe plified by Bre er’s  odel that sho s 
ingroup and outgroup attitudes on a continuum.
7
 The continuum is made up of social 
categorisation at one end, the development of ingroup positivity and intergroup 
comparisons in the middle, and outgroup hostility at the other end. As Brewer argues, 
“[...]the first t o ele ents are probably universal characteristics of hu an social groups 
[...] but the third and fourth elements require additional social structural and 
motivational conditions that are not inherent in the process of group for ation itself.”8 
Outgroup derogation and conflict, and certainly violent conflict, does thus not always 
arise in the presence of intergroup boundaries, but only when there is perceived to be no 
other option,
9
 or in other words, when group boundaries for some reason are viewed as 
impenetrable or threatening. As Tajfel also argues, 
 
[t]he basic condition for the appearance of extreme forms of intergroup 
behavior […] is the belief that the relevant social boundaries bet een the 
                                                          
3
 Steven Reicher and Nick Hopkins, Self and Nation: Categorization, Contestation and Mobilisation 
(London: Sage, 2001). 
4
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5
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groups are sharply drawn and immutable [so that] it is impossible or at least 
very difficult for individuals to move from one group to the other.
10
  
 
Ordinarily, group boundaries are not fixed. Since it is in the nature of the individual to 
seek increasingly efficient status roles for the fulfilment of basic needs, there is a 
tendency of social  obility fro  less to  ore efficient groups. Indeed, “[...]subjects  ill 
experience their membership more strongly the greater the perceived likelihood that 
their groups will attain positive outco es or avoid negative outco es.”11 Conflict is 
likely to arise only when group boundaries are fixed and social mobility is thwarted. It 
is this impenetrability of common group boundaries which causes group members to 
constitute what Rabbie and Hor itz call a “co  on fate” group,12 leading them to 
construct new identities and sometimes to resort to (militant) protest.
13
 Such boundaries 
also create the image of the Other, the group possessing a superior or inferior needs 
strategy in which one cannot, or will not, participate. On the lower needs levels, 
Otherness may result from structural class differences and on the higher levels from 
ideational ones. In either case, the Other serves as the trigger for action, either as the 
standard that one wants to achieve (for the deprived) or that one wants to avoid (for the 
relatively gratified).  
 
The impenetrability of group boundaries may lead to feelings of threat in both high and 
low-status groups, as people, depending on their status, experience challenges either to 
their physiological/security or status fulfilment. While it is well known that individuals 
in general cope with threat by adopting hostile and ideological attitudes,
14
 it is worth 
looking in more detail at how such attitudes in reality influence collective action in 
groups experiencing different levels of needs fulfilment, and accordingly how the 
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“social structural and  otivational conditions” suggested by Brewer can be usefully 
integrated into a model of threat and Otherness. 
 
A Framework of Perceived Relative Deprivation 
The present dissertation has argued from the start that the primary motivating factor in 
all human behaviour is the necessity of needs fulfilment. Indeed, if behaviour depended 
only on biology (rather than also psychology), it would be easy to predict the onset of 
collective violence. As the age-old frustration-aggression theory
15
 suggests, individuals 
or groups frustrated in their needs or wants fulfilment become aggressive against those 
blocking such action. Using the motivational framework of Chapter 1, this would 
suggest that on the lowest levels of needs fulfilment, collective violence would be 
immediate given that people in such situations are wholly concerned with survival. On 
the higher levels, groups would become less interested in violent strategies and would 
rely on non-violent approaches for collective empowerment. For example, strategies of 
passive resistance, such as those influenced by Gandhi aiming at Indian independence, 
and peasant strikes such as those seen in Russia from 1905 or in Poland during the 
1970s and 1980s, would become the norm.
16
 Along with the development of society and 
the gradual elimination of severe deprivation, the maladaptive aspects of needs 
strategies would be reduced and violence would accordingly decrease. 
 
In reality, however, human action depends not on deprivation per se but on the ways in 
which deprivation is perceived and attributed to Others. What matters is not objective 
deprivation but the relative differences in the collective needs fulfilment of groups or 
classes. This idea is captured most famously by the concept of relative deprivation (RD) 
developed by Gurr.
17
 In the RD framework, Gurr highlighted the importance of 
collective needs fulfilment but also brought Otherness into the picture by suggesting 
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that both real deprivation and the perceived justifiability of the deprivation influence the 
likelihood of collective violence.
18
 Many conflict theories (including the present one) 
are based on such a theoretical framework. A recent review paper on the RD literature 
suggests that for RD to result in conflict, at least three elements must be present: the 
individual must make comparisons between groups, perceive the ingroup to be 
disadvantaged in comparison with an Other, and perceive the disadvantage to be 
unfair.
19
 However, since RD has little to do with objective levels of deprivation,
20
 
perceived relative deprivation, rather than simply relative deprivation, may be a more 
accurate term.
21
 
 
If, however, the feeling of deprivation depends largely on perception, then elements 
such as leadership manipulation and the level of needs fulfilment, which affects the 
nature in which identity and leadership function, must also be integrated into the model. 
Although Gurr does use a rather elaborate needs hierarchy and even argues that the 
intensity of RD correlates with the importance of the needs in question,
22
 he does not 
elaborate on the implications of the needs level on the dynamics of conflict. Gurr also 
does not explain why, or how, frustration actually develops into aggression (rather than, 
for example, lethargy or avoidance) and into collective action.
23
 He admits that leaders 
“offer plausible explanations of the sources of relative deprivation, identify political 
targets for violence, and provide sy bols of group identification,”24 yet fails to 
investigate how this is done. This, of course, leads him to ignore the possibility that 
leadership might function differently on varying levels of RD. 
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The PRD model can arguably be developed into a more complex and revealing model of 
conflict by integrating into the model both the needs fulfilment level and the dynamics 
of the actual (rather than ideal) nature of leadership and its effects on collective identity. 
PRD may thus consist of varying levels of deprivation (its objective level), relativity 
(the importance of comparison with the Other and consequent feelings of injustice), and 
perception (which can be manipulated by leaders). One can hypothesise, for example, 
that due to the importance of identity on the higher levels of needs fulfilment, 
manipulation and leadership may play a greater role in conflicts in developed societies 
which rarely experience physiological deprivation. That said, as a result of the 
biological factor, the realistic, objective class differences between groups may be a 
more common cause of conflict on the lower levels of needs fulfilment. If PRD at one 
end of the continuum is realistic and at the other based more on perception, then one can 
also resolve the old dichotomy between rational and non-rational conflict found in the 
work of root theorists
25
 as well as various sociologists.
26
 
 
Although, as the following sections will show, some recent theories do combine the 
realistic and ideational aspects of conflict into a single framework, it is also the case that 
the distinction between rational and irrational/manipulative conflicts (hereafter called 
“botto -up” and “top-do n”),27 persists in conflict theory. The suggested framework is 
a step forward in the sense that in linking the real and the ideational aspects of conflict 
to the level of needs fulfilment it allows one to purposefully reconcile the existing 
approaches. More importantly, by drawing attention to the changing nature of identity 
and leadership, it allows one to delve much deeper into the dynamics and prerequisites 
of conflict at the opposite ends of the conflict continuum.  
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2.2. Bottom-Up and “Middle” Conflicts: Mobilisation and Identity 
 
As mentioned, conflict literature, like theories of identity, has not succeeded in 
reconciling needs and identities in the way suggested in the previous chapter. Indeed, 
theories of revolution and conflict created after Gurr's RD model and other second 
generation
28
 root theories have concentrated on one or the other end of the conflict 
continuum, rather than attempting to reconcile the two ends. In addition, many of them 
have claimed universal rather than historical or regional applicability, which is why the 
dynamics of the different types of conflict have remained under-theorised. The purpose 
of the present section is to describe, firstly, how rational action, and more specifically, 
economic and class theories of conflict, describe only one end of the PRD continuum; 
secondly, it reveals the actual dynamics of mobilisation and the tools of leadership 
required for collective violence to be possible on the lower levels of PRD, as well as the 
relationship between mobilisation and identity on this level of needs fulfilment. The 
elements examined here are further analysed through the first case study in Chapter 4. 
 
Economic and Class Conflict Theories 
At one end of the theoretical spectrum, conflict theory is inhabited by rational action, 
economic, and class conflict theories. These theories largely align with RCT in social 
psychology in assuming that the main causes of violent conflict are the real, material 
desires of individuals or the realistic inequalities between groups or classes of people. 
These models generally suppose that individuals are interested in furthering their wealth 
and power and will attempt to achieve material benefits when the likelihood of success 
is high enough to outweigh the risk. A logical hypothesis is that the relative size and 
material resources of a group consequently largely determine whether it will resort to 
aggression,
29
 and that war is thus likelier in regions plagued by scarcity or a general lack 
of employment opportunities for young men.
30
 In this scheme, ideational factors do not 
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seem to matter. This can be seen as problematic, for rational action models have a hard 
time making any viable predictions without also considering the way in which the social 
context is perceived by the actors.
31
 
 
Economic models of conflict are also based on individual rationality. Such models have 
primarily been advanced by Collier and Hoeffler, who argue that collective violence is a 
result of greed caused by economic hardship.32 They point out that rebellion, especially 
in the least developed countries (LDCs), is often caused by the struggle for primary 
commodities such as minerals and oil. Their model follows RCT in arguing that 
identities are created by conflict rather than the other way around. Collier specifically 
argues that: 
 
Ethnic grievance is actively manufactured by the rebel organization as a 
necessary way of motivating its forces. [...]When such conflicts are viewed 
during or after the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the 
conflict have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting 
organizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being 
caused by ethnic hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-group 
hatred and may even [...] have created the groups.
33
 
 
Unfortunately, Collier does not give any clear reasons to why group identities do not 
come within the ambit of his framework, even though, as he accepts, they seem to play 
some role in mobilisation. 
 
Class conflict theories are similar to economic theories in linking collective violence to 
structural inequalities. In the realm of revolution theory, (third generation) structural 
theories emphasise the inequalities between the masses (usually peasants) and the 
authoritarian state.
34
 Such models have their origins in the Marxist idea that violent 
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mobilisation is necessary to break down the existing structures of exploitation and to 
transform society.
35
 In these theories, identity again plays a secondary role, or if it does 
emerge, it is seen as dependent on class position. Wallerstein, for example, argues that 
“…the constructed ‘peoples’ – the races, the nations, the ethnic groups – correlate 
heavily, albeit imperfectly,  ith ‘objective class’,”36 and Cohen posits that “social 
stratification develops as a correlate of cultural distinctiveness and the competition of 
scarce resources.”37 Like RCT and economic theories of conflict, then, also class theory 
argues that conflicts of interest exist prior to group identification. Consequently, identity 
 anipulation does not co e into play. As Goldstone asserts, “in structural theories of 
revolution […] leaders hardly ever appear, or if mentioned, they seem to be unwitting 
dupes of history whose best intentions are always frustrated by deeper social, political, 
or econo ic forces.”38 
 
Both the greed and class conflict paradigms have, of course, been rejected by many as 
over-simplifying the causes of conflict. Mere greed or deprivation experienced by 
various individuals does not amount to cohesive collective action. Economic and class 
theories can also be seen as problematic in not distinguishing between motivational and 
material causes. Collier and Hoeffler, for example, talk about greed, seemingly a 
motivational issue; but rather than investigate its development, they presuppose its 
existence based on the existence of primary commodities and other lootable resources. 
Some 'mixed' models of conflict similarly measure motivation through a set of structural 
elements such as per capita income, geographic and demographic conditions, external 
help, the availability of military technology, and the existence of primary commodities 
– although also history and identity may be taken into account.39 While perhaps useful 
in predicting large-scale violence, such models confuse motivation with opportunity. As 
Cra er argues, “there is no denying the significance of material interests in the origins 
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of conflicts, even if at times [...]it is difficult to separate their role in the origins of 
conflict from their influence on the characteristics and durability of conflict.”40 
 
However, the seeming failures of economic and class theories – the absence of identity 
and leadership considerations, the mixing of motivation with material factors – can be 
easily theorised away by rejecting the supposed universal applicability of such models 
and by connecting them to a low level of needs security. The economic and class 
conflict models seem to apply best to LDCs not only because they emphasise scarcity 
and the inequitable dispersion of resources, a problem plaguing developing countries in 
particular, but also because, as hypothesised in chapter 1, collective identities can be 
seen to lose their persuasive power in conditions of physiological deprivation. Although 
a low level of needs security or development does not necessarily render people 
continuously deprived, repeated instances of physiological deprivation do predispose 
individuals to weak identity dynamics and to spontaneous individualistic behaviour.
41
 
Thus, under conditions of low development and severe deprivation, the exclusion of 
collective identity from conflict models may, after all, not be wholly unwarranted. 
Similarly, considering the weakness of ideational factors as well as the importance of 
survival in severe deprivation, it is perhaps natural that theorists concentrating on LDCs 
should equate motivation with material opportunity. 
 
“Mixed” Theories 
The simplicity of the greed and class paradigms have been contested by various other 
theories, which here shall be called ‘mixed’ theories in that they attempt to combine 
economic and ideational factors. As Gurr already argued, people do not resort to 
collective violence only because they desire economic betterment, but also because they 
believe that their demands are justified. Rather than automatically mobilise, the group 
must first agree on the causes of deprivation and achieve cohesion. In this respect, the 
grievance literature, which finds a correlation between conflict and the perceived 
(in)equality of resource distribution,42 can be said to be an improvement on the greed 
paradig . As Nafziger and Auvinen state, “[ ]hile high inequality is associated  ith 
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emergencies, insurgency is more likely if the less advantaged can identify the 
perpetrators of their poverty and suffering.”43 Otherness thus matters a great deal for the 
overall decision to resort to conflict. This, however, inevitably brings forth the question 
of collective identity, which the grievance literature does not examine in any depth. 
 
If one wants to properly understand how grievances are transformed into cohesive 
action, the only theoretical solution left thus seems to be to merge collective identity 
with class/economic theories of conflict. This has in effect been done by the “horizontal 
inequalities”  odel, developed by Ste art and others.44 According to this model, the 
likelihood of conflict is greatest not where deprivation is greatest, but rather where both 
economic and cultural factors are present; for instance when people believe their 
deprivation is a result of the Other's deliberate choice and is based on their ethnic, 
religious, or other collective identity. It is also acknowledged that horizontal inequality 
“ ay not translate itself into conflict if there is a strong state  hich suppresses it, or if 
ideological ele ents are such that the inequalities are not  idely perceived”45 – in other 
words, because of leadership and manipulation. Accepting that the combination of 
grievance and identity together render conflict most likely is an important step, yet one 
question remains to be answered: is it then not possible for conflict to be triggered either 
in the absence of identity or in the absence of grievance? 
 
Again the problem can be resolved not by arguing that the “horizontal inequalities” 
model enjoys universal applicability, but rather by connecting it to a ‘middle’ level of 
needs fulfilment – the security level – and development. Although the motivation for 
collective violence may be most readily present among people living in undeveloped 
societies, these peoples are most likely to resort to low-scale/local rebellion rather than 
cohesive civil or international war. According to one sample, conflict was absent only in 
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about 9% of (externally) non-pacified pre-industrial societies,
46
 but these were mainly 
local conflicts. On a higher level of development or on the security needs level, on the 
other hand, also ideational factors may come into play, meaning that the movement may 
be characterised by a higher level of unity and cohesive action. On this level, large-scale 
conflicts involving tens or hundreds of thousands of people may be more common. 
 
Recent research supports the hypothesis that large-scale violence is most common on 
the middle levels of needs fulfilment or development. Previously it was simply argued 
that societal development increases the likelihood of conflict when the capacity of the 
group/state to carry out cohesive action increases.
47
 Recently, however, Boehmer and 
Sobek have come to a rather more multifaceted conclusion about the relationship 
between the level of development and conflict: 
 
At lo er levels of develop ent the lack of opportunity li its a state’s 
ability to initiate militarized conflict[...]. In contrast, at the higher levels of 
development the lack of willingness limits a state's conflict propensity even 
though it is more than capable [...]. It is in the middle range of development 
that states have the volatile mix of opportunity and willingness to engage in 
bellicose behavior. This does not imply that conflict is impossible at low and 
high levels of development; rather, it is less likely.
48
 
 
If conflict is likeliest in the presence of both willingness and opportunity, or of both 
material and ideational factors, then only one question remains to be answered. How is 
it possible that people sometimes achieve the necessary unity to trigger large-scale civil 
and international war even in extremely undeveloped regions? 
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Leadership in Economic/Class and Mixed Theories 
If the dynamics of conflict on the physiological and security levels is to be developed 
any further, it must be done by considering the role of leadership, an issue that existing 
economic and class conflict theories tend to ignore. If severe deprivation is likely to 
lead to the collapse of collective group identities, social hierarchies, and group norms 
and culture, then the key question for a comprehensive motivational theory must be how 
it is possible for severely deprived groups to sometimes overcome their resource and 
identity challenges for the sake of collective empowerment? Despite the assumptions of 
economic theories of conflict, individualistic and materialistic motivations are not 
automatically translated into collective action: while one can easily understand why in 
severe scarcity individual mobilisation should come about, the unity of the movement is 
a different issue altogether. 
 
In the previous chapter it was argued that on the lower levels of needs fulfilment, 
leadership tends to be action-oriented rather than manipulative. However, if one wants 
to achieve unity and restore a level of social structure in physiological deprivation – a 
state of affairs inimical to the dynamics of this particular needs level – then arguably 
one must also resort to coercion. The role of coercive leadership as a prerequisite of 
collective empowerment in physiological deprivation is demonstrated by the Southern 
Sudanese case study (Chapter 4). This case shows that the deeper the deprivation, the 
more readily people adopt new group affiliations capable of addressing the deprivation, 
and the more likely they are to indiscriminately fight others. The challenge thus lies not 
in motivating people per se, but to direct action against the Other truly responsible for 
the deprivation and thus overcome the challenge of deprivation. It seems that the only 
way leaders can forge unity in such circumstances is by acquiring more resources to 
dole out to the masses than alternative groups and leaders (thus creating imaginary or 
temporary unity among the people) or by preventing individuals from moving across 
group boundaries through coercive methods. While such military leadership capable of 
achieving coercive or material hegemony is rare, it explains why even in LDCs people 
will sometimes rise from their lethargy to trigger (and win) large-scale conflict, as in 
Southern Sudan. 
 
In severe deprivation, then, ordinary group processes may collapse and materialism and 
individualism take over. As Kalyvas points out, civil war can sometimes be “the ideal 
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revanche opportunity for losers in local power conflicts as well as individuals who feel 
slighted and envious.”49 This applies particularly well to bottom-up conflicts, where it is 
less likely that the conflict will be seen in terms of the master narrative. As one moves 
upwards on the needs hierarchy, however, one can hypothesise that the demands of 
leadership change and the need for coercion is reduced. In the area between 
physiological and security PRD, the importance of political ideology emerges to a 
greater extent, resulting in higher group cohesion. In the case of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia,
50
 for example, members have been found to be primarily 
motivated by injustices (the realistic aspects) but also by the ideology of the group, and 
the “ eaning” it provides (in other  ords, status).51 Sometimes, as in the case of the 
former Yugoslavia (Chapter 5), ideology and needs concerns may both carry weight at 
the same time as they point to opposing policy options (nationalistic versus Communist 
affiliation). Also, as the importance of perception increases, the nature of leadership can 
become less authoritarian. 
 
Even on the lower needs levels, leaders can of course rely on identity categories, yet this 
does not necessarily mean that motivation is based on anything except the desire to 
survive and to acquire material resources to do so. Esteban and Ray
52
 provide an 
explanation as to why bottom-up types of class conflict are, nevertheless, often defined 
in terms of identity or ethnicity: the reason lies in the incapacity of the lowest classes to 
initiate effective collective violence without the help of elite leaders. Pure class conflict 
is not a viable alternative as it involves only the marginalised in conflict and is therefore 
likely to weaken the movement and keep it from achieving benefits of any significance. 
Usually, class alliances are created in which the elites provide the material resources 
and know-how, and the masses provide the numbers required for overt violence. 
Leaders on both sides, however, not being as equally deprived as the masses, have an 
interest in defining the conflict in terms of identity rather than in terms of clear class 
injustice.
53
 This applies, notably, to the Sudanese conflicts, defined by leaders and the 
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international community as revolving around identity and ideology, but in reality being 
based on realistic (class) grievances. 
 
 
2.3. Top-Down Conflicts: Mobilisation and Ideology 
 
Opposed to rationalist economic and class theories of conflict are theories that cite 
identity and ideology as the causes of conflict. Some of these theories emphasise the 
role of historical categories such as ethnicity and culture, while others emphasise 
ideology. In either case, the focus is on mass perceptions rather than real class 
differences. As opposed to economic and class conflict, which tends to rely on rational 
action theory and supposes that needs precede interests, ethnic and cultural theories of 
conflict tend to be based on constructivist ideas, which generally assume that identity 
precedes interests.
54
 Once again, however, identity and mobilisation are better seen as 
separate issues. This section will consider the approaches based on ideational factors but 
will also attempt to point out the missing elements: the significance of ideology as 
opposed to identity, and the ultimate rationalism of mobilisation even on the higher 
needs levels. The elements examined here are further analysed through the second case 
study in Chapter 6. 
 
From Primordialism to Constructivism 
At the more simplistic end of ideational theories of conflict are primordialist theories 
based on the work of Shils
55
 and Geertz,
56
 which emphasise the natural cultural, ethnic, 
and other long-term differences between communities and understand conflict as natural 
or inevitable between culturally different groups. Some primordialists accept that ethnic 
identities can be subject to change and transformation, but maintain that, once 
solidified, they tend to direct collective behaviour.
57
 Although rare in the academic 
literature, these types of si plistic ‘ethnic hatred’ explanations are still frequently seen 
in the popular press, not only in connection to genocides or other large-scale conflicts 
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such as those of the Sudan or the former Yugoslavia, which are defined as ethnic by the 
parties themselves,
58
 but also in connection to those that are generally not so 
characterised, such as tribal or other local disputes.
59
 However, while conflicts may be 
easy to categorise based on ethnic differences, such theories have little explanatory 
force.
60 
As already mentioned, identity is not a source of motivation in severe 
deprivation, and the role of identity is doubtful even in status-level conflicts. As Gilley 
argues, “the concept of ‘ethnic conflict’  rongly conflates the t o things – ethnicity in 
identity and ethnicity in conflict.”61 
 
Theories of ethnicity have in recent decades moved away from primordialism towards a 
more constructivist approach, which argues that identity categories are not fixed, but 
come into existence through action and discourse,
62
 and are thus subject to constant 
transformation. Although no comprehensive constructivist theory of conflict exists as 
yet, constructivist approaches have been used in various ways in the qualitative conflict 
literature. Fearon and Laitin have pointed out three ways in which the conflict literature 
integrates constructivist ideas:
63
 conflict is explained as a result of interactions between 
the masses, as a result of discourse, or as a result of strategic elite action. The discourse 
approach is rejected as a relatively unconvincing alternative, and one coming too close 
to primordialist explanations. As Fearon and Laitin point out, discursive systems are 
enduring structures, while violence is episodic.
64
 Here, one can perhaps best see the 
confusion bet een “ethnicity in identity and ethnicity in conflict” suggested by Gilley: 
a long-term prejudiced predisposition is one thing, actual mobilisation is another. 
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The other explanation – strategic action by the elites and interaction of the masses – are 
in Fearon and Laitin’s opinion ore convincing. The elite-based explanation can also be 
called the "instrumentalist" explanation.
65
 According to this model, strategic action and 
the use of identity categories by elites and extremists may prevent moderates from 
acquiring power and provoke people to violence.
66
 From this perspective the value of 
the constructivist approach would thus not lie in its emphasis on the role of identity at 
all, but rather in its attention on elite manipulation and the strategic use of identity 
categories in conflict. As Fearon and Laitin ad it, “the mere observation that ethnic 
identities are socially constructed does not by itself explain ethnic violence and may not 
even be particularly relevant,”67 but the way in which identities can be manipulated by 
elites is more so. This opens up a way to explore the perceptions and ideologies created 
by the elites in conflict situations, and the ways in which mass perceptions can be 
manipulated, for example, through the use of historical categories.
68
 
 
The Role of Ideology 
Both conflict resolution
69
 and revolution theorists
70
 have considered ideology and 
manipulative leadership worthy of integration into conflict theories, albeit without 
succeeding to unravel the dynamics of conflict on different levels of need fulfilment. 
Some steps forward, especially in the realm of class conflict theory, have also been 
taken in the neo-Marxist literature of Gramsci,
71
 who considers manipulation a 
condition for revolution. In his model of social change, the creation of a hegemonic 
ideology is achieved through the education of the masses by organic intellectuals, or, 
                                                          
65
 Graham K. Brown and Arnim Langer, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnicity," Oxford 
Development Studies 38, no. 4 (2010): 411-436, 413. 
66
 Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction," 864-865. 
67
 Ibid., 845. 
68
 See in particular Beverly Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach,” and 
"Explaining Cultural Conflict in Ex-Yugoslavia: Institutional Weakness, Economic Crisis," in The Myth 
of “Ethnic Conflict,” eds. Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (International and Area Studies 
Research Series/Number 98, University of California, Berkeley, 1998). See also further Chapter 6 on the 
Milosevic campaign. 
69
 Kreisberg, Louis. "Escalation and Institutionalization Stages," in Beyond Intractability, Guy Burgess 
and Heidi Burgess (Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado: Boulder, September 2003), at 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/escalation_stage/; see also Louis Kreisberg, Constructive 
Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, 2
nd
 ed. (New York, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) 
and Edward Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1990). 
70
 Eric Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); John Foran, ed., 
Theorizing Revolution (London: Routledge, 1997);  Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited" (1993). 
71
 For lucid reviews see for example Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987); James Martin, Gramsci's Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (New York: 
Palgrave, 1998). 
59 
 
the party leaders.
72
 Significantly, Gramsci also implicitly acknowledges the changing 
nature of conflict on different needs levels  hen distinguishing bet een the “ ar of 
 ove ent,”  here violence plays the central role, and the “ ar of position,”  hich 
consists of a continuous ideological struggle; he even acknowledges that the latter is a 
more modern phenomenon. 
 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that theories of conflict emphasising identity and 
ideology over the realistic aspects of grievance are better suited for explaining conflict 
triggered on the higher needs level or by groups enjoying higher status. Unfortunately, 
thus far a connection has been made only between ideology and high-status group 
members, not between ideology and a generally high level of development or needs 
fulfilment in general. In the field of social psychology, it has been found, for example, 
that high-status groups are more accepting of inequalities prejudiced against Others than 
low-status groups,
73
 especially in the presence of threat.
74
 In the words of Guimond and 
Dambrun, one can say that although relative deprivation causes more prejudice than a 
situation of neutrality (equality), relative gratification (RG) causes even more prejudice, 
ethnocentrism, and racism than does RD.
75
 
 
The fact that high-status groups are more prone to prejudice, however, does not mean 
they are also more prone to collective violence. As Galtung in his theories of structural 
and cultural violence argues, cultural categories are a tool for those in positions of 
power and are most often used to legitimise and preserve existing social structures.
76
 
Rather than leading to violence, RD “[...] ay trigger the need to find justifications, a 
process  hich is pri arily cognitive in nature...”77 High status also strengthens group 
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processes such as scapegoating, projection, and dehumanisation, which legitimise social 
inequality and prevent the transformation and fluidity of group boundaries.
78
 In other 
words, RG prejudice and ideologies are primarily used to justify existing structural 
inequalities, not to mobilise people. The idea that ideology serves to reinforce existing 
boundaries rather than motivate people to participate in violence is to some extent also 
supported by the case literature. Gagnon, for example, argues in connection to the 
Yugoslav wars, that the ideology of ethnic superiority was not designed to, or did not 
have the effect of, mobilising people, but only of rendering the masses passive and 
unaware of the irrationality of elite politics.
79
 
 
Interestingly, Fearon and Laitin, in their qualitative revie  of “ethnic” conflicts, also 
argue that the importance of ethnic identities is not so much that they help to provoke 
conflict with the Other, but that they help extremists win internal conflicts with 
moderates.
80
 The idea that leaders trigger external violent conflicts to prevent the 
masses from perceiving domestic problems is of course a well-acknowledged, if 
inconsistent, finding.
81
 For a theory of motivation, and especially for ideational 
explanations, however, this is somewhat problematic since it seems to indicate that 
while identity or ideology is present in situations of conflict, it may, after all, have 
nothing to do with mobilising the masses. Rather, the purpose of identity politics seems 
to be that it allows the leaders and elites to retain a high level of authoritarianism – a 
leadership style characteristic of and adaptive on the lower levels of needs fulfilment, 
but maladaptive on the status level. 
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Strategies of Irrational Collective Violence 
What, then, is the real motivation for conflict in relatively developed countries, where 
people are suffering only from status deprivation? One should assume that as societies 
develop and leave behind repeated instances of physiological and security deprivation, 
collective violence should become increasingly difficult to trigger. The broader division 
of labour and larger pool of alternative status roles should render people unwilling to 
jeopardize their lives through conflict. Even if one loses one’s job and one’s status 
fulfilment, one can usually avoid physiological and security deprivation by adopting an 
alternative role, or temporarily relying on the state or family for survival. The level of 
stress also remains relatively low, and violence thus remains irrational. 
 
The case study on Serb mobilisation (Chapter 6) suggests an explanation may be found 
in the combination of escalation and manipulation. If collective violence is automatic 
when both deprivation and identity categories are present, or on the middle levels of 
development, then surely the best way to trigger it must be by convincing people that 
they are in fact suffering from physiological or security deprivation instead of status 
PRD. Manipulation is thus not significant because it highlights Otherness but because 
the Other is seen to constitute an existential threat. As far as Serbian propaganda in the 
early 1990s in concerned, the threat aspects of Otherness were definitely prominent. 
Another way to highlight the threat was to use the radical elements of society to trigger 
actual low-scale conflict. In the Serb case as in others, “easy identifiers”82 such as 
criminals, unmarried and unemployed youths
83
 were initially mobilised to trigger 
conflict and persuade the masses that the suggested threat was indeed real. 
 
The Serb case study also suggests that although most individuals are unlikely to resort 
to collective violence on the status level, they may well choose to do so once they 
perceive or experience security deprivation after conflict has escalated. Consequently, 
unlike bottom-up situations, where people tend towards immediate reactions (even if 
not in any cohesive manner), top-down conflicts usually transpire through gradual 
escalation. Although escalation is often understood as a mental process connected to the 
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supposed need to distinguish between oneself and the other (as per SIT), or a 
bandwagoning effect of some kind,
84
 it may in fact have everything to do with actual 
changes in needs fulfilment, or at least with changes in the way people perceive their 
needs fulfilment to be threatened. 
 
An even more effective way of initiating non-rational conflict, even in the absence of 
PRD, is with the help of professional militaries. Professional groups can be separated 
from the core ingroup both in terms of needs and identity and can therefore be more 
effective in carrying out objectively irrational projects. They can be more effectively 
indoctrinated so as to psychologically distance themselves from the real interests and 
perceptions of the wider ingroup/nation and can be subjected to such stressful training 
techniques that violence can become an integral part of their needs strategy.
85
 
Professional soldiers can consequently experience stronger group dynamics, especially 
obedience.
86
 In addition, elite units are often used to carry out the most inhumane 
attacks and atrocities against both outgroup and ingroup civilians (as was partly the case 
in the Balkans). The greater the psychological distance between such elites and the 
masses, the easier it will be for them to ignore the objective interests of the nation as a 
whole and trigger violence.
87
 
 
One can thus argue that on the higher levels of PRD, manipulation plays an especially 
important role in triggering collective violence, but the reason why it works is not, as 
tends to be assumed, because it emphasises collective identities. Quite the opposite: in 
the first instance, ideological manipulation provides a psychological excuse for the 
elites to retain intergroup inequalities; second, it helps the elites, including professional 
criminals and military units, to develop into a sub-group with needs and identities 
separate from the overall ingroup; and third, it sometimes helps the masses acquire a 
(objectively unreal) sense of security-level deprivation. In a sense, therefore, even in the 
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absence of severe deprivation, ideology helps the various classes of people to imagine 
that collective violence is rational, or at least acceptable. Even in a relatively high needs 
fulfilment one can say that ultimately “ ars occur  hen those  ho ake the decision to 
fight esti ate that it is in their aterial interests to do so.”88 
 
 
2.4. PRD and Conflict: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the synthesis between needs, identity, and leadership 
developed in the previous chapter must be combined with theories of relative 
deprivation in order to create a complete theory of collective violence. To the role of 
deprivation and Otherness, which comes about through the perceived impermeable 
nature of group boundaries, one must add the role of perception and the role of leader 
and elite agency, which enables mass manipulation and makes possible irrational 
collective violence. Conflict thus depends of perceived relative deprivation, whose 
dynamics differ according to needs level. At one end, the realistic aspects of deprivation 
matter more, while on the other, perception and escalation are the tools by which 
collective violence is triggered. 
 
As was shown in the latter sections of the chapter, the dynamics of conflict at the two 
extremes differ significantly. The main elements of each type of conflict are set out in 
Table 2.1. Cohesive collective action is not automatic at either end: in bottom-up 
conflicts, mobilisation is automatic, while unity is difficult to achieve. The role of 
leadership in such conflicts is to create an illusion of common fate, which can be done 
only by offering material benefits to the masses or through coercion. In top-down 
conflicts, on the other hand, unity is easy to achieve due to persistent historical 
categorisation, while mobilisation is irrational due to the high levels of needs fulfilment 
and thus difficult to achieve. The only way to trigger conflict where it objectively seems 
irrational is through ideological manipulation and the creation of the illusion of a 
security-level threat. Opposed to what is commonly believed to be the case, irrational 
collective violence has little to do with identity, which provides only the frame for 
manipulation but is not directly connected to mobilisation. 
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Since the regularity and severity of deprivation obviously correlates with the level of 
economic development, the present framework also explains why different types of 
conflict are historically and regionally specific. Since severe physiological deprivation 
is a common phenomenon in developing countries but relatively rare in developed ones, 
rational, bottom-up violence tends to be triggered in the LDCs, while irrational top-
down violence prevails in more developed countries. This connection to the needs 
hierarchy and the change in conflict dynamics also explains why different types of 
groups trigger conflict in different parts of the globe at different times in human history. 
Scattered rebel movements are usually found in (historically and regionally) poorer 
regions due to the ease of mobilisation and the lack of unity, while professional armies 
and international war are found in more developed countries due to the importance of 
leadership and combatant manipulation. In the modern world, as Kaldor famously 
argues, terrorism and “identity” conflicts are the norm.89 
 
Ultimately, as also the horizontal inequalities model suggests, conflict is most common 
in the presence of both realistic and ideational factors. Conflict is thus  ost ‘natural’ on 
the security level (see Table 2.1), where both unity and deprivation are automatically 
present. Historically, such conflicts have taken place for exa ple in Europe, “...the most 
conflict-prone level of development [being] empirically equivalent to Austria-Hungary 
at the beginning of World War I, Spain in the 1950s, and Belgiu  around 1850.”90 
Today, on the other hand, such conflicts tend to be limited to LDCs. As Clapham writes 
in connection to Africa, “[…]the  ost disciplined and effective African insurgencies 
have arisen in those societies – highland Eritrea, northern Ethiopia, southern Uganda, 
Rwanda – which have long established traditions of statehood; and […] in societies 
which have lacked such traditions – Somalia, Liberia, northern Chad, Southern Sudan – 
insurgent  ove ents have been far  ore liable to frag entation and indiscipline.”91 
Clearly, then, since identity and leadership dynamics change according to the level of 
needs fulfilment, so are conflict dynamics changing along with societal development. 
 
                                                          
89
 Mary Kaldor, in New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002), argues that large-scale inter-state war has disappeared but these regional phenomena have taken 
their place. 
90
 Boeh er and Sobek, “Violent Adolescence,” 17. 
91
 Christopher Clapha , “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies,” in African Guerrillas, ed. C. 
Clapham (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 1-18: 13. 
65 
 
 
Table 2.1: The Types of Collective Violence 
 
 Bottom-up Conflicts 
 
“Middle” 
Conflicts 
Top-down Conflicts 
 
Natural 
Aspects 
Mobilisation Mobilisation and 
Common Fate 
Common Fate 
Aspects 
manipulated 
by leaders 
Illusion of Common 
Fate  
Any/Neither Illusion of Security RD 
Leadership 
Techniques 
Coercion, materialism Any/Neither Manipulation 
Type of 
Group 
Rebel groups Naturally cohesive 
interest groups 
Professional militaries 
(and terrorists) 
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3. The Sudan: Ideology and Identity on the Lower Needs Levels 
 
 
This chapter examines the inherently rational nature of group identification in lower 
level needs fulfilment. The nature of identity on these levels is examined in the context 
of the Sudan, and in connection with the gradual division of the country into two 
separate and independent entities. In line with the hypotheses of Chapters 1 and 2, it 
will be suggested that instead of identity directing collective action, physiological and 
security deprivation lead the relatively deprived groups to create new identities, while 
the relatively gratified use ideology to justify their positions. In the Sudan as a whole, 
one can see a correlation between the adoption of identities by various tribes and the 
core-periphery structure of economic and political relations, which has prevailed 
between tribes throughout Sudanese history. 
 
The first section of this chapter examines the development and spread of collective 
identity from the Sudanese economic and political centre in the Northeast of the country 
towards the peripheral regions. This section suggests a correlation between the levels of 
relative gratification and the extent to  hich the centre’s ideologies  ere adopted by 
various tribes. The second chapter section examines in more detail the rational 
development of the new Southern Sudanese core identity, linking it to the necessity of 
developing a new needs strategy in a situation where existing strategies had largely 
collapsed. The purpose of both sections is to describe the overall historical context of 
the conflicts between the centre and peripheral regions during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Following this, the relation to the nature of mobilisation will be examined in Chapter 4. 
 
Since this and the following chapter address the Sudanese nation in history rather than 
the present context,  hen talking about “the Sudan,” both  odern Sudan and  odern 
South Sudan are implied, while Northern Sudan, or the North, is used to denote the area 
more or less comprising modern Sudan. Southern Sudan, or the South, is used to denote 
the area more or less comprising modern South Sudan. In regard to South Sudanese 
names, first names are often used to refer to a person, given that last names actually 
refer to the father(s) of the given person rather than the family line as a whole. An 
exception is made with John Garang, who is often referred to only by his last name in 
the literature. 
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3.1. The Development of Northern Identity and Ideology 
 
Northern Sudan is inhabited by a variety of peoples and tribes, nearly all of which today 
adhere to Islam as their main religion. However, as most of these groups are of African 
origin, only a portion of them have come to adopt Arab identities. The ‘Arabised’ 
peoples cover primarily the areas surrounding the Nile, Kordofan, and parts of Darfur 
and are in both centre and periphery,  hile those categorised as culturally ‘African’ are 
located in the peripheries only. The Arabised peoples are divided into those claiming 
direct lineage to the Prophet (the riverine Arabs of the centre) and those claiming 
lineage to the Prophet’s entourage (the  ore  arginalised Arab tribes). So e of the 
peripheral Arab peoples have relatively strong traditional Arab identities, such as the 
cattle-herding Baqqara and camel-herding Abbala tribes of Darfur and Kordofan,
1
 while 
others are more culturally and politically distinct (for example the Beja, located close to 
the Red Sea, and the Nubians, mainly located in the far north). From among the African 
peoples, the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, located in Darfur close to the Chadian border, 
and the various Southern peoples (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others), are the most 
integral to the examination of Sudanese history in this discussion.  
 
While ample literature describing the Sudanese identity crisis in general already exists,
2
 
the aim here is rather to describe how the spread of collective identity and the use of 
ideology by the various peoples of the Sudan has depended on the level of their relative 
gratification in the overall core-periphery structure of Sudanese society. Local tribal 
identities on the periphery have historically competed with the Islam and Arabism 
promoted by the centre and continue to do so, largely due to persisting class 
inequalities. The grievances of the various Southern peoples have influenced the 
development of Northern identity in important ways, and therefore these grievances, 
and the overall North-South relationship, will be touched upon in this section. However, 
the section will concentrate on analysing Northern Sudanese identity, for it is in this 
case that identity-related ideological justifications have played a role in directing 
collective behaviour. 
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The Origins of Disunity 
In the 4
th
 and 5
th
 centuries of the Common Era, Christian kingdoms existed in the region 
of modern Sudan. Islam entered the region from the 7
th
 century onwards, when trade 
relations were established between North Africa and Arab traders. In the process, 
Islamic teachings took root, transforming the pre-existing way of life.
3
 Because the 
traditions of Arab traders were followed and imitated, their connections to the North 
helped produce increased wealth. Intermarriage between Arabs and locals became 
common, and children born out of such marriages tended to be more culturally Arabic 
than previous generations.
4
 Arabic language spread in a similar manner, offering a new, 
universal tool of communication.
5
 For centuries, Christian and Muslim traditions co-
existed throughout the region, especially under the powerful Funj (1504-1821) and Fur 
(1603-1874) sultanates. Although Islam developed into an amalgamation of beliefs, 
pragmatically speaking, it was also a means of avoiding enslavement and gaining 
acceptance into cattle-herding communities.
6
 Thus, over time, it was adopted by all 
Northern peoples. In the 19
th
 century, the integration and practice of Islam in the North 
was further solidified by the introduction of Sufism to the region, increasing the 
emphasis of the role of holy men and personal experience as part of Islam.
7
 
 
From the Turko-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in 1821, law and religion were used to 
i pose a ne  type of collective identity on the Sudanese. Shari‘a la   as introduced 
and Sufism (the prevailing mystical and personal approach to Islam) was rejected in 
favour of Salafism (a more puritanical version of Islam). In addition, slave-trading, 
previously widespread, was gradually repressed in parts of the North. The peoples of the 
periphery, of course, had little interest in adopting policies promoted through force 
rather than benefit, and in any case, the Sufi orders had grown too powerful to be 
toppled. In particular, the Khatmiyya, dominated by the Mirghani family, and the 
Samaniyya, dominated by the Mahdi family, had created strong followings among the 
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northern tribes. In 1881, Muha  ad Ah ad bin Abd’Allah,  ho proclai ed hi self to 
be the Mahdi, the prophesised redeemer of Islam and successor of Prophet Muhammad, 
managed to unite the various slave-raiding peoples in western Sudan and overthrow the 
Egyptians. The popularity of the Mahdi and his movement was a direct consequence of 
the harshness of Turko-Egyptian rule and its restriction of slavery; in the North, tribal 
needs strategies and slave-raiding in Southern regions offered a superior means of 
survival when compared to the restricted Egyptian system. Instead of slavery coming to 
an end, it  as at this ti e that the concepts of “slave” and “Southerner” beca e near-
synonymous for many Northerners.
8
  
 
However, like leaders before them, the Mahdi, and his successor Khalifa Abdullahi, 
failed to offer a successful needs strategy for the entire region, and the movement 
resulted in further bloodshed, increased scarcity, slave-raiding and destruction – and 
consequent resistance. In particular, the Fur, Masalit, and other borderland tribes proved 
impossible to govern.
9
 Among the tribes benefiting from the system, however, Mahdism 
thrived and hero-worshipping reached new heights. In 1898, the British took control of 
Sudan
10
 and toppled the Mahdi’s  ove ent by killing so e 11,000 Ansar (Mahdi 
supporters). In Darfur, however, the new Fur Sultanate of Ali Dinar was toppled by the 
British only much later, in 1916, and neo-Mahdist rebellions supported by both African 
and Arab tribes continued unabated. The British attempted to pacify the region by 
increasing the powers of tribal chiefs, but this had little effect. Their failure was the 
result of resorting to similar methods as their predecessors: policies of limited 
development and education. While the peripheral tribes were suffering from 
physiological deprivation caused by desertification and raiding, the British remained 
unwilling to expand development projects beyond the Nile basin. 
 
In addition, British educational and administrative policies worsened the core-periphery 
divide as their main purpose was to ensure the creation of a pool of administrators to 
serve the British governors and avoid increasing the capacities of the population in 
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general.
11
 Such a narrow strategy naturally privileged the peoples around Khartoum and 
Omdurman – the Ja’aliyyin, Shayqiyya, and Danaqla tribes,  hich had co e to 
dominate the centre even under the Turko-Egyptian regime. These tribes had access to 
higher education and jobs in the central administration,
12
 while the peripheries remained 
unable to participate in this elitist needs strategy. This caused the Northern Arab tribes 
to develop an identity much different from the rest of the country. Similarly, riverine 
tribal identity developed as a result of  connections to the Arab world but with a focus 
on a scriptural version of Islam, while among the peripheral tribes, the penchant towards 
mysticism and the continued leadership of the Mirghani and Mahdi lineages retained 
their strength. 
 
Between the North and South, British policies had even more tragic consequences. In 
the North, the number of Islamic schools increased, while in the South, education 
remained almost non-existent, being limited to a number of Christian missionary 
schools condoned by the British.
13
 In the North, Arabic was made the official language, 
while English was used in the South. In the North, chiefs were more closely linked to 
the central authority of Khartoum,
14
 while the South was left largely to its own devices 
and authority continued to reside on the local level with tribal leaders. If in the North 
political unity was precarious, in the South it was non-existent. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, on the eve of independence, only the relatively gratified Northern elites had 
the intellectual capacity and practical wherewithal to demand independence from the 
British.
15
 Accordingly, in the June 1947 Juba conference, the Northern representatives, 
while refusing to provide any safeguards for the economically and politically 
marginalised South, managed to convince the Southerners of the necessity of Sudanese 
unity. The Southerners could only hope that in a unified and independent Sudan, their 
grievances would finally be heard. 
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Due to political considerations connected to Egypt, the British decided to grant early 
independence to Sudan in 1956. The ease and speed of achieving independence meant 
that the political forces in the centre and in the North in general – the Mahdi clan’s 
U  a and Mirghani clan’s Ashiqqa party (later National Unionist Party and 
Democratic Unionist Party) – had no need to cooperate to repel the British nor had the 
time or opportunity to develop into an inclusive national movement.
16
 A core-semi-
periphery-periphery structure remained in place and upon independence, the identities 
and cultures of the various peoples reflected this structure. The riverine tribes were in 
the core: the various colonial governments had created for them a separate, and highly 
efficient, needs strategy, psychologically disconnecting them from their kinsmen and 
causing them to develop a unique identity based on a particular reading of Islam and 
Arabism. Various other Arab tribes remained in the semi-periphery and retained 
traditional religious and political values based on a more lenient reading of Islam. 
Southern tribes, which had never really benefited from colonisation, retained a low level 
of political awareness and consequently maintained their own traditions and identities. 
 
Ideology in the Centre 
The disconnection between the centre and the periphery led early on to the rise of 
justificatory ideologies among the elites. Even before independence, the Graduates 
Congress, a collection of politically active elites linked to the colonial administration, 
expressed opposition to tribalism and a desire for a centralist Sudan, including the 
extension of Islamic education into the South. Despite clear demands for cultural unity 
in some quarters, others acknowledged the problem of multiethnicity and potential 
disunity. For a time, ethnic hybridity was highlighted: for example, Bedouin folk 
customs were used to define the nation as culturally diverse.
17
 This hybridity, however, 
was complemented by racism – in 1941, the nationalist and future Prime Minister 
Muha  ad Ah ad Mahjoub argued that the racially hybrid Sudan “o ed its cultural 
superiority, acquired through reason, intelligence, and courage, to the ‘Arabs’.”18 
According to Sharkey, the timing of this hybrid-racist thinking was essential, for 
“[...]independence  as appearing on the distant horizon, and the educated Northern 
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Sudanese – as ‘Arabs’, nationalists, and colonial govern ent e ployees – needed to 
justify their clai s for the future assu ption of po er.”19 
 
By 1956, when the Sudanese gained independence, the elite desire for continued relative 
gratification carried the day. As a result, under the successive governments of Ismail Al-
Azhari
20
 and Sayed Abdallah Khalil,
21
 as well as under the subsequent military regime 
of General Ibrahim Abboud,
22
 tribal grievances were sidelined and Southern revolts 
were violently suppressed. In addition, policies aimed at cultural and political unity 
were carried out in the South.
23
 According to Deng, the elites had created a “loathing” 
for tribalism,
24
 psychologically distancing themselves from their kinsmen with whom 
they no longer perceived any common fate. By seeing the peripheries as inferior, they 
managed to mentally justify their position of superiority. The chosen justificatory tool 
was pan-Arabism, the ideology of solidarity and unity with the wider Arab world, which 
was seen as a culturally superior and worthy model for Sudanese nation-building. Deng 
sees pan-Arabism as a near-inevitable ideological choice for the elites: given their fear 
of being absorbed by the supposedly pri itive ‘Africanis ’ prevailing in  ost of 
Sudan, the elites decided to adopt the most readily available identity – one which had 
most effectively countered Western and Christian colonialism.
25
 Pan-Arabism was a 
means to differentiate between the elites and the periphery as well as provide a suitable 
scapegoat (the West) to blame for the many failures of the future Sudan. 
 
The rebellion, and eventually all-out war, that took place in the South, however, 
constituted a serious economic burden for successive governments. By the time Gaafar 
Nimeiry
26
 assumed power in a military coup in 1968, the conflict had become 
impossible to contain. Going against the ideology of the elites, Nimeiry tried to solve 
the conflict by enacting a new constitution allowing freedom of religion and identity, 
putting an end to the first North-South war by signing the 1973 Addis Ababa 
Agreement. The interests of the centre, however, intervened quickly, and soon all the 
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main concessions of the Agreement were undermined by new policies. In Khartoum, the 
growing economic and political influence of the National Islamic Front (NIF; 
previously Islamic Charter Front and Muslim Brothers) led by Hasan al-Turabi forced 
Nimeiry to change track. Thus, soon after the peace agreement, Nimeiry began 
transforming himself from a peacemaker into a fervent Isla ist in favour of Shari’a 
law.
27
 
 
From the late 1970s, the extractive economic policies carried out in the Southern 
regions intensified and ideological justification became increasingly indispensable. In 
the absence of viable national economic policies, the new strategy came to use the 
peripheries’ resources to ensure an acceptable standard of living for the  asses in the 
centre, on  hose support the regi e’s future depended.28 The policies of oppression and 
the suppression of local culture and religion that went hand in hand with resource 
extraction were portrayed locally, and globally, as an effort to unite the country. In 
reality, ho ever, their purpose  as to highlight the ‘African’ and ‘Christian’ identity of 
the Southerners
29
 and thus convince the Northern masses of Southern inferiority. 
Especially as Northern awareness of the wars in the South grew, the use of pan-Arabic 
ideology helped to hide the inhumane nature of the policies carried out in the 
peripheries. The use of ideology and the highlighting of Southern Otherness seemed to 
be a success, for the masses around Khartoum revolted only when their own personal 
needs fulfilment was threatened by the rise of oil and bread prices – for example in 
1985, when demonstrations brought down president Nimeiry. 
 
Given the complete absence of free speech in the Sudan, it is practically impossible to 
say what kind of national identity, if any, the masses in the centre adopted during 
independence. The only group among whom a relatively coherent ideological hegemony 
prevailed were the relatively gratified elites who joined the NIF in the late 1970s and 
1980s. Under the leadership of al-Turabi, NIF ideology had various and often 
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contradicting dimensions,
30
 though persistent themes included jihad against non-
believers, international Islamic cooperation,
31
 and the strict adherence to Islam and 
Shari’a la .32 The party rose to prominence with the help of Arab funding and became a 
magnet for aspiring elites of various kinds. Its connections to Islamic banks allowed it 
to make credit dependent on politico-religious affiliation and helped force businessmen 
into a radical Islamic mould.
33
 In addition to the riverine elites, the NIF managed to also 
entice a great number of educated youth into its ranks. Active among the students of 
Khartoum University and one of the few sources of job opportunities,
34
 the NIF was the 
only route to social mobility. 
 
However, not all Northerners shared the radicalism of the NIF, nor their relative 
gratification and social mobility. Among Northerners in general, the definition of 
national identity remained confused, for it was based on nothing but competing readings 
of Islam and a vague connection to the Arab world. The fact that the Umma, DUP, and 
NIF parties never agreed on what political Islam should actually consist of attests to the 
fact that it functioned mostly as a justification for authoritarian political decision-
making.
35
 This became increasingly evident as the number of atrocities committed 
increased in both the North and South along with the intensification of the second 
North-South war. Under the military regime of General, and later President, Omar al-
Bashir, in which the NIF participated,
36
 bizarre readings of the Koran were used to 
condone torture and jihad against fellow Muslims in the peripheries,
37
 leading to ethnic 
cleansing among Darfuri tribes as well as among the Nuba, Ingessana, and others. The 
DUP and Umma parties, on the other hand, which in the 1960s had advocated for the 
creation of an Islamic state,
38
 began talking about democracy and the need for a more 
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inclusive national identity. This, however, was rooted in self interest as it occurred 
when the Bashir-NIF regime had become too strong to topple without Southern help. 
Political Islam thus never became an end in itself, and remained a tool for retaining 
positions of relative gratification at the top of the Sudanese hierarchy. 
 
Ideology in the Semi-Periphery 
The role of ideology was different in the semi-periphery among the Northern non-
riverine Arab and non-Arab tribes. Some aspects of Salafist Islam were adopted, while 
the ideological aspects were largely ignored. As far as in the borderlands of Darfur, 
people adopted increasingly conservative attitudes in relation to dress, the use of 
alcohol, and the status of women.
39
 However, state authority in the region was limited, 
and the peripheral tribes continued to rely on their own needs strategies: agriculture, 
pastoralism, and local trade. Tribal identities consequently retained their importance, 
and in cases of threats to needs fulfilment, as with drought and desertification, it was the 
tribe more often than the nation to which individuals turned for help. On the other hand, 
the participation of some tribal or regional leaders in the politics of Khartoum allowed 
peripheral Northerners to continue hoping for real influence and a better future, 
allowing them to believe in the value of their Muslim, and in some cases Arab, 
identities. 
 
Rather than resort to immediate protest and violence, Northern peripheral tribes first 
attempted to solve problems through political means, by establishing various 
movements aiming at rectifying the disparity in wealth and needs security. In 1957, the 
Beja Congress, a group of Beja intellectuals opposed to the centralised policies of 
Khartoum, was created in the extremely poor North-Eastern Sudan. The Darfur 
Development Front in Darfur and the General Union of the Nuba Mountains were 
created in the 1960s. These movements argued for improved rights for people living in 
the periphery, such as rights to land and freedom of movement in the Sudan.
40
 As 
Khartoum regimes changed but policies did not, however, it gradually became clear that 
non-violent strategies would not work, and military organisations were created: the Red 
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Flame and the Soony (with a wide ethnic basis) in Darfur
41
 and the Sudan African 
Nationalist Union (SANU) in the South. As time went on, the marginalised tribes 
became increasingly aware of their rights as well as of the intransigence of the 
Khartoum elites, leading many of these groups to join the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) in the 1980s, and others to initiate their own struggles. 
 
The long-standing quandary of the peripheral Arab pastoralists, especially those found 
in Darfur and Kordofan, over whether or not to share a common fate with the Arabs of 
the centre is reflected in the use of racial Arabism. Although pan-Arabism predominates 
in Khartoum, the use of Arab genealogies is more common among other Arabs.
42
 Racial 
Arabism places the various Arab tribes and Others into a status hierarchy irrespective of 
personal abilities in the Arab language or religious devotion.
43
 The status structure, as 
mentioned, consists of supposed descendants of the Prophet (riverine tribes) at the 
centre, the descendants of the Prophet’s entourage (pastoralist Arabs) in the semi-
periphery, and Southerners and Muslim but non-Arab Northerners in the periphery. 
Genealogies are widely used to create a distinction between peripheral Arabs and 
individuals of African origin,
44
 highlighting the supposed superiority of the semi-
peripheral Arabs vis-à-vis the periphery and providing a tool – proof of Arab lineage – 
for furthering one’s social  obility in the prevailing strategy. By attaching the 
peripheral Arabs to the fate of the centre, such an ideology also serves the status quo, 
hindering the rise of awareness regarding real differences of need fulfilment. It justifies 
political apathy vis-à-vis the centre which co-opts local leaders but refuses to promote 
local development, a combination which in turn causes continuous fluctuation in the 
perception of common fate. 
 
The use of genealogies, of course, results in racial Arabism, and even more than 
illustrating an Isla ic lineage, they reveal the identity crisis of the Sudanese ‘Arabs.’ 
For any outside observer, Sudanese Arabs and Africans are practically indistinguishable 
fro  each other, and have unifor ly been called “slaves” by the Arabs of the Gulf, 
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quite like Sudanese Arabs call the peoples of western and Southern Sudan.
45
 
Interestingly, however, the use of these racial categories seems to be highly situational 
in the semi-periphery. Unlike the centre, which has continuously appealed to ideology 
to justify their relative gratification, the peripheral Arabs have found the ideological 
aspects useful mostly on a temporary basis. For example, during the raids of the 1960s 
and 1980s  hen Baqqara Arabs attacked ‘African’ Dinka villagers  ith govern ent 
weaponry, and during the various conflicts in Darfur between the Arab and non-Arab 
tribes.
46
 In these instances of exaggerated violence, the Arab attackers were known to 
call their non-Arab victi s  ith de eaning na es such as “blacks,” “ onkeys,” and 
“slaves.”47 In times of cooperation and peace with the African tribes, on the other hand, 
racism has been wholly set aside. It thus seems that the racism of the semi-periphery is, 
like that of the centre, used as a justificatory mechanism for maladaptive collective 
action. While in the centre, ideology is used on a regular basis, in the semi-periphery it 
is used only temporarily. 
 
As already mentioned, despite their deprivation, the peripheral Northern tribes long 
maintained a positive outlook regarding politics at the centre – possibly because the 
presence of regional leaders in the central administration prevented the rise of 
transformative leaders. For instance, the pastoralist Arabs of Darfur continued to put 
their faith in the Umma party, whose leaders were closely involved in the running of the 
country in times of civilian government.
48
 The Umma Party and its neo-Mahdist 
followers continued to show their strength in the Nimeiry era, when in 1970 former 
Prime Minister and Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi attempted to topple Nimeiry in 
a coup d'état, leading to a confrontation between government forces and tens of 
thousands of Ansar fighters. However, during the Nimeiry and Bashir regimes, it 
became increasingly evident that the Umma and DUP elites were managing to achieve 
little for their constituencies in Western and Eastern Sudan.
49
 Although the process was 
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extremely slow, the diminishing faith in politics and the deteriorating security in the 
peripheries started to give way to the gradual development of tribal and regional 
alliances willing to openly and violently oppose fellow Muslims within the regime. In 
the borderlands between North and South, various Muslim tribes joined the Southern 
movement, and in Darfur, the Arab and African tribes briefly cooperated in their 
struggle against the Bashir government in 2003, initiating the Darfur conflict. 
 
Ideology and Class Position 
Thus far, this section has described the development and partial convergence of 
Northern identities, as well as the use of ideology by the relatively gratified Northern 
elites. The reason why a cohesive national identity has been, and still is, missing in the 
Sudan can be traced to the core-periphery relations that were created in the country by 
the colonial powers. The lack of development in the peripheries and the lack of a 
unifying independence struggle signified that the elites could easily maintain the core-
periphery structure after independence. Instead of unifying the country and developing a 
common identity through political cooperation, successive regimes did their best to 
maintain inequalities and to justify them through the use of ideological Islam and 
Arabism. 
 
The extent to which ideology was used seems to correlate with the level of relative 
gratification of the elites in the core-periphery structure. Ideology was used almost 
constantly in the centre, and more so in times of conflict. Among the tribes of the semi-
periphery, on the other hand, ideology was a less utilised tool. Their incapacity to fully 
participate in the centre’s superior needs strategy caused the  to retain traditional 
identities, and ideological justifications vis-à-vis the periphery were used only during 
especially difficult times of poverty and conflict. This begs the question of whether it 
would have been less complicated for the semi-peripheral tribes to acknowledge their 
marginalisation vis-à-vis the centre and mobilise against it sooner, had Southern Sudan 
not been part of the core-periphery structure. The fact that there was an even more 
deprived Other inside the same nation may well have influenced the judgement of Arab 
tribal leaders regarding the value of a supposed common fate with Khartoum. 
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3.2. The Development of a New Southern Identity 
 
The effects of the core-periphery structure in societies suffering from a low level of 
needs security extends to the periphery as well. However, in the case of the periphery, 
one can perhaps no longer talk about ideological effects at all, for the classes suffering 
from severe deprivation may feel that they do not benefit at all from the needs strategy 
of the ingroup, in which case complete rationalism prevails (at least as regards group 
identification). This aspect of class identity will be examined in the present section by 
describing the development of a new core identity in Southern Sudan. It will be shown 
that in severe deprivation, the development of new core identities tend to be connected 
to the collapse of existing needs strategies (common in LDCs) and to the need to create 
new relationships and group affiliations capable of offering alternative solutions to 
needs deprivation. 
  
The Origins of Otherness 
Northern Otherness began its development during the Mahdist era (about 1881-1899) 
 hen the Mahdi’s follo ers raided the lands occupied by Dinka and other Nilotic 
peoples for slaves and resources. These were the first times when tribal needs strategies 
temporarily collapsed in the South due to external raids. The raids were mostly carried 
out by the various Baqqara tribes from the regions of modern Darfur and Southern 
Kordofan, the closest Arab neighbours of the Southern Nilotic peoples. During the 
Turko-Egyptian era, the raiding continued, and these distant times are still remembered 
by the Dinka as an era  hen “the  orld  as spoiled.”50 These first incursions, however, 
were not yet perceived as attacks against the South as a whole since at the time, tribes 
worried exclusively about their own sufferings and survival. These raids by Northern 
Muslims (who praised Allah in the course of killing and raiding),
51
 however, set the 
stage for the Southern understanding the Northerners as the main enemy-Other and 
helped define future incursions and conflicts accordingly. 
 
The British colonisers were nearly as unwanted as their predecessors and thus were also 
initially called Turks (turuk) by the Southerners.
52
 Several Southern tribes resisted the 
                                                          
50
 Deng, War of Visions, 73. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Ibid., 77. 
81 
 
imposition of British rule, being opposed to interference with their traditional, and still 
relatively stable, needs strategies. Unlike Turko-Egyptian forces, however, the British 
actually made an effort to enter and positively affect the region. Despite the violence 
used to impose the British presence, and despite its failure to provide real benefits such 
as health services and education to the Southern tribes, a slightly heightened sense of 
security was created. The British treatment of the North and the South as separate 
entities also had the effect of supporting the Southern peoples’ pre-existing 
classifications of the world. All-Southern institutions were established, redefining tribal 
realities. This included separate military units in the South, a common language 
(English), some interference in judicial matters, and a few development schemes. 
Although the British never managed to extend their authority to many of the Southern 
tribes, their presence increased the general awareness of the North-South difference. 
 
A more potent source of material benefit, and thus a source of identity, were the 
missionary schools that operated among the more sedentary communities. Education 
increased Southern a areness of their tribes’ position inside the Sudan and of their 
relative deprivation vis-à-vis Khartoum, and functioned as a source of empowerment for 
those who desired to advance beyond the tribal strategy, creating a desire for increased 
development.
53
 Along with the capacity for reading, writing, and mathematics, the 
students adopted Christianity and Christian names. Along with Christianity came not 
only religious precepts but also a Western world-view emphasising personal 
development, and with it the awareness of their imposed inferiority.
54
 However, the 
effects of the missionary schools were largely limited to a narrow section of the 
population mainly living in towns. Most people retained tribal identities and traditional 
perceptions of the world. While remaining less aware of the surrounding world, these 
people were more likely to avoid feelings of severe deprivation. Christianity 
consequently spread wider only during and after the sufferings of the first North-South 
war.
55
 
 
The Southern policy, in any case, was a disaster and failed in any way to prepare 
Southerners for national politics or independence. As noted above, in the 1947 Juba 
                                                          
53
 Ibid., 87. 
54
 Sharon E. Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State (London: University of 
California Press, 1996), 30, 41. 
55
 Ibid., 144, 308. 
82 
 
conference Southern representatives were persuaded by the Northern elites and by the 
British to accept Sudanese unity. Although vague promises regarding self-government 
were made, they were not kept and Southerners were again treated like colonial 
subjects. With few exceptions, government posts in the South were filled by 
Northerners,
56
 and the inhumane treatment of Southerners led to violent rebellion by 
1955. Soon, violence above and beyond the usual tribal skirmishes was being associated 
with Muslims and Northerners, and cultural loathing for Northern peoples developed.
57
 
During the Abboud military regime, policies of Islamisation and Arabisation, such as 
the closing of missionary schools and the building of mosques, were carried out and 
local cultures eradicated through the imposition of central authority. The more sedentary 
peoples of the Equatoria province were most affected by these changes,
58
 leading to the 
rise of separatist guerrilla and political movements in the region. That Islamisation was 
not accompanied by economic growth or any increase in existential security in the 
South (in fact the situation  as quite the opposite),  ade Khartou ’s supposed goal of 
cultural and ideological unity entirely elusive. 
 
The First North-South War, 1955-1972 
The first North-South war was triggered by the violent oppression of Southerners by 
Northern Sudanese ad inistrators and soldiers,  hich included “large  ilitary 
manoeuvres in the countryside and collective punishments such as confiscation of cattle 
and burning of crops and villages.”59 In addition, raiding by Arab tribes along the 
North-South border regions contributed to the widespread physiological and security 
deprivation experienced by the Southern peoples. The first separatist movements 
developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s were among Equatorian soldiers,
60
 the 
Southern group most aware of, and affected by, the injustices. A political movement, 
the Sudan African National Union (SANU), was created, but it was divided between 
those favouring self-determination and those willing to cooperate with Khartoum 
through some sort of federal arrangement. Other regional political movements and 
various self-declared ‘govern ents’ ca e into existence during the 1960s,61 but 
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remained weak due to tribalism. The military wing, the Anyanya, was somewhat more 
united under General Joseph Lagu and capable of subordinating politicians under the 
title of SSLM (South Sudan Liberation Movement). However, the military wing was too 
weak to unite Southerners or to mobilise sufficient numbers outside Equatoria. In fact, 
the Anyanya achieved some cohesion and increased its numbers (from 5,000 to 13,000 
according by one estimate)
62
 in 1969 only after Lagu started receiving military aid from 
Israel and thus could provide important material benefits for his followers.
63
 
Nevertheless, it was mostly made up of ethnic units.
64
 
 
Although the cattle-herding Nilotic peoples were also affected by Northern oppression, 
they had yet to be convinced of the necessity of abandoning their traditional 
independence. Rebel movements did proliferate also among the Dinka and the Nuer 
when the war spread from the eastern Equatoria to the western Bahr al-Ghazal 
province,
65
 but movements remained relatively local. According to Hutchinson, during 
the first civil  ar, “it took years for so e Nuer co  unities to beco e convinced that 
the govern ent ar y  as their principal ene y.”66 Also, the Equatorian soldiers were 
often perceived as Khartou ’s allies.67 Although many of the separatist leaders made 
clear that they were fighting to protect a common Southern, African, and Christian 
identity,
68
 such a common identity remained feeble during the first war and failed to 
mobilise people in great numbers. It seems that at this point the destruction caused by 
Khartoum had not been either complete or long-lasting enough to warrant the 
abandonment of traditional solutions and needs strategies. Some mobilisation ensued, 
but unity did not. The leadership of the Anyanya, not to mention the politicians, was not 
strong enough to overcome the lack of trust between tribes and they were also incapable 
of offering a viable all-Southern needs strategy as an alternative. 
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The consequences of the first civil war, however, were important for the awareness of 
the Southern peoples, which later affected their readiness to grow into a nation. The 
spread of Christianity accelerated as a result of the existential dilemmas caused by the 
war and the Islamisation carried out by Khartoum,
69
 which by now had became a 
permanent Other for most Southern peoples. At the same time, there was increased 
awareness of their oppression and political marginalisation in comparison with the 
North and also with the Western world. The Sudanese government was increasingly 
blamed for failing to provide better schools, roads, and health services.
70
 For some 
tribes, the feeling of relative deprivation became overwhelming. The Nuer, for example, 
by the end of the  ar, sa  the selves as “an ignorant people  ho kno  nothing,”71 
which may well have given an impetus for accepting new collective identities. The 
psychological benefits brought about by the rise in Christianity may have partly 
compensated for the incapacity of the people to act in concert to repel the Northerners 
and restore a feeling of existential security, but it hardly eliminated the need for action 
and change in the long run. 
 
The efforts of the Anyanya, however, were partly successful in leading to peace in 
1973, whereby Khartoum allowed the creation of a legitimate Southern government 
with powers of taxation and the integration of the Anyanya into the Sudanese ar y’s 
Southern Command.  Despite the influence of tribal and local interests, as well as severe 
inefficiencies within the regional government,
72
 the creation of this first all-Southern 
authority provided the opportunity to perceive politics in non-tribal terms, making a 
unified or federal Sudan a feasible alternative.
73
 Although the regional government did 
not prove especially effective due to the easy co-opting of leaders into the political fold 
of Khartoum,
74
 it was a long-awaited tool for the Southerners to protect their interests 
and to increase their security vis-à-vis the North.
75
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The Second North-South War 1983-2005 
As  entioned above, the 1973 peace agree ent’s concessions regarding political and 
cultural autonomy in the South were soon undermined by the Nimeiry regime. The 
collapse of the agreement meant that the Southerners lost their only political means of 
protecting tribal and regional needs strategies and that survival was consequently again 
at stake. The collapse of existing needs strategies was also a result of the extractive 
policies of Khartoum. In the inter-war period, Southern peoples were being displaced 
and their lands appropriated due to oil exploration and the expansion of mechanized 
agricultural schemes that provided food for the Northern masses.
76
 The building of the 
Jonglei Canal, which would have ensured water security in the North but may have 
resulted in a human and ecological disaster in the South, was being pursued, also 
causing displacement.
77
 In addition, famished Baqqara herders were armed and 
encouraged to pillage Dinka lands in Bahr al-Ghazal and Kordofan, resulting in 
widespread famine in the later 1980s, especially among the Dinka. These policies were 
further exacerbated by the draught of the 1980s. Thus, already at the beginning of the 
conflict “[t]he disruption of the rural areas  as far  ore i  ediate and far  ore severe 
than anything experienced during the fighting of the first civil war in the 1960s and 
1970s.”78 
 
The destruction of local needs strategies played an important role in identity change. 
Even in times of peace, a rural Southerner had few alternative status roles capable of 
ensuring survival. Once the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or Arab militias entered the 
region and carried out their policies of cattle-stealing and field-burning, many 
Southerners were left without traditional opportunities for needs fulfilment. The only 
alternatives were working in the mechanised agricultural schemes on appropriated land 
run by Arabs, working with aid agencies, fighting for the government in the SAF, or 
joining the SPLA.
79
 The last option was by far the most common of the four, and often 
resulted in at least a partial abandonment of tribal identities in favour of a Sudanese one. 
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Even peoples who would have preferred to remain outside the conflict were transformed 
during the war in terms of identity. For the Uduk tribe, for example, identity change 
from peaceful tribalism to oppositional Southernism became inevitable when even the 
“relatively neutral rural co  unities” in the Southern region  ere classified by the 
Northerners as Southerners in terms of both culture and religion – “and therefore likely 
to be rebel supporters.”80 
 
The collapse of traditional needs strategies thus triggered a search for alternative 
affiliations capable of addressing the problem of survival. The reason why an all-
Southern group in particular was perceived as a viable alternative was the increased 
awareness of the possibility of an alternative needs strategy based on the use of 
Southern resources. By 1983, Southerners were well aware of the plans to refine oil 
being extracted fro  Southern territory. Turabi’s atte pts to redra  the boundary 
between North and South so as to make the oil fields part of the Northern Kordofan 
province had caused demonstrations in the South, leading to the replacement of 
Southern troops by Northern ones. Clashes occurred as well along the North-South 
border in other mineral-rich regions.
81
 These regions had provided by the peace 
agreement the right to organise a referendum to determine future status, but this was 
now revoked. In June 1983, Nimeiry defied the Southern regional government by 
dividing the South into three provinces without its consent, aiming to politically weaken 
the South. The vote among Southern representatives on the issue suggests that a 
common Southern fate had by then become a reality. Only the Equatorians, traditionally 
opposed to “Dinkais ” in the regional govern ent, still perceived the selves as part of 
a separate community and voted for the division.
82
 
 
The cultural oppression that resu ed in full after the restoration of Shari’a la  in 
September 1983 is considered another factor contributing to the resumption of war. 
However, former Anyanya Generals had already started organising the second civil war 
in the su  er of 1983. Although the Shari’a la s  ay  ell have contributed to the 
willingness of Southerners to bolster their common Southern Sudanese identity, the war 
                                                          
80
 James, “War & ’Ethnic Visibility,’” 142. 
81
 Lesch, The Sudan, 48. 
82
 Daly, War of Visions, 226. For a comprehensive analysis of the discussion on re-division, see Raphael 
K. Badal, “Political Cleavages  ithin the Southern Sudan: An E pirical Analysis of the Re-Division 
Debate,” in Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan (see note 4), 105-125. 
87 
 
would likely have taken place regardless due to the severity of deprivation. In any case, 
the oppressive actions of the North, both relating to economic resources as well as 
identity, continued year after year, increasing the awareness among the Southern tribes 
that a permanent alternative to tribalism was needed if physiological and security needs 
fulfilment was ever to be restored. Even if this had not completely crystallised among 
the tribal masses at large, by 1983, it was well known among Southern politicians, 
elites, and the future leaders of the SPLA. 
 
During the war, the common Southern identity was strengthened as the SPLA gradually 
toppled the SAF and various government-sponsored militias, as well as alternative rebel 
groups, and extended its presence in the South so as to restore some level of security 
and justice.
83
 Significantly, a common identity was being created despite the fact that 
the original aim of the SPLM/A was not Southern secession but Sudanese unity. The 
main theme of the SPLM/A Manifesto
84
 as  ell as SPLM/A leader John Garang’s 
public speeches
85
 was the elimination of class differences between the core and 
periphery. The reason why a new common identity nevertheless crystallised was 
because after SPLA victories, and given the intransigence of the Khartoum regime in 
changing its policies, Southern independence was perceived as the fastest way of 
rectifying physiological and security PRD. Thus, the independence project which came 
to fruition through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 2005, autonomy in 
July 2005, and independence on 9 July 2011 originated not in the need to distinguish 
oneself from the Other, but in the rational need to survive. 
 
Class Position and Identity 
This section has shown how a new Southern national identity developed among the 
peoples positioned in the periphery of the structure of Sudanese society who did not (at 
all) benefit from the common needs strategy imposed by the centre. The separation of 
what today is South Sudan from the rest of Sudan happened gradually, due to the severe 
deprivation and the repeated collapse of traditional needs strategies, caused by the 
raiding, killing, and political oppression carried out by colonial powers and, after 
Sudanese independence, by the Northerners. The Southern identity crystallised during 
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the second civil war for various reasons. First, the severe physiological deprivation 
caused by Khartou ’s policies required that alternative sources of existential security 
be obtained. Second, the existence of Southern resources meant that Southernism 
became a viable alternative to tribalism. Third, the war itself forced the Southern 
peoples to choose sides once they were faced with the Northern SAF or Arab militias. 
The creation of a new identity was thus not an issue of religion or ideology, but of 
collective survival. 
 
 
3.3. Sudanese Identity: Conclusion 
 
This chapter tackled the issue of the rise of identity and the use of ideology in 
circumstances of low needs efficiency and strong class differences. As Sudanese history 
testifies and as class conflict theorists have argued, class position in such a core-
periphery structure indeed influences identity and also ideology. In Northern Sudan, the 
relatively gratified elites who most benefited from the ingroup strategy used varying 
understandings of Arabism and readings of Islam to justify their relative gratification 
and the core-periphery structure in general. The semi-periphery, which consisted of the 
Northern Arab non-riverine tribes, remained relatively deprived and continued 
exercising traditional needs strategies despite significant connections to the centre. The 
semi-peripheral tribes accordingly adopted only so e aspects of the centre’s identity 
and used its ideologies only when needing to justify conflicts with the periphery. The 
periphery, which did not benefit from the common strategy at all, was not influenced 
either by the identity or ideology of the centre, and thus could perceive class differences 
in an objective manner and choose to develop a new ingroup with better chances of 
ensuring physiological and security fulfilment. 
 
Since new groupness can come about rationally, as a response to ongoing physiological 
deprivation, so statehood can also be a wholly rational project when it occurs on the 
lower levels of needs fulfilment. Although statehood is often seen as being driven by 
collective identity, and although constructivist accounts of nationhood or statehood tend 
to emphasise the interests of the elites and their manipulation of mass interest in the 
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state-creation process,
86
 one must acknowledge that the nature of statehood also 
depends on the overall needs level. Although the Sudanese conflict, for example, is 
often seen in ter s of identity, Northern Musli  ‘Arabs’ versus Southern ‘Africans’ 
adhering to Christianity and animism, these categories were not the main causes of 
independence. The independence of South Sudan in 2011 was a consequence of the 
group identification rationally used to address the existential threat in place since 1956. 
On the lower levels, statehood may thus be a contingent fact
87
 resulting from necessity, 
rather than a complex manipulative process. 
 
The assumption that identity has persuasive power across time and space is problematic 
also for explaining mobilisation. In the Sudan, identity could not possibly have affected 
mobilisation, given that in the North it re ained “far fro  achieved,”88 and because in 
the South, a Southern identity developed only during and after the conflict. Since 
identities and ideologies are flexible on low needs levels, they cannot have any power in 
defining mass interest; no ideological hegemony is possible on this level. As was seen 
in the case of Northern tribes, the elites may adhere to their own ideologies, but 
imposing them on others is difficult. In societies characterised by physiological 
deprivation, therefore, ideologies are thus not the “true philosophy” leading to the 
transformation of reality,
89
 as Gramsci once suggested. Both identity and hegemony can 
have a persuasive effect only when connected to a beneficial needs strategy. If the needs 
strategy is ineffective, also identity and hegemony are of no value. 
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4. The Sudan: Mobilisation and Leadership in Physiological/Security PRD 
 
 
This chapter will examine the nature of mobilisation and the role of leadership in 
physiological and security PRD. This will be done by describing the onset of the second 
North-South war (1983-2005) and the intertribal conflicts that took place in the 
Southern region during this time. It will be argued that on the lowest level of needs 
fulfilment mobilisation is largely automatic and immediate and that individuals 
accordingly tend to identify with groups and leaders offering immediate means of 
addressing the experienced deprivation. In line with the hypotheses of Chapter 2, it will 
be shown that group affiliation in severe deprivation depends on material factors and 
consequently that the outcome of conflict is largely dependent on the funds and coercive 
capacities of alternative leaders. A comparison of Southern mobilisation and 
mobilisation among Northern tribal and semi-professional forces towards the end of the 
war and during the Darfur conflict (2003-) will further emphasise the correlation 
between low needs fulfilment and the spontaneous nature of collective violence.  
 
The first section of the chapter will investigate the spontaneity of mobilisation in a 
situation where traditional needs strategies have collapsed and physiological and 
security deprivation prevail as a result. It will examine the onset of the conflict, the 
(un)importance of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) political ideology 
for mobilisation, the way in which collective identity in physiological deprivation loses 
its value, and how materialism alone directs collective behaviour. The second section 
will briefly introduce the Darfur conflict and describe the nature of mobilisation on the 
opposite side – the government-led Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and the tribal 
janjaweed militias – and show how the difficulty of mobilisation increases as one moves 
up on the needs hierarchy. The conclusion will argue for an evolutionary understanding 
of conflict dynamics in physiological and security PRD. 
 
 
4.1. South Sudan: Mobilisation and Leadership 
 
This section will examine the ease of mobilisation and the insignificant role of political 
ideology in conflicts taking place in physiological and security deprivation. Because 
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physiological and security deprivation are often experienced in situations of low needs 
efficiency, where existing needs strategies are under severe threat or collapsing, these 
two levels are difficult to distinguish and must be examined in the context of the same 
conflict. As the present section aims to show, survival, and consequently materialism, 
are the main motivators on these lower levels of needs fulfilment, although a slight 
difference in the role of political leadership and awareness-raising may be detected 
between the two needs levels. 
 
The Spontaneity of Mobilisation 
Physiological and security deprivation were a reality in Southern Sudan by the early 
1980s. The Sudanese government was appropriating the lands of various peripheral 
tribes and destroying their traditional livelihoods. The decentralisation of the South 
carried out by Nimeiry had the desired effect of causing disagreements over tribal 
authority and land use between various Shilluk and Dinka tribes,
1
 and inter-tribal peace 
mechanisms largely ceased to function. From the mid-1980s, the situation worsened, 
especially in Bahr al-Ghazal, where Baqqara Arab tribes were given weapons by the al-
Mahdi government
2
 for the purposes of raiding the Dinka and ensuring their own needs 
fulfilment in conditions of severe scarcity.
3
 The arming of militias in already poor 
regions in turn led to famine and displacement of tens of thousands of people. 
 
Physiological and security-level deprivation caused stress in regard to future survival, 
triggering a desire to accept alternative needs strategies offered by leaders other than 
tribal elders. In addition, the collapse of local tribal strategies caused the loss of status 
fulfilment for young men and boys who previously would have adopted the lifestyles of 
their forefathers, resulting in a large-scale search for other status-enhancing activities. 
Severe deprivation and the inability of the masses to rely on traditional survival 
strategies caused them to accept potentially successful rebel groups as alternative 
legitimate leaders and allowed for the widespread and immediate mobilisation of 
resistance among the various Southern peoples. Given the low needs efficiency and 
limited number of roles available for individuals in the traditional context, the collapse 
                                                          
1
 Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 1997), 23-24. 
2
 Umma Party Sadiq al-Mahdi was Prime Minister in 1986-1989, during the brief period of democratic 
rule between the military regimes of Gaafar Nimeiry and Omar al-Bashir. 
3
 David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 
1983-1989 (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), passim. 
93 
 
of local strategies happened easily and affected whole generations of men. Lack of 
security and status together made it possible for existing collective identities to be 
devalued and alternative ones to be adopted based solely on the immediate benefits they 
provided. 
 
Some authors have described the Southern Sudanese conflicts as generational,
4
 being 
essentially driven by the desire of younger men to find useful status roles. The 
generational nature of the conflicts in South Sudan cannot, however, be separated from 
the collapsing of the group survival strategies, which made it impossible for anyone 
within the community to retain traditional roles. Hutchinson describes this process 
among the Nuer: in the traditional community, the only source of empowerment was the 
group, and the traditional source of status was cattle. This began to change during the 
1970s when awareness rose regarding alternative and individualistic means of 
empowerment. During the 1980s, however, the local economy collapsed and the tribal 
elders found it impossible to provide even the basic coping resources for members of 
the community. At this time, the possession of guns developed into a new source of 
empowerment.
5
 Many of the eastern Nuer even joined the rebel movement for the 
explicit purpose of acquiring guns,
6
 often for raiding purposes.
7
 The subsequent 
alienation of young men from their original tribes led to the abandonment of tradition, 
which was also supported by SPLA leaders.
8
 The collapse of the fragile tribal needs 
strategies thus caused not only security but also massive status deprivation, which 
consequently led to wide-scale mobilisation and in the long run to the potential adoption 
of new group identities. 
 
Southern mobilisation has also been described as largely unnatural, given that the SPLA 
mobilised, or even abducted, young boys by force, or lured them to the SPLA training 
camps with promises of education in Ethiopia.
9
 According to some testimonies, this was 
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sometimes true, but according to others, mobilisation was often also a result of the 
absence of alternative means of needs fulfilment. Boys and men joined the SPLA to 
gain access to arms and to protect local communities;
10
 some even returned home for a 
while and then voluntarily left again.
11
 In essence, “the  ajority of Southerners fought 
or supported those wars to protect the home and to overcome their sense of 
po erlessness in relation to the  ilitary.”12 This was especially common in 
communities with individuals of a higher level of awareness of the situation, given that: 
 
[...]it was very difficult for young men who had completed intermediate and 
senior high school to find a job or to continue their studies in higher 
institutions. Most of them were forced to return to their villages, and the rest 
stayed in the towns, still hoping for employment. Later, almost all of them 
joined the SPLA and played a leading role in its military operations.
13
 
 
For many, therefore, the second North-South war was a question of survival. Even 
before the war officially began in 1983, the masses were plagued by insecurity, 
collapsing commerce,
14
 and oppression by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). 
Mobilisation began simply because there were few alternative routes to needs 
fulfilment. In the early 1980s regional rebel movements proliferated
15
 and “[t]he 
insurrection that ensued throughout the South was spontaneous and, apart from the 
general contradiction and antagonism of the North, every tribal grouping in the South 
had its own agenda for joining the insurrection.”16 These agendas included everything 
from protection of local strategies, to revenge against neighbouring tribes (whether Arab 
or Southern), and the settling of old scores.
17
 Ideology thus played practically no role. 
As Nyaba  rites, “[... the] majority of the people who joined the SPLM/A did so not out 
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of political a areness or revolutionary zeal alone but out of anger  ith the regi e,”18 
and as per Collins, the “SPLA  as a peasant ar y  ith little political consciousness.”19 
 
The Role of the SPLM/A’s Political Ideologies 
There were originally various rebel movements in the South but the individuals who 
managed to forge a cohesive movement were the ones with the highest level of political 
awareness and clear personal grievances against the government. These were mainly 
former Anyanya rebels who had remained in the bush during the entire inter-war period 
and others unhappily incorporated into the SAF.
20
 Violent incidents between Southern 
and Northern troops in the South had occurred since 1974,
21
 although the second civil 
war is usually understood to have been triggered by the revolt of the 105
th
 Bor battalion 
in April 1983 and subsequent mutinies in May and June. Consequent clashes between 
Northern army units and the soldiers of the Southern Command led to the defection of 
about 3,000 Southern soldiers by July 1983, many of whom crossed the border to 
Ethiopia
22
 where the SPLA began to train recruits and develop a political platform. 
 
It is important to note that the rise of John Garang to SPLA leadership was not 
automatic, and that it was not him or the other commanders, often calling themselves 
Anyanya 2, who really initiated the civil war. Conflict was already a reality in various 
parts of the South, and the commanders simply attempted to unite the various rebel 
movements. The reason why Garang and the SPLA became victorious in the struggle 
for leadership was because of the military and ideological support provided by the 
Ethiopian Mengistu regime. This regime was Marxist, and favoured a clearly socialist 
and non-secessionist movement in Southern Sudan.
23
 The influence of Ethiopia ensured 
that the SPLM manifesto came to include Marxist phraseology, although these remained 
without any influence in the daily functioning of the movement and were soon dropped 
entirely.
24
 For several years, Garang’s speeches in public and on Radio SPLA 
emphasised the economic challenges of Sudan, the marginalisation of the peripheries, 
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and the corruption in Khartoum.
25
 Far from rejecting Northern culture or highlighting 
Southern superiority, he suggested that Arabic be retained as the official language of the 
entire Sudan,
26
 and instead of attacking the North as a whole, he attacked Khartoum 
elites, his  orst insult perhaps being calling Ni eiry a “dictator and onster.”27 
 
In addition to Ethiopian support, Garang’s o n background and personality prevented 
the SPLA leadership from emphasising the growing Southern identity. Unlike most 
Southern leaders of the time, Garang chose not to take refuge either in his tribal identity 
(so as not to promote a tribal followership) or in his Southern identity (which he might 
have done in the hope of one day becoming leader of an independent South Sudan). 
Instead, during the course of his life he developed a non-tribal and modern way of 
thinking, leading him to prioritise development over identity and equality over 
superiority. He was well aware of Southern grievances; his years of study in the United 
States and Tanzania included a Ph.D. on the Jonglei Canal and its potential 
environmental effects on the Sudd wetlands. Having been part of the Anyanya 
movement and thereafter rising to rank of Colonel in the SAF, Garang had seen the 
sufferings of the Sudanese peripheries, which likely contributed to his chosen rhetoric 
of a “Ne  Sudan”28 characterised by racial equality and freedom of religion. In short, he 
wanted to save the whole of Sudan from its sufferings, not only the Southern peoples. 
 
Ho ever, it is unclear  hether Garang’s idea of a “Ne  Sudan” had any real effect on 
mobilisation among the tribal masses at large.
29
 The idea of a “Ne  Sudan”  as 
disseminated through radio and in SPLA training camps, which combined hard physical 
training with political indoctrination. While the training camps did produce a division of 
motivated soldiers yearly,
30
 the ideological side left something to be desired. Violence 
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was not limited to Northern army units, but extended to Southern civilians.
31
 In their 
testimonies to anthropologists and NGO representatives, SPLA soldiers have almost 
never referred to political motivations besides the need to be protected fro  the ‘Arabs.’ 
It is possible that few Southerners, both due to their age and their peasant background, 
never came to understand or much care for the ideologies offered. According to a Nuer 
recruit who had trained at Bonga camp: 
 
He [Yusif Kuwa, SPLA commander in the Nuba Mountains] used to give us 
political lessons [...] I don’t recall  uch of  hat he said, nor of  hat  y 
political commissar at the training centre told me. I just hated how we were 
made to sit do n for a long ti e, listening to  ords that I didn’t understand! 
However, all revolved around freedom for the marginalized people in the 
Sudan, and that we were fighting for our right! In fact I was aware of the 
two objectives of the SPLA/M: justice and equality, but it  asn’t a big deal 
by then...
32
 
 
If SPLA ideology did have an effect on recruits, this would suggest that awareness-
raising in physiological or security PRD need not be racist or ideological to allow for 
mobilisation, and that no element of manipulation need to be present. If it did not, this 
would suggest that awareness-raising is wholly unimportant in physiological/security 
PRD. It can be argued that both alternatives apply. Where individuals suffered from 
security PRD, as in the South in general and parts of the North, the overall political 
context did play a role and awareness-raising carried out by the SPLA thus was of use 
in mobilising people, or at least in forging acceptance for the movement in principle. 
Where individuals suffered from physiological deprivation, on the other hand, the 
content of ideology played no role. The latter situation can be exemplified by the Pari 
(in Equatoria), who did not understand the Arabic or English broadcasts of Radio SPLA 
(or did not even own a radio). They  ere thus largely una are of the ideas of a “Ne  
Sudan” as  ell as of the various infor ation and disinfor ation provided,33 and of the 
extent of common grievances against the Arabs (presented in vernacular broadcasts).
34
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They were aware only of their own deprivation. Still, among the Pari, about 2,500 out of 
a population of 11,000 sought out the SPLA and joined the movement by the end of 
1984.
35
 
 
Given that SPLA units were regional and often worked independently under their 
commanders, it is no surprise that Garang’s ideology did not reach the  asses, or  as 
ignored by them. Instead, the ideology which developed in the various units came to 
reflect the necessity of empowerment under new leaders. According to Nyaba, SPLA 
songs were designed to create a cult around the SPLA leadership, and “[...] instead of 
praising the revolution or liberation struggle, the soldiers idolised and mystified the 
leaders.”36 However, some songs also reflect the pride of finding a new, if inevitable, 
means of empowerment in the struggle against the Other. Some songs highlighted the 
persistence of the Southerners in opposing suffering and humiliation. This is the case in 
the SPLA songs reproduced by Deng: 
 
O, the liberation struggle of my country/ When I rose and hoisted my 
weapon high/ To shoot and chase away the one who has transgressed on me/ 
And has betrayed the pride and dignity of my nation!/ Man, rise and shoot to 
kill the coward who has betrayed the  cause of your life/ And the virtues of 
your nation/ Prove to him your existence.../ Rise, sister and shoot the 
coward/ Prove to him your existence./ O, land of our Forefathers/ We have 
dedicated to you our blood and our last breath/ Let it be liberation or death/ 
Let the struggle continue until victory is won/ Martyr after Martyr/ The 
struggle will continue until victory is won.
37
 
 
In these songs, as in the ideology of the movement in general, the mythology of identity 
or culture, or the dehumanisation of the Other, did not play a role. The need to find a 
way of opposing Northern oppression was so clear that individual experiences were 
more than sufficient cause for mobilisation. Hatred need not be incited, because the 
necessity to act against Northerners was self-evident. Therefore, for individuals 
suffering from physiological deprivation, joining the movement was inevitable. On the 
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other hand, for individuals suffering from security deprivation, as well as for the leaders 
of various co  unities in general, Garang’s ideology had the very i portant effect of 
highlighting their awareness of Northern Otherness and the rational benefits of joining 
the movement. This was especially important on the Northern side of the border among 
the Nuba, Ingessana, and Beja peoples. These were Muslim but non-Arab peoples, all of 
whom had for several decades suffered from the appropriation of land by the 
government and incursions by Arab tribes.
38
 Due to the rational, all-Sudanese approach 
promoted by Garang, the leaders of these peoples could decide to put aside the clear 
cultural differences between the North and South and temporarily ally themselves with 
the SPLA against fellow Muslims. 
 
The Materialism of Identification 
The SPLA was for many years hindered by the same problems as the Anyanya during 
the previous insurgency. The SPLA was initially perceived as a Dinka, or at best a 
Nilotic movement, because its leader, John Garang was a Twic Dinka and the other 
founding  e bers  ere either Dinka or Nuer. In particular, the Equatorians’ attitude 
towards the movement was dismissive due to their opposition to Nilotic domination 
during autonomy.
39
 In the early years, the SPLA had to fight various government 
militias among the Mundari, Murle, and Toposa tribes.
40
 The internal weakness of the 
 ove ent also resulted in a co plete division by 1984 of Garang’s SPLA and Nuer 
units (including those calling themselves Anyanya 2 under the leadership of William 
Abdallah Chuol, Paulino Matip Nhial, and others.
41
 The Nuer faction intermittently 
fought against the SAF as a parallel organisation to the SPLA, sometimes in 
cooperation and sometimes not, but also occasionally hindered SPLA progress by 
committing massacres of SPLA recruits.
42
 Eventually, in 1991, despite the overall 
success of the SPLA under Garang,
43
 several SPLA commanders in the Nuer-populated 
Nasir area (Riek Machar, Lam Akol, Gordon Kong Chuol) sided with Khartoum. 
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Despite clai ing opposition to Garang’s authoritarian tendencies44 and preference for 
Southern independence over unity, the Nuer commanders were driven by their hunger 
for status and resources in the absence of rewarding status roles. After the collapse of 
the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, the main benefactor of the movement during the 1980s, 
the SPLA had grown weaker.  The NGOs in the Nasir area, in turn, had developed into 
a new source of authority for the competing Nuer leaders.
45
 In August 1991, they 
decided to publicly dismiss Garang as SPLM chairman. After Garang refused to give up 
his position, these commanders formed a separate faction of the SPLA, SPLA-Nasir (by 
its other name SPLA-United, as opposed to Garang’s SPLA-Torit/Mainstream). Failing 
to gather political support among Southerners at large, however, Riek relied on 
Khartou ’s  aterial and  ilitary aid to retain his position a ong his Nuer 
constituency. To punish Garang for retaining leadership of the movement, Riek in 1991 
led the Nuer-Nasir fighters against their Dinka neighbours, leading to the Bor massacre 
in which thousands of Dinka civilians were killed and enslaved.
46
 In return for 
Khartou ’s support, Riek also  elco ed the SAF back into the South and cooperated 
with government forces in 1993 and 1994 to topple SPLA-Torit in the Equatoria and 
Bahr al-Ghazal regions.
47
 
 
What is  ore interesting than Riek’s questionable strategies of personal fulfil ent, 
though, is that his followers (comprising mostly Bul Nuer, Luo Nuer, and the 
diminished Anyanya 2 of Chuol
48
) accepted them as long as their basic needs were met 
 ith Khartou ’s provisions. In conditions of lo  needs efficiency, the availability of an 
alternative source of material benefits became an immediate source of mobilisation. 
This further supports the conclusion that quite opposite to being motivated by tribal 
identity, the Nuer, as well as the various other tribal militias of the South, were 
motivated by the necessity of finding alternative needs-fulfilling strategies. Even the 
Dinka and Nuer leaders did not appeal to tribal identities, but to necessity. Riek and 
Garang both constantly appealed to political, rather than tribal, awareness, and Riek 
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even tried to turn his Nuer-dominated SPLA-United into a more ethnically diverse 
South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) to convince people of his political potential. The 
conflict was purely about needs, both of the masses and of the leaders. As one Dinka 
soldier explained: “We don’t care about their political careers, at least not to the point of 
killing ourselves. They know this and that is why they have to make it sound as if tribal 
wealth [cattle] is under threat from the rival tribe in order to persuade people to wage 
 ar.”49 
 
The masses were thus not interested in following political or ethnic categories, but only 
in figuring out the party to the conflict capable of offering the best material resources 
for survival, whether it was the government or a Southern entity. These motivations are 
exemplified by the case of the so-called ‘White Ar y’. This group  as  ade up of 
young Nuer men from various tribes living in challenging conditions characterised by 
existential scarcity.
50
 The fact that it fought not only against the Dinka but raided also 
Nuer villages suggests that it was not motivated by political or tribal ideology as much 
as by the easy access to weapons in the Nuer region, caused by the alliance between 
Riek and the government.
51
 Given that the movement served only the accumulation of 
wealth and status among its members,
52
 “[i]n the co petition for support fro  the  hite 
army between the SSDF and the SPLA, the SSDF won out, in essence, because it 
provided  ore  eapons.”53 The decision of the young Nuer men to choose 
individualistic criminal needs strategies over traditional status roles also entailed a 
refusal to respect Nuer tribal elders. This caused them to be spurned by their own 
communities, leading them to become even more estranged from their tribes and to 
further undermine traditional culture. 
 
Thus, although collective action during the civil war was most often based on tribal 
affiliation, the emphasis was on action itself rather than the importance of the tribe. 
Once the situation deteriorated into physiological deprivation, even traditional tribal 
identifications started to collapse into smaller concentrations of common fate, as 
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became evident in the intra-Nuer civil war. The unconvincing needs strategy offered by 
Riek and the government could not fully compensate for the meagre harvests in the 
Nuer region, and the acquisition of Khartoum-provided firearms by the Luo Nuer 
precipitated open warfare between the Luo and Jikany Nuer.
54
 The availability of 
firepower and the consequent opportunity to escape from existential scarcity through 
raiding and stealing had more motivational force than any pre-existing Nuer identity. 
Group identification on this level of scarcity was thus wholly connected to the present 
challenges of needs fulfilment and the material benefits offered by alternative group 
affiliations. Any potential unity arising from shared culture and identity, and a shared 
future, was rendered non-existent due to the pressing nature of needs fulfilment. 
 
The Role of Authoritarianism 
The materialism of identification in severe deprivation meant that the success of 
leadership and the cohesion of the Southern movements depended wholly on the 
capacity of the leaders to maintain a position of control regarding the sharing of material 
resources. Garang lost this material hegemony when the Mengistu regime collapsed in 
1991, and had to rely instead on international relief organisations and the resources of 
the local people.
55
 The increasing dependence on the local population and the 
impossibility of continuing the war indefinitely also forced Garang to address the 
question of self-determination and grievances against the movement, essentially 
creating a complete shift in SPLM/A ideology.
56
 As Riek’s  ove ent gradually 
collapsed due to its ineffectiveness and leadership struggles,
57
 the SPLM/A had the 
chance to recover. It arranged a National Convention in 1994 in which far-reaching 
decisions were made regarding the organisation of administration in the South.
58
 
However, the movement fully regained its authority only after it had again managed to 
restore some level of intertribal security through traditional dispute resolution 
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mechanisms
59
 and a certain level of commercial activity in the South,
60
 thus lifting the 
masses from the physiological level back to security needs fulfilment.
61
 
 
Nyaba, the main authority on the SPLA split, argues that the SPLM/A could have 
avoided many of its problems through openness and democracy in its early years. Yet, 
in the same book, he describes why democracy failed to work in the inter-war era. 
Southern politicians proved incapable of maintaining consistent political ideologies and 
cohesive political parties because “[t]he  eak econo ic base of  any South Sudanese 
could not allo  the  to re ain long in opposition politics.”62 For example, politicians 
who had demanded freedom and self-determination were, in the inter-war period, in the 
regional government and soon supporting the status quo.
63
 As Nyaba himself states, 
“[a]fter attaining  hat they had been cla ouring for over the years, i.e. access to the 
resources of the state through ministerial portfolios, this elite forgot about what the 
people of South Sudan had sacrificed their lives for in the seventeen-year  ar.”64 The 
same pattern, unfortunately, applied to the elites of the SPLA. Given the desire of the 
elite to escape the deprivation plaguing Southerners in general, political ideologies 
serving mass interest could be maintained only by the most resolute individuals. 
 
Given the level of basic needs deprivation in the South, it is somewhat difficult to 
understand how democratisation and looser control over the movement could have 
helped. The SPLM/A  as pri arily a  ilitary  ove ent, and Garang’s 
authoritarianism, even if unfortunate in humanitarian terms, was key in preventing the 
movement from being completely destroyed by competing leaders and strategies. The 
easy rise of alternative leaders would not have been so dangerous had they all prioritised 
the unity of struggle over their self-interest – but it was almost certain that they would 
not. The masses suffering from physiological deprivation – as Nuer behaviour testifies – 
did not possess the capacity to evaluate the long-term value of ingroup strategies or the 
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suitability of leader personality or ideology.
65
 The spontaneity of collective action on 
the low needs levels means that the SPLA would have been better off not with 
democracy, but with even harsher elimination of alternative factional leaders. 
 
The way that unity in the SPLM/A could be forged was thus not through ideology as 
both Garang’s calls for unity and Riek’s calls for independence had little, if any, effect 
on the Southern masses.  Unity could be achieved only through awareness-raising, 
military successes against various Others, and the capacity to offer superior material 
benefits and needs fulfilment strategies in the long run. Leadership also necessitated the 
ability to see the big picture and the un illingness to succu b to Khartou ’s nepotistic 
politics. Contrary to many Southern leaders since independence, Garang consistently 
refused to join the central government until the 2005 peace agreement, by which time it 
had become clear that toppling the regime was unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable 
future and that secession  as the easier path. Without Garang’s violent 
authoritarianism, the South would have for a much longer period been plagued by 
regional militias, such as those active during the early years, and leaders fighting for 
alliances with the Other.
66
 As Nyaba argues, “[t]he SPLM/A’s internal cohesion  as 
stronger, not because of political or ideological awareness, but because the contradiction 
of the South and North  as stronger than the internal contradictions.”67 This was largely 
thanks to Garang’s effort. 
 
Mobilisation in the South:  Conclusion 
The events of the second North-South war make clear the immediate nature of 
mobilisation in physiological and security PRD. Since survival is at stake, ideology, as 
well as group identity, loses its significance, and identification becomes possible with 
groups or leaders offering superior survival strategies. Especially in physiological 
deprivation, the mere fact of deprivation is sufficient to mobilise people, and practically 
anyone can become the Other. One could thus argue that in severe deprivation, the value 
of perception regarding the relativity of deprivation is practically zero: creating a 
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cohesive movement against a particular enemy cannot be achieved through persuasion, 
but only through authoritarianism and coercion. Also in security PRD, rationality 
matters a great deal. Nevertheless, on this level, political ideology may play an 
important role in defining existing class differences in terms of a certain dichotomy. 
Garang used the (realistic) dichotomy between elite and marginalised tribes, which, 
despite being ignored by the masses of the South, had much persuasive power among 
the Southern elites as well as among various Muslim, but non-Arab, tribes along the 
North-South border. 
 
 
4.2. Comparison: Mobilisation in the North 
 
On the other side of the core-periphery conflict, the Sudanese government mobilised 
various groups made up of Northerners, the main ones being the SAF, the PDF, and the 
janjaweed
68
 militias. While the behaviour of the SAF is largely left out due to the 
meagre amount of information available, the mobilisation of the PDF and janjaweed 
militias is examined through comparison with the mobilisation among the Southern 
tribes. It is argued that although political ideology has played a slightly greater role in 
the behaviour of these Northern militias than in the South, mobilisation among these 
groups can be better explained by the level of needs fulfilment in the Sudanese core-
periphery structure. It should be noted that since the data available on these groups is 
limited, so are the conclusions that can be drawn.  
 
Types of Mobilisation 
The military strategy of the successive Khartoum governments against the peripheries 
consisted of two main elements: sending Northern troops into the periphery to fight the 
insurgents and, at the same time, providing weapons and resources to chosen peripheral 
tribes in order to trigger intertribal conflicts. These strategies were used against the 
Southerners during both North-South civil wars, and also more recently against fellow 
Muslims in Darfur. The Darfur conflict displays similar dynamics as the one in the 
South. Being economically marginalised within Sudan,
69
 Darfuri tribes have 
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experienced long-term physiological and security deprivation caused by desertification, 
governmental neglect, and the war between Chad and Libya (during the 1970s and 
1980s).
70
 These factors have caused repeated intertribal conflicts between the sedentary 
Fur and pastoralist Arab tribes as each tries to fulfil its needs.
71
 
 
The Southern and Northern peripheries have, however, offered different types of 
opponents in terms of identity. Although the SPLM/A’s political platfor   as based on 
economic marginalisation and injustice and in no way highlighted Southern identity,
72
 
the history of Southern Otherness allowed Northern troops to find easy justifications for 
collective violence. Religion played an especially important role: many Northerners 
supported the extension of Shari’a la  to all of Sudan and  ere consequently exhorted 
by the Ulama in 1992 to kill apostates and non-Muslims.
73
 In Darfur, however, the 
dichotomy was less clear. The main insurgent groups, namely the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM, with a largely Zaghawa tribal constituency) and the Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army (SLM/A, made up of Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribesmen) were, 
despite their close links to the SPLM,
74
 fellow Muslims. Although the African tribes of 
Darfur too have a history of deprivation-driven conflict, they have not historically 
fought against the elites of the centre but primarily with the equally physiologically 
deprived Arabs of Darfur. Such conflicts took place in the 1980s and 1990s and were 
mainly over land and resources.
75
 
 
Given that the PDF and tribal militias were mobilised on mostly tribal lines, they are 
often difficult to distinguish from each other. Nevertheless, it seems that the role of 
ideology was greater among the more formal PDF, which was more widely used in the 
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second North-South war and also involved individuals from the riverine tribes. In 
Darfur, on the other hand, the unruly janjaweed force was more effective at carrying out 
violent acts, while its motives seem to be less ideological. 
 
The Popular Defence Forces 
Both the PDF and the janjaweed originated from the tribal militias of the 1980s. During 
the drought of 1985, the poverty-stricken and land-deprived Rizayqat and Missiriyya 
Baqqara Arabs were armed by the government, the purpose being to allow them to 
avoid physiological deprivation through the raiding of Dinka lands. This, of course, had 
the additional effect of protecting the government from an imminent peripheral Arab 
uprising. Then called the “ urahileen”, these group’s co  on needs strategy  as to 
cooperate with the regime in depriving rebellious tribes of their livelihood. Under the 
Turabi-Bashir regime, the use of such militias expanded, especially among the Baqqara 
of northern Bahr al-Ghazal, South Darfur, and South Kordofan, and in 1989 they were 
institutionalised as the PDF.
76
 Later, Abbala Rizayqat (camel-herding) Arabs of Darfur 
joined the fray,
77
 although  any of these tribes “[...] insisted on ca paigning according 
to their seasonal agenda instead of follo ing the ar y’s strategic priorities.”78 
 
As the war in the South raged on, the Bashir-Turabi government began to transform the 
PDF into a religious populist movement and compelled the more privileged masses to 
participate in its activities. In 1990, the government sent thousands of students from 
NIF-affiliated institutions to PDF training camps near the capital.
79
 Also, military 
officers from the SAF, which by the early 1990s was collapsing internally and unwilling 
to continue fighting in the South,  ere integrated into the PDF and “re-educated.”80 The 
PDF soon largely replaced the SAF ground forces, necessitating large-scale recruitment 
through mosques, educational institutions, and the media.
81
 In the PDF, the rebellious 
non-Arabs were portrayed as a threat to the northern Arab tribes.
82
 Around Khartoum, 
PDF recruits spent anywhere from 45 to 60 day periods in training, half of which were 
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used for indoctrination through Islamic lectures on jihad and prayers, and religious 
songs. In addition, martyrdom, tinted with a supernatural perspective, was celebrated 
through ceremonies and media coverage.
83
 This level of indoctrination, however, 
applied primarily to the masses in the centre. Rural PDF militias were either trained 
locally with little or relatively simplistic indoctrination or not trained at all.
84
 
  
Compared to recruitment into the janjaweed, achieved mainly through material perks, 
PDF recruitment was a failure. Recruiting for the SAF had been difficult enough to 
compel the government to abduct people off the street,
85
 and recruiting volunteers into 
the PDF was nearly as dismal. According to one source, in 1997, less than 6% of those 
leaving school who were required to attend PDF training had done so, while some of 
those in training ended up escaping, rebelling, or being killed.
86
 The failure to mobilise 
the masses at the centre led to the intensification of recruitment among the tribal militias 
in the Southern and Western parts of the country and the redevelopment of the SAF. 
According to Salmon, the PDF lost what little appeal remained after Turabi was ousted 
from the Bashir government in 2000 and consequently allied with the arch-enemy of all 
Islamists, the SPLA. The religious nature of the PDF no longer corresponded to the 
needs of the regime, or the ousted Turabi, and the alliance between Turabi and the 
SPLA effectively destroyed the illusion of martyrdom of the PDF volunteers.
87
 
 
Ideology thus played an important role for some recruits, but primarily those near 
enough to Khartoum to not be subjected to physiological or security deprivation. More 
significantly, however, while such ideology was likely to have affected the overall 
patterns of thinking among recruits, it did not lead to their wide-scale mobilisation. 
Identity may have convinced the relatively gratified masses around Khartoum that 
attacking the SPLA and its allies, often equated with Western Christians and Zionists, 
was somehow justified,
88
 but it did not convince them that their own survival was at 
stake or that they should mobilise to protect their own interests. Consequently, among 
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these better-off groups subjected to intensive training, only about 25% wanted to 
participate in “ oderate Isla ic action” and a ere 5% volunteered for co bat.89 
 
The Janjaweed 
In contrast to the PDF, recruitment into the tribal janjaweed was of a radically different 
sort and followed a very different pattern. In the periphery, militia troops were usually 
controlled by local leaders, mobilised around local issues, and sometimes even 
harboured sympathy for the non-Arab rebel movements, as they were well aware of the 
failures of the government in the region.
90
 Being poor but Arab, the mostly nomadic 
peoples of the periphery have been repeatedly forced to decide who is the most salient 
Other. Given that the janjaweed includes former criminals and bandits, as well as 
demobilised soldiers and unemployed young men
91
 suffering from the collapse of or 
personal exclusion from the traditional community, the group inevitably worried more 
about survival than politics. Therefore, although a number of Arab tribal chiefs in 
control of sufficient land resources for collective survival (such as the Beni Hussein of 
North Darfur and some southern Baqqara with their own homelands) refused to 
cooperate with the government,
92
 many young Abbala men joined the janjaweed, 
against the desires of tribal elders, due to the financial benefits offered by the 
government. 
 
Although the government has used the Arab-African divide to define the Darfur 
conflict, portraying it, for example, as a plan of the Zaghawa peoples to push the Arabs 
out of Darfur altogether,
93
 ideology has clearly not been the main motive for conflict. 
The primary source of mobilisation was instead the money flowing into Darfur. 
Depending on their resources (often a camel or horse), tribal affiliation, and training, the 
janjaweed fighters were paid anything between US$30 to US$120 per month, or 
separately for each operation.
94
 They were also given cars, property, and phones by the 
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government.
95
 During the first year of the conflict, the Sudanese government managed 
to recruit as many as 20,000 men into the tribal janjaweed, but when the government 
could no longer afford paying them, participation decreased rapidly.
96
 Mobilisation was 
thus directly connected to survival and only those who had received sufficient pay 
proved willing to continue the fight in the ranks of the government. Meanwhile, others 
turned against it by carrying out attacks against government property and through the 
creation of their own anti-Khartoum movements.
97
 
 
Given the level of deprivation, one can argue that among the parties to conflict, only the 
PDF and SAF did not act in self-defence. It was these groups that also most extensively 
used ideology to justify their actions. Although non-Arab tribes were, during the ethnic 
cleansing, called by both the PDF and the janjaweed anything from slaves, to donkeys, 
dogs, and monkeys,
98
 such names were used primarily in situations where the atrocities 
committed clearly surpassed what was necessary for survival – for example, in towns 
where the SLA/JEM rebels were not present during ethnic cleansing.
99
 Although it is 
impossible to examine the exact content of PDF and janjaweed ideology, the frequency 
of the using racial epithets seems to differ between the two groups. During combined 
janjaweed/PDF/SAF operations, the use of racial epithets were prevalent, while during 
independent janjaweed attacks, their use was less common.
100
 The behaviour of the 
janjaweed thus resembles the material and non-ideological tendencies of the equally 
deprived Southerners. As one janjaweed recruit testified about the use of racist slogans, 
“No it does not  ean anything to  e. Just  e  ere fighting  ith no object... The 
slogans mean nothing to them. These are fighters, just fighters. They are saying the 
slogans, they don't understand anything about it, and they just go on killing.”101 
 
Mobilisation in the North: Conclusion 
The core motivation for individuals to mobilise for violent conflict in the Sudan has 
been the protection of their own interests. This was the case also in Northern Sudan, 
where the relatively gratified PDF was somewhat more difficult to mobilise than the 
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tribal janjaweed. Ideology has not been the main cause of mobilisation but a tool used to 
justify violence against people who do not, in reality, constitute an immediate threat. 
Ideology has also not been sufficient to create cohesion among the Northern Arabs 
themselves. Although the Arab Baqqara and Abbala peoples have usually taken the side 
of the government in local conflicts, the physiological deprivation experienced by all 
tribes in the region has recently caused even them to fight each other
102
 and prompted 
some to oppose the policies of Khartoum politically, as well as through violent means. 
Perhaps the evident failures of the Umma party,
103
 continuing marginalisation under the 
NIF and Bashir governments, the rise of the JEM and SLA, and the degradation of local 
needs strategies to the level of physiological deprivation, are forcing the Arab tribes to 
finally acknowledge class reality. 
 
 
4.3. Sudanese Mobilisation: Conclusion 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, the flexible nature of collective identity in physiological 
deprivation tends to cause problems for collective mobilisation. It was hypothesised that 
in physiological deprivation, leaders must possess greater material and coercive 
resources than alternative leaders if they are to forge a cohesive movement. On the 
security level, on the other hand, leaders may resort to slightly more ideational 
strategies to motivate the masses. Although it is difficult to separate physiological and 
security deprivation from each other in the various conflicts of the Sudan, the findings 
of this chapter support the hypotheses. 
 
Physiological deprivation has been a reality for at least some groups involved in the 
Sudanese wars. In particular, the environmental circumstances experienced by the Nuer 
and janjaweed militias, and the nature of their mobilisation, suggest that in 
physiological deprivation, everyone, even e bers of one’s o n tribe, can be perceived 
as Others, and the only thing motivating individuals is personal survival. On this level, 
people care only for material benefits to support their individual survival and tend to 
affiliate with groups and leaders with the most material resources, irrespective of their 
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ideological credentials. As the case of SPLA-United shows, weak or self-interested 
leaders can be temporarily accepted and followed, but the only way in which the group 
can retain cohesion and rise from physiological deprivation to the security level in the 
long run is through military success. In physiological deprivation, only coercive power 
works, and thus only military leadership is truly effective. 
 
Security PRD, on the other hand, can be said to characterise the Southern and Darfur 
conflicts more generally. This is the level at which identity change can occur and where 
alternative perceptions of class differences may prevail. It can be suggested that in 
regions characterised by security PRD, mobilisation was likely to involve more 
awareness-raising and the use of political ideology. On the side of the rebels, this was, 
for example, the case with the various tribes on the North-South border. On the side of 
the government troops, this was the case with PDF soldiers. On the security level, the 
role of leadership was to convince the masses of the usefulness of a particular strategy 
in the long run. In the South, the SPLA managed to do this through its military 
successes and due to the existence of common resources, which thereafter allowed the 
common Southern identity to crystallise. In Darfur, on the other hand, the insurgency 
failed due to weak leadership
104
 and the absence of material resources to enable a 
separate needs strategy. 
 
In short, on the physiological level, materialism is decisive, while on the security level, 
rationalism prevails in determining collective action. On the physiological level, due to 
the complete collapse of needs fulfilment strategies and high stress, mobilisation is 
automatic but unity is lacking. On the security level, mobilisation is also rather easy and 
identities are flexible. On the physiological level, leaders can forge unity through 
material and coercive means, and on the security level, through the creation of an 
alternative strategy. Therefore, on the lower needs levels, leaders are best seen as 
entrepreneurs of strategy rather than of identity. The existence of natural resources or 
external aid is not necessary for mobilisation, although they are essential for the long-
term success of the movement against a particular Other and for the creation of a new 
needs strategy once the group is lifted from physiological to security PRD. As the group 
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advances on the needs hierarchy, materialism slowly begins to leave space for reason 
and idealism – and to new collective identities with independent motivational power. 
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5. Yugoslavia: Identity and Ideology on the Status Needs Level 
 
 
The case study on the former Yugoslavia concentrates on evaluating the nature of 
identity and mobilisation in status PRD. The present chapter, which examines collective 
identity in the former Yugoslav republics, has two purposes. First, it illustrates that in 
status PRD, the persuasive effects of identity are significantly stronger than has been 
seen to be the case on the lower levels of needs fulfilment. Second, it is argued that on 
the status level, leaders possess the capacity to manipulate mass perceptions and thereby 
direct collective action, which in turn suggests that whether groups cooperate or not 
depends largely on the perceptions created by leaders. The chapter also functions as an 
introduction to the wars of the 1990s and Serb mobilisation in particular, examined in 
the next chapter. The present chapter concentrates on developments in Serbia, Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia only up to and through the early 1990s, given that the largely 
similar events in Kosovo and Montenegro would be repetitious. 
 
The first section of this chapter examines the Yugoslav project as a whole, and the way 
in which both historical identities and leader-created ideologies were used to define 
alternative needs strategies on the security and status levels. The second section 
examines the use of identity and ideology in Serbia and the ways in which an 
ideological version of national identity came to hide the realistic (class) aspects of 
intergroup relations and trigger competition between nationalities. The third section 
looks at the independence projects of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
section can be seen as a comparison to the Serbian case, examining how the interaction 
of leadership and traditional categorisation can lead to outcomes ranging from 
competitive to cooperative intergroup relations, depending on leader/elite orientations. 
The conclusion will draw together the findings and complete the framework for 
perceiving the nature of identity in an evolutionary manner. 
 
 
5.1. Yugoslavism – Illusions of an Ideological Homeland 
 
From antiquity to the 20th century, the Balkans were controlled by various kingdoms 
and empires: the Illyrian kingdoms from the 8
th
 century BC to 167 BC, the Roman and 
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Byzantine empires thereafter, and more importantly, for the present chapter, by the 
Hungarian Kingdom from the 12
th
 century, the Ottoman Empire from the 15
th
 century, 
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1867. Due to the history of warfare and power 
politics in the region, the constituent nations of the first Yugoslavia, which came into 
being in 1918, likely suffered from near-constant security PRD. The birth of Yugoslavia 
can therefore be seen as a common South Slav response to the threats posed by the 
international environment.
1
 Although by the time Yugoslavia came into existence its 
constituent nations had already developed a certain level of national awareness, this 
awareness was sacrificed for the sake of security fulfilment. Serbia, having gained 
independence in 1878 from the Ottoman Empire, had a strong military capable of 
providing internal and external security for the other republics, and was temporarily 
accepted as the leader of all South Slavs. Demands for the respect of national identities 
and more equitable leadership were voiced only when status PRD no longer prevailed in 
the international system. 
 
Realism versus Common Fate 
The problems causing security PRD in 1918 were multiple. Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Slovenia were eager to rid themselves of Austro-Hungarian 
domination and saw a common South Slav state as the only alternative to secure their 
interests: Slovenia its territorial integrity, Bosnia-Herzegovina relative peace between 
ethnic groups, and Croatia the Adriatic coast coveted by Italy. The idea of a federative 
alliance was thus natural, although the practical outcome was far from what many 
desired. A South Slav federation, providing equal rights to all ethnic groups, was 
supported by most Croats, but the clandestine plotting of Serbians and Croatian Serbs 
eventually led to the proclamation of a hereditary kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes under King Aleksandar Karadjordjević fro  Serbia. Arguably, the reason  hy 
none of the other national groups broke away from such an uneven alliance was that 
Serbian military capacity and security needs were at the time more important than any 
status-level concerns such as ethnic equality or free political hierarchy. 
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117 
 
The new Yugoslav kingdom was, however, clearly comprised of regions with different 
traditions and legal systems, and thus of entities with high expectations regarding 
intergroup equality. Although a degree of centralised authority was inevitable, the 
Croats’ longing for independence, as well as their disinterest in participating in Serb-
dominated institutions, clashed with Serb leadership from the beginning. Due to strong 
Croat identity, which had developed since the 11
th
 century, and the relative lack of 
common fate with Serbia, Croats perceived themselves as a separate entity forced only 
by circumstances to cooperate with the dominating Serbs. The same applied to Serbia, 
with the exception that Serbia perceived itself to actually be the legitimate leader of the 
conglomeration, mainly because of the firepower it possessed, but also bolstered by its 
ethno-nationalist mythology.
2
 Serb domination was institutionalised in the constitution 
of 1921, but the parliamentary system proved to be ineffective between ethnic blocs. As 
a result, ethno-nationalism rose on all sides. The possibility of Croatia and Slovenia 
seceding was discussed, prompting King Aleksandar to suspend the constitution and 
institute an autocratic Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. 
 
In the interwar period, as security PRD temporarily subsided and status PRD became 
the prevailing needs level, the Yugoslav identity forged under King Aleksander 
disintegrated and pre-existing identities took over. Status concerns triggered 
demonstrations and opposition, especially among the Croats. Although the Croats and 
Slovenes had originally accepted Yugoslav unity under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for 
the sake of security, achieving that security then allowed them to turn their demands 
towards collective status concerns, such as equal representation in state institutions. 
However, Serb domination prevented such equality and cohesion, emphasising pre-
existing prejudices between the different ethno-national identities. The consequent 
status PRD led to the rise of radicalism (but notably not to wide-scale violence) among 
so e Croats, and to the creation of the infa ous Ustaša  ove ent.3 Far from easing 
tensions, King Aleksandar polarised the situation by dividing territory so as to create 
regional Serb majorities.
4
 After his assassination in 1934, the situation continued to 
deteriorate. Croatian representatives in 1939 convened independently in Zagreb and the 
Kingdom had no option but to agree on Croatian autonomy. The result was the 
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Sporazum Agreement, which gave 30% of Yugoslav territory to the Croatian 
population, creating strong opposition among the dominate Serbs.
5
 
 
Consistent with the security-level threshold regarding the rationalism of collective 
violence (see Chapter 2), large-scale violence erupted, not in status PRD, but only after 
the fascist invasions of World War II (WWII) gave rise to wide-scale security PRD. The 
Nazis allied the selves  ith the  ost radical ele ents of Croatian society: Pavelić’s 
Ustaša. The Ustaša  as an ultra-nationalistic Croat movement whose members sought 
the creation of an ethnically pure and Catholic Croatia. As leaders of the new 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH) created under the Nazi occupation,
6
 pri ary Ustaša 
mission was the extermination and expulsion of the Serb population, leading to the 
killing of at least 300,000 Serbs in concentration camps
7
 and to the emigration of many 
more. 
 
As an answer to German and Croat fascism, two Serb-dominated resistance movements 
were born: the Communist Partisans under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito from 
Croatia, and the Chetniks, led by Draža Mihailović.8 While the Partisans wanted to 
create a multiethnic and socialist Yugoslavia, the Chetniks sought to create a monarchist 
Greater Serbia. Although the Chetnik  ove ent’s initial purpose  as fascist resistance, 
they ended up cooperating with the Nazis in the elimination of Croats and Muslims, as 
well as Serb Partisans in Serb-dominated regions. As security PRD began to take over, 
ethno-national identities again became flexible: the two Serbian resistance movements 
now fought not only the fascists, but also each other, vying for political power as Nazi 
withdrawal became imminent. Croats and Slovenes were equally divided between 
fascist collaborators and moderates who aligned mainly with the Partisan movement,
9
 
contributing to the rise of a new Yugoslavism. 
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Strategy and Identity 
Given that the era of constant security PRD was drawing to an end in Europe,  
authoritarian leadership was increasingly constrained by democratic and international 
institutions. However, in Yugoslavia, Tito and his victorious Partisans, much like their 
Soviet and Eastern European counterparts, did not foresee the impact this would have.  
Elites  ho rose to po er in the  ar’s aftermath held fast to the illusion that the coercion 
and manipulative leadership that played upon xenophobic tendencies would allow them 
to hold on to po er. Tito and the Partisans, despite talking of ‘brotherhood,’ killed 
thousands of people for opposing their agenda and executed fascist collaborators 
without trial. Opposition parties and free media were suppressed to ensure a seamless 
assu ption of po er by the Co  unist Party in the ne  Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia. A new collective identity was introduced which theoretically was supposed 
to overcome the ethno-national divisions that had plagued the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
and in the long-term bring stability to the multiethnic state. 
 
The new identity was founded upon concepts of brotherhood and unity and 
accompanied by a needs strategy in the form of Communism. The identity failed along 
with the inefficient needs strategy it offered. The planned economy aimed to force upon 
people equality rather than offer them equality of opportunity – a strategy which already 
in principle prevented the fulfilment of personality-dependent status needs. Instead of 
allo ing personalities and innovation to flourish and encouraging ‘brotherhood’ 
through material benefits, tactics of harassment and manipulation were used to control 
the political and economic identity of the  masses. The reason, of course, was the desire 
of the elites to keep the needs of the masses on the security level, where fixed political 
hierarchies and coercive leadership were natural and acceptable. Allowing the masses to 
fulfil their status needs would have necessitated a change in power structures, including 
the introduction of relationship-oriented leadership and the respect for multiple 
(traditional) identities. Ho ever,  the elites’ atte pts at indoctrination  ere too  eak to 
render the masses unaware of the status RD which they suffered from, leading to the 
gradual disintegration of the strategy, as well as the Yugoslav identity. 
 
120 
 
The failure of Yugoslavis   as largely a result of Tito’s conflicted atte pts to 
reconcile Edvard Kardelj’s10 relatively liberal and ethnic “organic Yugoslavis ” and 
Aleksandr Rankovic’s11 centralist “integral Yugoslavis .”12 Arguably, Yugoslavism 
could have been maintained only by eliminating status PRD in practice or in perception: 
either by embracing a free market structure and economic growth in line with Western 
Europe, or by closing off Yugoslavia from the rest of the world entirely and thus 
preventing the perception of status deprivation from coming into being. Although a 
supporter of indoctrination of workers and youth, Tito did rather little in practice. 
Educational systems were not merged, ethnic affiliations and various, competing 
perceptions regarding the Yugoslav project persisted.
13
 The media remained affiliated 
with the separate Yugoslav republics, and Western consumer-oriented influences. Also, 
rather than presenting the West as the primary Other, the USSR, another Communist 
country, filled this role beginning with the Tito-Stalin split in 1948.
14
 As a result, the 
West became the only model whose needs efficiency could be freely admired. 
 
During Tito’s reign status PRD only  orsened,  hile at the sa e ti e the individual 
republics’ authority gre . Econo ic decentralisation brought businesses and industry 
under republican control, yet economic power lay in the hands of politico-economic 
oligarchies and inefficient enterprise managers,
15
 thus preventing free enterprise among 
the masses. Although the economy was further liberalised in the 1960s,
16
 this only 
served to highlight disparities between the republics. Economic disparity between the 
wealthier republics (Slovenia and Croatia) and poorer republics was becoming a 
problem, as the wealthier regions shouldered the cost of development in the poorer 
ones.
17
  Political power was also shifting from Belgrade to the individual republics: 
separate Communist Parties were established in the republics under the League of 
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Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in the early 1960s, and in 1966 an end was put to the 
oppressive policies (especially in Kosovo) of the federal secret police. Such 
liberalisation led to the assumption of power by liberals in most republics, including 
Serbia, and to the transfer of power from the Serb minority to the Albanian majority in 
Kosovo. In 1970, the ‘sovereignty’ of the republics and provinces  as recognised by the 
Yugoslav party presidium, allowing for a collective (ethnically balanced) state 
presidency and republican militias.
18
 
 
This liberalisation was never allowed to take full effect given that it went against the 
elites’ desires of continued centralis  and personal gratification. After the 1968 student 
revolts in Belgrade against unemployment and social inequality, Tito redefined the 
existing grievances in Marxist terms.
19
 Despite promising reforms he excluded the most 
liberal initiatives in order to safeguard his own authoritarian leadership. Nevertheless, 
liberalisation had allowed the republics to develop their own powers and identities, and 
to define their grievances in increasingly ethnic terms. When the Croatian Spring 
arrived in 1971, demands were made for liberal economic policies, which in turn 
translated into demands for national sovereignty, a national army, and territory.
20
 Tito 
answered by prioritising his own authority over mass demands for higher needs 
efficiency, implicitly threatening Croatia with military force. The Croats backed down, 
once again rationally avoiding a potentially worse outcome (sliding into security PRD) 
than the prevailing status PRD. 
 
Although Tito later returned to the path of decentralisation,
21
 he maintained an 
authoritarian leadership style and allowed the Serbs to continue to dominate government  
institutions,
22
 which was anathema to the status fulfilment sought by the masses. As the 
international environment started moving towards status fulfilment and liberalism, it 
became evident to the masses that experimentalist socialism was obstructing their social 
mobility – in other words, preventing them from improving their status opportunities 
vis-à-vis the Yugoslav elites, as well as relative to the West. Had Tito really wanted to 
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hold on to his malfunctioning communist needs strategy, he would have needed to take 
the masses back to the security-level of the 1920s, either through triggering a war 
against Others, or by more intense manipulation (as was later done by the Serbian 
leadership). As he did not, it was inevitable that a plethora of alternative values and 
identities (based on existing ones) were recreated in the republics as an alternative to the 
existing strategy. In the battle between ideology and national identities, the latter won 
because they were perceived to better promote status fulfilment. Consequently, once 
Tito and his charisma died in 1980, little was left of the brotherhood and shared 
common Yugoslav identity he strove for. 
 
 
5.2. Heavenly Serbia – Myth and Martyrdom in RD and RG 
 
If the history of the former Yugoslavia showed how traditional ethno-national 
categorisations can be useful and ready tools for challenging maladaptive strategies and 
ideologies on the status level, then the history of Serbia tells an even more convincing 
story: how collective identities can be used to manipulate intergroup status inequalities 
for political gain. Serb history illustrates the makeover of identity into ideology, and 
gives so e credence to the idea of a “cultural trau a,” or, a perceived “threat to culture 
 ith  hich individuals in that society presu ably have an identification.”23 Unlike the 
histories of the other former Yugoslav republics (see next section), Serbian history can 
be described as a period of power and independence followed by one of severe security 
and status PRD, caused by the Ottoman invasion in the 14
th
 century, which was in turn 
followed by collective struggles lifting the Serb elites out of status RD to status RG in 
the Yugoslavia. In the last stage (of Serb hegemony and RG), the history of suffering 
was used to justify atrocities against Others – in other words, the trauma was politicised. 
Compared with the elites in the other former Yugoslav republics, Serb elites found it 
easier to manipulate mass perceptions due to the common Serb past – although, as will 
be shown in the next chapter, this led only to abnormally strong Serb unity, not to 
mobilisation. 
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The Collapse of Strategy 
Unlike the other former Yugoslav republics, Serbia had by 1918 experienced both long-
term independence and imperialism. The first relatively stable and independent Serb 
state was formed by Stefan Nemanja in 1180. One of his sons became the still much-
venerated Saint Sava, founder of the independent Serbian Orthodox Church. During the 
14
th
 century, the size of the Serbian state  as doubled by Tsar Dušan the Mighty, 
although this territory  as lost by Dušan’s successors. The Otto an E pire invaded 
Serbia in the late 14
th
 century and through a series of battles, concluding with the fall of 
Smederevo in 1459, came to occupy the whole of the country. The Battle of Kosovo in 
1389 would become, in later versions of history, the mythical defeat marking the oft-
la ented “five hundred years of Turkish oppression.”24 The invasions led to mass Serb 
migrations to the northern and eastern parts of their native lands, and Kosovo became a 
multiethnic and religiously diverse frontier region with a growing number of Albanians. 
This was the first stage of Serb trauma: independence followed by outside rule. 
 
The Creation of Trauma 
The second stage of Serb trauma was the creation of an ethno-nationalist mythology to 
compensate for the absence of political power. Despite the myth of heroic suffering, the 
Serb way of life under the Ottomans was not as culturally oppressive as is often 
presented: the invaders were religiously tolerant
25
 and the Serb Orthodox Church was 
allowed to expand its authority. The people also experienced an increase in local 
autonomy. Religion became important, a tool of local organisation as well as a source of 
mythical understandings of the origins of the Serb nation. The Church promoted 
religious ethno-national events and the Battle of Kosovo was celebrated as a myth of 
religious heroism, becoming the subject of epic poetry in later centuries.
26
 Gradually, 
Ottoman influences in the region weakened, leading to two Serbian uprisings in the 
early 19
th
 century. The first, led by George Petrović (Karadjordje) fro  1804 to 1813 
led to naught, but the second, organised by Miloš Obrenović in 1814, resulted in 
Turkish administrative withdrawal and Serb autonomy, with the centralisation of Serb 
authority. 
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Serb nationalism bloomed in the mid-19
th
 century when the Kosovo myth also 
experienced an epic transformation. Originally, the Kosovo myth was a story of heroism 
in the face of adversity. With the growth of Serb nationalism, however, the narrative 
began to e phasise a need to avenge the loss of Kosovo and recover  hat “rightfully” 
belonged to the Serb nation.
27
 The heroes of the  yth are Miloš Obilić, the killer of 
Turks, and Prince Lazar, leader of the Christian forces who, according to the myth, was 
captured by the Turks and beheaded.
28
 Epic poetry, standardized by Vuk Karadžić in the 
20
th
 century, interprets the death of Lazar as a choice between a heavenly and earthly 
Serb kingdom. Martyrdom for the greater good of the Serb nation implied the 
importance of achieving the earthly kingdom at a later date.
29
 The Kosovo myth is 
considered a means of coming to grips with defeat and the loss of independence – in 
other words, a means of empowerment through ideology in the absence of real political 
authority in status PRD. 
 
The myth took on an increasingly aggressive nature along with important literary works 
of the mid-19
th
 century, most importantly The Mountain Wreath published in 1847 by 
Petar Petrović Njegoš, a Montenegrin state and religious leader. An epic story about a 
massacre by local Christians – other ise kno n as ‘baptis  by blood’ – of Muslim 
Montenegrins who refused to convert, The Mountain Wreath’s vitriol illustrated the 
fervour behind the nationalism of the time. Interestingly, this story of allegedly justified 
bloodshed of the Other became the most widely read literary work among the Serbs up 
to World War I (WWI) and was never viewed as polemical before the wars of the 
1990s.
30
 If there thus ever was a tradition of national hatred and violence, it was to be 
found in pre-independence Serbia. Epic poetry promoted a belief in the superiority of 
the Serb nation and aided its path towards independence and changing power relations. 
 
The long-awaited Serbian independence in 1878, however, did not completely bring an 
end to Serb security/status PRD or to the need for Serb mythology. In Bosnia, where 
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Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats had been subjected to a history of serfdom,
31
 the 
Serbs remained under the domination of the Hapsburg and Muslim elites. Despite 
efforts to improve the lot of the Serb and Croat masses in Bosnia,
32
 Muslims still 
constituted 91% of landlords in 1911 and the Serbs remained relatively much poorer.
33
 
When political organisation was finally allowed in 1910,
34
 parties based on ethno-
national affiliation became the norm in Bosnia. This Serb nationalism in Bosnia gave 
rise to the creation of pro-Serb and pro-Yugoslav military organisations, which would 
later provide the spark that led to the outbreak of WWI. Inside Serbia, nationalism was 
also on the rise, characterised by close relations between the state and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church.
35
 Serbs increasingly perceived of themselves as not only the 
“original” people fro   ho  all South Slavs derived and  ho  they should e ulate,36 
but also the chosen people whose destiny was ordained by God.
37
 
 
Given their significant military and ideological resources, Serbian leaders chose to 
direct the national consciousness, via education and mass communication, towards a 
desire for territorial expansion.
38
 Since rescuing Bosnian Serbs from Muslim and 
Austro-Hungarian domination was militarily impossible, Serb leaders directed their 
attentions south, where the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. In the Balkan wars of 
1912-13, Serbia annexed Kosovo, representing the culmination of the national project 
laid out in the dominant mythology. One might assume that with the demands of the 
Kosovo myth having been fulfilled, the Serb nation might have discarded its imperial 
obsessions and some of its hatred for its neighbours. This, however, was not to be. The 
annexation of Kosovo led in Kosovo to the installation of a sort of colonial apartheid 
administration and to Albanian emigration.
39
 While Albanians were accused by the 
Serbian media of ethnic cleansing during the previous decades, this policy was actually 
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carried out by Serbia.
40
 A similar ignorance for regional status concerns continued 
under Aleksandar, whose authoritarianism was perceived by the Serbs as a legitimate 
effort to maintain the previously so elusive integrity of the state.
41
 
 
From Real to Imaginary Deprivation 
The years after the Kosovo annexation and creation of the Yugoslav kingdom represent 
the third step in the creation of the Serb trauma. Serb authoritarianism continued despite 
the fact that all Serbs had been integrated into one state and even after the assassination 
of King Aleksandar had brought the problem of ethnic Serb domination into the open.
42
 
With a history of suffering ensuring the acquiescence of the Serb masses, the elites 
found it impossible to give up their hegemony vis-à-vis their weaker neighbours. 
Instead of nationalism diminishing, Greater Serbian ideology flourished within the 
Serbian Cultural Club and the Democratic Party, especially after the Sporazum 
agreement.
43
 In the aftermath of WWII, the desire for a Greater Serbia was present also 
in Mihailović’s royalist Chetnik ideology. Even the Partisan victory did not bring 
Serbian elite RG to an end. Serbs ended up dominating the Communist Party of the 
multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the staffing of federal ministries without regard to 
ethnicity allo ed Serb do ination to continue in Belgrade. The Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA), despite a socialist identity, retained its mostly Serb-Montenegrin 
constitution. Serb hege ony  as also sustained by Ranković’s pro-Serb secret police.44 
 
Despite their domination of federal institutions, the Serbs continued to believe in their 
relative deprivation. As Ra et  rites, “Serbs re e ber the years of co  unist rule as 
years in which Kosovo was the beneficiary of a disproportionately large portion of 
special federal funds to sti ulate the province’s econo y[...]” and increase its political 
power.
45
 Tito’s pro-Albanian policies were perceived to be deliberately weakening 
Serbia,
46
 while Serb emigration from Kosovo, promoted by better social mobility in 
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other regions and the high birth rate among Kosovo Albanians
47
 helped to create an 
illusion that Serbian territorial integrity  as once again threatened by ‘Turks.’ 
Demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians in the spring of 1981, Serb petitions to boost Serb 
political power sent to Belgrade in 1982 and 1985, the portrayal of the Albanians as 
rapists and genocidal maniacs,
48
 and support of the Serb Orthodox Church desiring to 
recover its lost popularity
49
 promoted PRD. The Serb elites polarised the situation to the 
extent that the illusion of status and security PRD started to become a reality – at least 
for Kosovo Albanians, who were increasingly persecuted for their supposed crimes. 
 
The nationalist surge of the 1980s was enabled by an alliance of elites who had been 
incapable of free status fulfilment under Tito.
50
 These included nationalist intellectuals, 
politicians, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose clergy had suffered from 
vilification and demoralisation for decades.
51
 Aiming to create a new authoritarianism in 
Serbia, these elites allied themselves with rural Kosovo Serbs,
52
 “a ready-made 
audience for a populist appeal.”53 As Ra et sho s, Dobrica Ćosić, one of the  ain 
ideologues behind Milošević’s nationalis  and a future president of ru p state of 
Yugoslavia, and Vuk Drašković, future leader of the Chetnik and Greater Serbian 
Serbian National Renewal (SNO) and the Serbian Guard paramilitary group, as well as 
several other ‘intellectuals’ fro  Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, published bestselling 
novels about the anti-Serb atrocities of the two World Wars.
54
 These writings not only 
provided intricate depictions of tortures and killings supposedly committed by enemies, 
but also predicted the final settling of scores between the Serbs and their neighbours.
55
 
Past struggles and heroes also abounded in other fields of culture, including ne  “turbo-
folk” usic.56 Through such fiction and exaggeration, the elites promoted the illusion of 
an existential threat applicable to the entire nation. 
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Politicisation of the Trauma 
Politicisation was the last phase of the development of the cultural trauma. Serb 
nationalism and Other-hatred culminated in 1986 with the publication of extracts from 
the infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.
57
 The 
Memorandum  as “a co posite of tearful self-pity, aggressiveness, and animosity 
to ard all the other inhabitants of Yugoslavia,” and lacked any real political insight.58 
The 1974 Communist constitution was considered the source of all evil, leaving Serb 
minorities without cultural or political rights within the other republics.
59
 Kosovo Serbs 
were allegedly subjected to genocide and forced conversion, assimilation, and 
indoctrination.
60
 The Communist regime was attacked for its incompetence and apathy 
– and demands were made for a new constitution and federation which would ensure the 
“equality” of Serbs  ith the other Yugoslav nations.61 Despite talk of federalism, the 
wish for a Greater Serbia was clear in the Memorandum, as it demanded self-
determination through a referendum without regard to existing borders of the republics 
or the rights of other ethnic groups.
62
 Milošević,  ho rose to power within the Serbian 
Communist Party from 1987,
63
 silently accepted the contents of the memorandum.
64
 
 
Although Milošević is often held responsible for the polarisation of the Yugoslav 
conflict, he in fact only exploited the ethno-nationalist tendencies already in existence 
among the intellectuals and Serb masses. Before he assumed control of the Communist 
party, a tendency to define the imminent federal collapse in nationalistic terms already 
prevailed; even in the absence of political pressure, the press already in the early 1980s 
was highlighting Serb suffering during WWII and failing to criticise the nationalist 
authors who were responsible for promulgating these historical exaggerations.
65
 What 
Milošević did  as allo  the national discourse on Serb  artyrdo  to develop into a 
conscious national policy through further manipulation of the masses via the Belgrade 
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media and the mobilisation of rural Serbs. He used the existing platform of hate and 
aggression to polarise inter-republican political and ethnic relations, which in turn 
created a sufficient level of PRD in the whole of Yugoslavia so as to allow for the 
maintenance of authoritarian political structures. Yet again, cultural trauma was 
harnessed to further elite gratification. 
 
Lessons from Serbia 
Serbian history has at least three lessons to teach about collective identity. The first 
relates to the polarisation that took place in Serbia in the 1980s. While polarisation is 
generally understood as a natural and wholly psychological process – one aptly 
described by SIT and the supposed ‘need’ for identity – an important element in the 
Serbian campaign was the perception created through traditional categories and 
experiences of an existential, security-level threat. The past was equated with the 
present, and past atrocities were equated with the present illusory threat. The 
polarisation of the Serb nation was thus not an outcome of intergroup comparison, but 
one enabled by security PRD, which was manipulated by the intellectuals and clergy 
who directly benefited from rendering the masses psychologically unaware of actual 
power relations within Yugoslavia.  
 
The second lesson is that the ‘cultural trau a’  as specific to the Serbian experience. 
As will be seen below, such trauma never developed in the other former Yugoslav 
republics. It developed amongst Serbs because they experienced severe deprivation after 
they had already established a strong, functioning state and needs fulfilment strategy in 
the 12
th
 century, and consequently experienced the sufferings through their pre-existing 
collective identity. Security and status PRD under the Ottomans thus led to the 
intensification of identity as opposed to assimilation (as was the case of many 
Bosnians). When the Serbs had recovered their unity and strength, this cultural trauma 
was a ready tool for the elites to create an imaginary perception of security PRD among 
the masses. This was done after independence, while part of Yugoslavia, and intensified 
after the death of Tito. Supposed security-level threats among the masses were the 
perfect tool for the elites to retain security-level leadership styles and relative 
gratification at the top of the hierarchy. 
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The third lesson relates to ideological hegemony, which in the Gramscian sense 
becomes a reality on the higher levels of needs fulfilment. On the status level, the nature 
of action is not deter ined exclusively by  ass needs but also by the intellectuals’ and 
leaders’ definitions of reality. In status PRD, conflicts between parties are not about 
action (war of movement) as much as about perception (war of position). One condition 
must be added, however: for ideological hegemony to last, the manipulated perceptions 
must be based on traditional identities. Just any ideology-strategy will not do: 
maladaptive strategy-ideologies such as Communism and unity where none exists can 
be maintained only temporarily on the security level. If hegemony is to be lasting, it 
must thus either be based on the manipulation of long-term collective identities, or on 
the actual realistic superiority of the ingroup strategy. 
 
 
5.3. Comparison: Smooth and Violent Change on the Status Level 
 
The independence projects of the former Yugoslav republics also demonstrate the 
relationship between needs, identity, and leadership in status PRD. Here, the events 
leading to the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina will be 
briefly examined. At the beginning of the federal collapse in the 1980s, these various 
groups suffered primarily from status PRD. The western republics experienced status 
PRD vis-à-vis the Serb elites who largely controlled the federal institutions and also 
compared with liberal Western Europe. In contrast, the poorer Kosovo Serbs, 
Albanians, Macedonians, and Montenegrins experienced status PRD vis-à-vis the 
better-off republics. All of these groups experienced a certain level of internal common 
fate, which for the Croats was strong, for Slovenia was relatively strong, and in the case 
of the Bosnian Muslims was relatively weak. As it happened, the leaders of all these 
groups closely followed the demands of history in defining the future of the nation; 
otherwise they would hardly have been prototypical. 
 
In the cases of Croatia and Slovenia, due to their relatively long history and strong 
economies, the independence movement easily gathered popularity when status PRD 
became a reality in Yugoslavia. Only in the case of the Bosnian Muslims, who had for 
some time preferred assimilation over religious nationalism, did independence come 
about in a similar fashion as in South Sudan: through physiological deprivation and 
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threat of annihilation. The nature of change at independence, however, depended 
largely on the leaders and elites. While the adaptive leaders determined their leadership 
strategies according to the level of needs fulfilment, the maladaptive ones followed the 
common fate tradition alone. 
 
Slovenia: The Rational Search for Needs Efficiency 
For the Slovenes, the Otherness of the other Yugoslav republics became eminently clear 
during the 1980s. An economic crisis had caused the cost of living to rise enormously
66
 
and in 1989 inflation topped 1,000%.
67
 When serious reforms were finally enacted by 
Pri e Minister Ante Marković, it  as already too late. Slovenia had reason to 
complain: being the wealthiest of the republics,
68
 it paid for nearly one-fourth of the 
federal budget while constituting only 8% of the population;
69
 border tariffs and 
currency regulations also affected the social mobility of workers and limited the 
remittances from Slovenes abroad. In 1982, every private person travelling abroad was 
required to deposit several thousand dinars in the bank for a year,
70
 hindering the free 
needs fulfilment of the mobile Slovenes. 
 
The rational approach to Slovenian independence was a result of a tradition of 
cooperation necessitated by the small size of the nation and of prototypical leadership. 
Unlike the Serbs and Croats, Slovenes had not developed an intensive state- and ethno-
centric mythology during their short history. After being governed by a number of 
empires, the idea of a Slovenian nation came into being only in the 18
th
 century.
71
 Even 
then, the nation aimed at friendly alliances: under the Hapsburgs, the Slovenes aimed at 
federalism; in the 19
th
 century, towards Illyrianism;
72
 and during the 20
th
 century, 
towards Yugoslavism. As part of Yugoslavia, however, Slovenia grew disappointed 
with the lack of economic freedoms and increasingly looked to Europe for an economic 
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model.
73
 The discontent was reflected in literature, which centred on the condemnation 
of oppression and slaughter, and lamented the lack of freedoms.
74
 After Tito’s death, the 
idea of a federation remained acceptable as long as it efficiently and equitably served 
Slovenian economic interests. Yugoslavian institutions, however, did not meet this 
condition. 
 
In Slovenia, the independence project did not follow the common Andersonian model 
where leaders seeking to improve their status fulfilment force statehood on the masses, 
later manipulated towards nationalism. Instead, the change in Slovenia was triggered by 
civil society, particularly by newspapers such as Nova Revija, Delo and Mladina, which 
openly discussed the lack of democratic control over the JNA and the corruption of 
leading military figures.
75
 This led to the trial of four journalists, which further 
highlighted Serbian domination and the authoritarian nature of the JNA,
76
 and brought 
together the Slovenian opposition. The Slovenian Co  unist leaderships’ siding  ith 
the people led to a stand-off with the JNA and Serbia. When demonstrations staged by 
Milošević further highlighted Yugoslav Otherness, the Slovenian Co  unist party 
leader Milan Kučan in February 1989 attended a rally organised in support of Kosovo 
Albanians and sent Slovenian TV crews to cover events in Kosovo so as to ensure the 
dissemination of accurate information in Slovenia.
77
 Having chosen to become 
prototypical relations-oriented leaders, the Slovenian leadership was on a clear collision 
course with the still-authoritarian Serbia and JNA. 
 
Despite the overall dynamics towards liberalism, the Slovenian Communists, content 
with their power and RG, could have either chosen to side with the federal centre in 
order to maintain their own positions or to whip up national fervour to do the same. The 
fact that they did neither proves that adaptive and capable leaders do exist, and that 
sometimes leaders seek to honestly serve mass needs rather than their own. On the 
status level, therefore, personality and individual agency matters a great deal. Of course, 
choosing liberalism over authoritarianism can be seen as a natural alternative for 
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Slovenia given the high level of mass awareness, which was  largely a result of their 
collective historical experience. Listening to the people, the Slovenian officialdom 
decided to mimic the even more liberal Slovenian opposition in writing up a 
“Funda ental Charter of Slovenia,”78 which spoke of sovereignty, self-determination, 
political plurality and ethnic equality, making an association with the federation 
contingent on the respect for human rights.
79
 Constitutional changes were carried out 
 hich li ited Slovenia’s federal financial obligations and asserted the right of the 
republic to secede from the federation.
80
 This was perceived as the most appropriate 
course of action, especially after the JNA and Serb leadership responded to the 
constitutional changes with threats and cut first economic, and then political, ties with 
Slovenia.
81
 
 
The fact that needs fulfilment rather than some need or desire for collective identity 
determined Slovenian policy at the time is evident in the fact that Slovenia suggested 
the creation of “an association of independent states” in the last party congress of the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in January 1990. However, Serbian 
opposition caused the plan to fail and the collapse of the LCY ensued. The new 
Slovenian democratic government, chosen in April 1990,
82
 was thus left with no choice 
but to prepare for independence and begin preparing for the defence of an independent 
Slovenia. A plebiscite for independence was arranged in December 1990 and six 
 onths later, on 25 June 1991, the Slovenian parlia ent declared independence ˗ 
triggering, in turn, the 10-day war between the JNA and Slovenian troops (see next 
Chapter). 
 
Although the Slovenian independence project drew the wrath of Serbia and the JNA and 
set the stage for later collective violence, it is a model case of rational state-creation on 
the security level. What was needed for the project was not violence to protect essential 
resources for survival, but mere pressure and the free mobilisation of opinion. What 
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sufficed was not action-oriented leadership capable of overcoming obstacles, but 
relations-oriented leadership willing to listen to the people and modify the institutional 
structure accordingly. What was needed was not the manipulation of identity or 
ideology, but respect for old classifications combined with a free competition of ideas. 
In its peacefulness, it was as rational as the South Sudanese project was rational in using 
coercion and violence: both projects centred on needs efficiency rather than any 
supposed demands of identity. Had Tito chosen the path of political and economic 
liberalism, Slovenes would have had nothing against remaining in a federation. It 
seems, after all, that what matters also on the status level and beyond is personal status 
fulfilment rather than the group through which it becomes possible. 
 
Croatia – The Irrational Search for Escalation 
Unlike Slovenia, Croatia had a much longer and more powerful tradition of common 
fate, starting with independent Croat kingdoms in the 10
th
 and 11
th
 centuries. As 
described in the section on Yugoslavia, however, most of its subsequent history was a 
balancing act between the rational-realist necessity of alliance and the desire to ensure 
status fulfilment as an independent nation. As part of the Hungarian kingdom and then 
the Hapsburg Empire, Croatia was largely autonomous, although the military border 
between the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires created a national Serb minority inside the 
nation. Despite some calls for Croatian independence in the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, full 
independence was generally acknowledged as an insufficiently secure option. The pan-
Slavic Illyrian alternative was considered in the 1830s, as well as a federation with 
Serbia in the 1860s.
83
 Hard-line nationalists, however, rejected any connection with 
Serbia and even began classifying Croatian Serbs and Slovenes as “Orthodox Croats” or 
“ ountain Croats”84 The opposing South Slav and anti-Serb orientations governed 
Croatian politics ever since. 
 
Security PRD repeatedly prevented the rise of an independent Croatia: at the end of the 
19
th
 century, Austro-Hungarian repression led to peasant revolts and a rise in 
“Yugoslavis ,” and fro  1906 the Croatian Sabor (parlia ent)  as do inated by a 
Serb-Croat coalition which decided to politically confront Austria-Hungary. The 
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massacres of WWI again confirmed the necessity of a Yugoslav alliance, although 
extremist Croats took the war as an opportunity to eliminate Croatian and Bosnian 
Serbs. The frustration caused by the elusive nature of independence continued under 
King Aleksandar, giving rise to the Ustaša85 and the fascist NDH massacres during 
WWII.
86
 In the Republic of Yugoslavia, the alliance originally based on the Croatian 
security needs came under increasing pressure. Awareness of status PRD vis-à-vis the 
Serbs became evident, especially during the Croatian Spring in 1971, when information 
about the nu ber of Serbs in “Croatian” jobs beca e public.87 The environment, 
ho ever,  as still not conducive to status concerns: through Tito’s decade-long 
oppression, Croatia had transfor ed itself into a prag atic “silent republic,”88 with 
minimal media criticism of party policies.
89
 
 
A significant change, ho ever, had taken place bet een the Ustaša era and the Croatian 
Spring. The international environment had changed from one dominated by empires to 
one of emerging cooperation, at least in Europe. Croatia was no longer plagued by 
constant security PRD and calls for nationalism could thus draw less on tradition and 
more on rational needs evaluations. Being one of the wealthier republics, the masses 
started defining their independence project in terms of economic efficiency. Polls from 
1990 sho  that the electorate’s pri ary values included peace and security and a 
European orientation,
90
 a far cry from the past Croatian nationalism. The new leaders 
who emerged after multiparty elections (enabled by the new liberal party leader Ivica 
Račan) could thus relatively freely choose whether to draw on the rational or the 
ideological side of the Croatian people. Unfortunately, the weakness of Croatian civil 
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society,
91
 silent for years, meant that the choice would essentially remain in the hands of 
politicians – they grabbed the opportunity and continued with authoritarianism. 
 
The media was divided in their approach to the changing political environment. Some 
continued traditional leader-worship and idealism, while others tried to be more critical 
and independent of the political elites.
92
 In retrospect, some Slovenian-style soft 
Communism might have been a good option, allowing the masses and intelligentsia 
time to get accustomed to the novel political situation. Instead, Croatia in 1990 
experienced a nationalist surge. The breakup of the LCY had allowed the participants of 
the Croatian Spring to return to politics, and among these was Franjo Tudjman, an 
historian and nationalist author who had twice been imprisoned for his subversive 
activities. In a situation characterised by a power vacuum, an aggressive Serbia, and 
unfortunate electoral rules benefiting the largest party, he led the nationalist Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) to a clear victory and Croatia to independence. The elections 
were portrayed as a choice between Croatian statehood (at this point confederalism) 
versus malfunctioning Communism,
93
 the restoration of national dignity being a central 
slogan.
94
 
 
Until the HDZ victory, Serbs and Croats had perceived interethnic relations as generally 
positive,  ithout any general perception of threat to one’s national rights.95 The 
Tudjman regime, however, did its best to escalate interethnic tensions. The regime 
decided to change the Serbs’ constitutional status fro  a constituent nation to a 
minority, angering the Serb population.
96
 The Croatian flag acquired the NDH 
checkerboard sy bol,  hich for so e Serbs  as a re inder of the Ustaša era and  as 
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rejected by many Serb policemen.
97
 Tudjman also changed the names of public places 
to use only the Latin form of the Serbo-Croatian language in public spaces (Milošević 
was doing the same with Cyrillic in Serbia). At the same time, Serbians started to lose 
their jobs. The only reason for highlighting the Otherness of the Serb minority was 
Tudj an’s personal preference for nationalism and centralism. Rather than be a 
prototypical leader of the Croatians as a whole, Tudjman decided to represent only 
Croats, and in a dubious prototypical manner. To ensure polarisation, he accepted the 
Serb Democratic Party (SDS) as the legitimate representatives of the Serb minority and 
repressed non-ethnic parties capable of offering an alternative, more liberal vision to the 
masses.
98
 
 
Nationalism and centralism, however, were tools reserved for security-level leaders. 
Tudj an’s centralist tendencies and preferences for ideology over reason, identity over 
needs fulfilment, and his belief in a personal historical role as the saviour of the Croat 
nation, polarised the nation and led to security PRD in regions with mixed Serb-Croat 
population –  hich in turn aided Milošević in his corresponding authoritarian project. 
Given Croatian history, Tudjman had extensive ideological material to draw on, and 
people were easily persuaded by old categorisations. The fact that Tudjman and the 
HDZ cared little for mass needs efficiency and prioritised their own status through 
authoritarian mechanisms meant that change and the transition to independence would 
not be as smooth as in Slovenia, but instead be competitive and violent. 
 
Bosnian Muslims – The Surprising Dangers of Liberal Identity 
Unlike its neighbours, the Bosnian Muslims never developed a strong common fate. 
Development of the region was hindered by the presence of surrounding nations with 
changing frontiers. Medieval Bosnia had been an important power until the Ottoman 
conquest in 1463, also in addition to being culturally and religiously heterogeneous, 
with the Orthodox, Catholic and Bogomil Churches all present. After the Ottoman 
invasion, much of the population converted to Islam, for doing so ensured them freedom 
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from slavery, guaranteed citizenship rights, and gave them tax exemptions.
99
 Thus was 
created a ne  ‘ethnic’ group, the Bosnian Musli s,  hose chosen needs strategy  as 
one of assimilation with the surrounding states and empires. During the Ottoman and 
Hapsburg empires, the various ethnic groups of Bosnia were forced to cooperate, but the 
mass politics of the Kingdom or Yugoslavia allowed ethnically defined deprivations to 
come into the open
100
 highlighting ethnic differences rather than peaceful coexistence. 
 
Throughout Yugoslavia’s history, only Bosnian Musli s failed to develop a strong 
national identity and continued to take interethnic assimilation as the norm. Although in 
the 1940s Tito made Bosnia into a separate republic and the Bosnian Muslims into an 
official minority, this furthered, rather than prevented, Bosnian Yugoslavism. Bosnia 
became the largest producer of military equipment due to its location and natural 
resources and developed prosperous multicultural cities. However, at the same time, the 
Serb population in the countryside remained politicised along ethnic lines. The result 
was an untenable alliance, in which the Serbs veered towards Serb nationalism, Western 
Herzegovina veered towards Croat nationalism, and the Muslims alone remained 
consistently attached to a multiethnic solution. The strict prohibition of free expression 
and association also hindered any emerging perception of a common fate. Nationalists 
were forced to leave the republic, or, as in the case of Alija Izetbegović and other 
intellectuals, were sentenced to prison for alleged Islamic fundamentalism.
101
 The 
Communist Party consequently remained popular until the late 1970s, especially among 
the Muslims; it represented all ethnic groups equally and enabled the prospering of large 
semi-monopolies, providing secure employment for a significant proportion of the 
people.
102
 
 
The development of a common Muslim identity began only in the late 1980s after the 
Communist monopoly of power was broken by the Agrokomerc scandal, a case of 
wide-scale fraud resulting in the resignations of many important party members. The 
scandal weakened party authority and membership and resulted in a severe power 
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vacuum in the republic.
103
 The federal economic crisis and the failure to pay workers 
brought many in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the verge of (individual, but not collective) 
security PRD, leading to hundreds of strike actions in 1988 and 1989. Only at this time 
 as “brotherhood and unity” challenged by the Musli s. Articles criticising Milošević 
appeared and the behaviour of the party and police was discussed.
104 
The aggressive 
propaganda emanating from Serbia was adopted by local Serbs and polarised the 
Bosnian republic’s  edia. Clashes bet een ethnic co  unities beca e co  on in 
1989 and 1990. Often these were triggered by local Serb nationalists instigated by 
Serbia proper.
105
 While the Croats and Serbs had ready-made programmes and leaders 
in Zagreb and Belgrade, Izetbegović’s Party of De ocratic Action (SDA) was only 
created in March 1990 and became quickly affiliated with the Islamic faith.
106
 
 
The fact that the republic’s parlia entary elections in 1990 turned out to be a contest 
between ethnic parties was a consequence of polarisation and lack of truly reformist, 
non-Communist and non-nationalist alternatives.
107
 Several authors suggest that 
ethnification of politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina  as a result of “fear” experienced by all 
ethnic groups.
108
 This is true: while in 1989-1990 a vast majority of Bosnians saw 
nationalist divisions and ethnicity as unimportant, perceived of themselves primarily as 
Yugoslavs,
109
 and supported the Marković refor s,110 the ethnification of politics by the 
Serbian and Croatian leaderships had by 1992 given rise to wide-scale security PRD and 
the dominance of ethnic categorisations. The lower needs efficiency of Bosnia-
Herzegovina
111
 likely also contributed to the radicalisation of Bosnian Serbs and Croats. 
Given the security threats, Bosnia required strong, even coercive, security-level leaders 
capable of uniting the people. Unfortunately, it was instead plagued by factional 
ideologues. As the federation was collapsing on both sides, President Izetbegović had 
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no alternative but to organise a referendum of independence in February-March 1992, 
against the basic interests of the various communities and their peaceful status 
fulfilment. 
 
Given that Izetbegović  as a liberal and prone to follo ing the  ulticultural and 
cooperative path that historical tradition had set for him, he was incapable of offering 
the security-level leadership that Bosnians needed in time of imminent conflict. 
Although the SDA electoral platform was religious, it emphasised the need for a 
“ odern federation,” de ocracy, and econo ic refor s.112 Even as the situation 
worsened, the civic-minded Izetbegović  anted to solve the crisis through negotiation 
rather than mobilisation of the Muslim population. In a situation in which the various 
ethnic groups had already been politicised and perceived security RD, this was a 
seriously maladaptive approach. Incapable of transforming his status-level leadership to 
one addressing the existential threat, Izetbegović allo ed alternative leaders to take the 
lead in organising the common defence of the Muslim community. In addition, the 
media was equally slow in mobilising support for Bosnian Muslim nationalism, in effect 
“psychologically disar ing” the group for the co ing  ar.113 Such liberal civic-
mindedness was near-lethal to the newly-emerging nation. 
 
Although Bosnian independence was undermined by the Bosnian war and the Dayton 
Accords of November 1995, which split Bosnia into separate Croat-Muslim and Serb 
entities, the development of Bosnian statehood can in many respects be likened to that 
of South Sudan. Independence was declared because collective survival necessitated 
such an arrangement, and collective identity began to develop during and after the 
ensuing fight. Unlike in South Sudan, however, some level of historical common fate 
did exist and old categorisations therefore defined the boundaries of the group that 
mobilised for self-defence. On the other hand, however, the liberal collective identity of 
the Bosnian Muslims hindered their leaders from acting in an adaptively coercive and 
authoritarian manner. The fact that Izetbegović, despite failing to efficiently protect his 
own ingroup, maintained his position even after the war, was thus not a result of his 
own prototypicality but of the intervention of the international community, which came 
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to the rescue and enabled parts of the Bosnian community to cling to its multiethnic 
identity. 
 
 
5.4. Identities in the Former Yugoslavia: Conclusion 
 
The history of Yugoslavia and its breakup demonstrate the power of identity in security 
and status PRD. As the section on the Kingdom and Republic of Yugoslavia showed, 
both (Communist) ideology and traditional (national) identities could be used to define 
a common fate group. However, the reason why nationalism eventually won over 
ideology was because the Communist strategy was not conducive to status needs 
fulfilment and independence offered just such opportunities. The shift from security to 
status PRD also created new demands on identity and leadership. As the sections on 
Serbia and the other former Yugoslav republics testify, leadership in status PRD was 
expected to be increasingly relations-oriented and accepting of various identities. On the 
other hand, when traditional identities and categories were respected by leaders, they 
could be used to influence mass perceptions and determine the nature and direction of 
change, as well as the choice between cooperation or competition in the intergroup 
environment. 
 
As the case of Slovenia showed, when mass desires are clear and leaders agree to follow 
them in a manner prototypical of a status-level leader, the nature of change in status 
PRD can be smooth. If status concerns are respected, categories do not matter; in the 
Slovenian case, either independence or a federal strategy would have been acceptable, 
as long as it was free and efficient. However, change on the status level is by no means 
always rational or unidirectional. As the Serbian and Croatian cases show, a direct 
correlation seems to exist between a historical common fate and the ability of leaders to 
hide actual class relations, and in such circumstances, leaders often choose manipulation 
over rationalism for the purposes of personal gratification. In historically tormented 
Croatia, for example, the masses achieved free status mobility only in 2000, after the 
death of Tudjman,
114
 and in Serbia, the shift to status fulfilment became real only after 
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the Kosovo  ar and NATO intervention leading to the toppling of Milošević in 2000. 
Thus, while the direction of change in all republics was clearly towards mass status 
fulfilment, the level of common fate had an important effect in preventing the ingroup 
from perceiving the economic and political environment in realistic terms, hindering the 
establishment of a free society. 
 
The Yugoslav case study thus shows that contrary to physiological deprivation, security 
and status PRD allow identity to define collective interest and makes a certain level of 
ideological hegemony possible. Interestingly, however, identity again has rather little to 
do with the mobilisation that took place during the wars of the 1990s. As will be 
described in the next chapter, the manipulation of identities was not as essential for 
mobilisation as it was for rendering the masses lethargic and accepting of actions by the 
more radical elements of society who had materialistic motivations for violence. As 
Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson have  ritten, “Yugoslavs did not hate their neighbours 
when the first fears and opportunities arose. Rather, their hatred and intolerance 
increased along  ith the violence of  ar.”115 As argued before, collective identity does 
ensure unity, but bias and mobilisation are different issues altogether – issues not 
connected to collective identity but to realistic differences in needs fulfilment. 
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6.  The Serbs: Mobilisation and Leadership in Status PRD 
 
 
This chapter addresses the question of how Serbs in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, as part 
of various armies and militias, and as volunteers, were mobilised into conflict during the 
Yugoslav wars from 1990 to 1995. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether 
mobilisation is as easy or immediate in status PRD as on the lower needs levels, or 
whether it is more difficult to achieve. The chapter  also addresses the issue of whether 
identity and mobilisation are in any way connected on the status level. It will be 
suggested that mobilisation in status PRD is difficult indeed, and that while mobilisation 
necessitates both ideology and threat perceptions, it tends to be limited to a relatively 
small group of people, at least until the conflict escalates. Mobilisation in status PRD 
will be analysed by way of concentrating on Serb involvement in the Yugoslav wars, 
given that the Serbs are usually understood as the initiators of the conflict. When the 
war began, the Serbs were not (objectively thinking) suffering from physiological or 
security deprivation and thus cannot be said to have acted in self-defence, which is why 
their behaviour requires a deeper explanation. 
 
The first section of this chapter explores the way in which Serbian history was used to 
create threat perceptions among the masses and how this failed to lead to large-scale 
mobilisation. The second section addresses the limited mobilisation of the JNA, the 
third section the limited mobilisation of the Croatian Serbs, and the fourth section that 
of the Bosnian Serbs. Each section attempts to show that mobilisation was triggered by 
local elites who benefited from polarisation, rather than by the ideologically 
manipulated masses. The fifth section describes in more detail the mobilisation of Serb 
radicals, whose acts of violence helped make the illusory security threat a reality. The 
findings, it will be suggested, support the hypothesis that while strong collective 
identities on the status level do affect intergroup unity, mobilisation in status PRD is 
mostly driven by personal interest. 
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6.1. Milošević and the Serbian Serbs: Illusions of Existential Threat 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the rise of nationalism and the use of Serb 
 ythology did not begin  ith Milošević. Ho ever, Milošević did politicise the 
prevailing ideological nationalism. This was especially easy regarding the Kosovo 
Serbs, who had lost the most as a result of the decentralisation and shifts in political 
po er in Tito’s ti e. Given the  ythology connected to Kosovo and the fact that 
Kosovo was also one of the poorest regions of the federation,
1
 Kosovo Serbs were likely 
to perceive themselves as severely status or even security deprived in relation to the 
other ethnicities of the federation.
2
 There was a clear difference between mobilising the 
Kosovo Serbs and those of Serbia proper, ho ever. While Milošević’s nationalistic 
manipulation rendered all Serbs submissive to his authoritarianism, it did not lead to 
wide-spread mobilisation among Serbs at large. In particular, the Serbs of Serbia not 
suffering from security PRD were hardly interested in volunteering for violent conflict. 
The nationalist fervour thus did create unity, but not wide-scale radicalisation or 
mobilisation. This began only after the conflict had escalated and real security PRD 
arose around 1992, and even then it was primarily limited to the Croatian and Bosnian 
Serbs, in whose republics the conflict was triggered. 
 
Creating Leader Prototypicality 
Milošević had risen to pro inence  ithin the League of Co  unists of Serbia (SKS) 
 ith the support of Ivan Sta bolić, the previous party president, and beca e party 
leader in May 1986. During 1987, he managed to discredit moderates within the party 
and wrest po er fro  Sta bolić.  With help fro  loyal friends and supporters, he also 
assumed control of the state television and the main newspapers (the most important 
being Politika and Politika ekspres). By the end of the year, Milošević had acquired 
near-dictatorial powers within the party and adopted a clearly nationalist platform. His 
nationalism became public knowledge after his appearance in a local Party meeting in 
Kosovo Polje in April 1987, where he told the local Serbs to stay firm, and uttered his 
fa ous  ords “no one should dare beat you” to local Serbs de onstrators – a phrase 
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thereafter regularly repeated by the Milošević-controlled media.3 Despite the general 
image of Serb suffering in the province, however, the demonstration (characteristic of 
status, not security PRD) was organised by local Serbs and Belgrade together.
4
 
 
Fro  then on, Milošević began to speak in ter s that catered to the Kosovo Serbs, 
promoting the idea of an existential threat, which immediately transformed him into a 
prototypical and venerated leader for marginalised Serbs.
5
 The challenge, however, was 
to maintain the centralism of the federation yet become representative for the entire 
Serb nation, of which not all were nearly as status deprived as Kosovo Serbs. Thus, 
Milošević decided to draw on Serb mythology so as to create an image of him being a 
national saviour and hide the real political issues from sight. This combination of 
nationalism and conservatism drew the support of the masses by offering the perception 
of change without actual improvements in the state or economy.
6
 The people’s attention 
was directed towards Kosovo through hysterical media accounts of the Kosovo 
Albanian’s activities and through presenting the federal econo ic and political collapse 
as a historical Serb struggle.
7
 From 1987, Serbian history, including its battles and 
sufferings, was featured in the Belgrade media,
8
 and Muslim Otherness was emphasised 
by referring to them with Ottoman names.
9
 Through such language, “Serbian discourse 
had formed a system of evocative terms that can most accurately be called an absolute 
terminological construction of the Ottoman period and hence of the oral heroic 
epic[...]”10  
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In 1988 and 1989, frequent  ass rallies  ere organised by Milošević supporters,11 
drawing on Serb mythology and history to promote an image of inevitable struggle and 
unity. The rallies were designed to boost the popularity of the Serbian Communist Party 
and create the illusion of wide-spread support for the centralisation of power. This 
centralisation included constitutional amendments revoking the autonomous status of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina and a forced change in the Montenegrin leadership.
12
 The 
purpose of these changes was to bring the smaller republics/provinces into line with 
Serbian policy and thereby increase the Serbian leadership’s po ers  ithin the 
federation.
13
 Milošević’s pro-socialist and pro-Yugoslav approach was promoted in the 
media, which exaggerated the popularity of the rallies and censored the Chetnik insignia 
from the footage shown,
14
 thus portraying them as socialist rather than nationalistic.  
However, it was clear from the beginning that the protesters held fast to the ideal of a 
’Greater Serbia’. Individuals participating in the  ass rallies held posters of Milošević 
together with those of epic heroes.
15
 They had placards with verses referring to national 
epics such as The Mountain Wreath and others expressing the desire to create a Greater 
Serbia, declaring for exa ple the desire to “[...] seek nothing ne  – only the empire of 
Dušan.”16 
 
The Church, starting in 1988, also stepped up its participation in the revival of the Serb 
cultural trau a. Its authority  as boosted by the Milošević press and ne  religious 
policies.
17
 Prince Lazar’s bones toured the country and the construction of Belgrade’s 
St. Sava Cathedral resumed.
18
 The activities and statements of Church dignitaries added 
further legitimacy to the authoritarian policies of the leadership, creating an analogy 
between the absolute authority of past heroes and the modern ones. Through intense 
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 edia coverage, Milošević  as recreated as the  odern equivalent of Dušan, Lazar, or 
Obilić.19 His first na e  as transfor ed into “Slobo” ( eaning freedo ) and ne  epic 
songs were composed on the virtues of this saviour of the Serb peoples.
20
 As ethnic 
polarisation increased within the federation, other heirs to Lazar and Dušan  ere 
created and songs were written on the virtues of radical politicians such as Radovan 
Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj, and later  ilitary leaders including Ratko Mladić and 
Arkan.
21
  
 
In March 1989, Milošević ensured through  ilitary threats the resignation of the 
Albanian Kosovo party leadership, gaining control over the province. This was followed 
by the violent suppression of protests by Kosovo Albanians in the spring of 1989 and 
the gradual exclusion of Albanians from significant political, economic, and academic 
posts.
22
 The cul ination of Milošević’s nationalist rhetoric ca e on 28 June 1989 in 
Gazimestan, during celebrations of the 600
th
 anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, an 
event receiving special treatment in the Belgrade media.
23
 This is  here Milošević 
provided the first indications that his violent intentions extended beyond Kosovo, 
stating that “[s]ix centuries later  e are again involved in battles, and facing battles. 
They are not battles  ith ar s, but these cannot be excluded[...]”24 Reclaiming Kosovo 
was, of course, not enough, for it was only through polarisation and security-level 
threats that political centralism and authoritarianism could be maintained in the long 
run. 
 
The manipulation of the masses was a means to ensure that people would not too loudly 
object to the coercive, authoritarian  easures taken by Milošević. Despite opposition 
within both federal and republic institutions, the polarisation within the federation 
ensured that the chosen policies were not wholly rejected or capable of being thwarted. 
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Although the collapse of the LCY in 1990 and rapid democratisation in Slovenia and 
Croatia eventually forced Milošević to allo  additional political parties also in Serbia, 
his campaign of threat and mythology carried his power through the democratic 
transformation. Importantly, a referendum was organised prior to the Serbian 
presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1990 whereby constitutional 
changes giving wide powers to the future president were approved – Milošević’s 
continued authoritarianism was thus ensured. 
 
Serbian Mass Demobilisation 
Although the media campaign was effective in preventing alternative, more rational 
definitions of the political situation from coming to the fore, it could not capitalise on 
this and triggered very limited voluntary mobilisation in Serbia proper. In fact, despite 
their nationalism, most Serbs still preferred moderate national strategies, and most were 
interested in internal economic prosperity rather than radicalism and military 
endeavours. In addition, Yugoslavis  and Marković’s refor s  ere popular a ong 
 any Serbs, and his popularity  as greater than that of Milošević.25 Despite the 
Milošević and  edia created illusion of an existential threat, the  ajority of the 
population followed their needs instinct: their security needs were not endangered and 
the threat to their status needs was also doubtful, except in poverty-stricken Kosovo. 
Thus, for most, nationalism was fine, but there was no need for violence in its name. 
 
Given the relative moderation of the Serbian electorate, the Milošević-dominated SKS, 
which changed its name to Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) in July 1990, developed a 
platform of economic development and interethnic peace
26
 – the exact opposite of its 
actual ai s. Milošević pretended to offer the  oderate Serbian  ajority what they 
wanted, but at the same time was mobilising the radical elements of society for the 
anticipated future conflict. During the course of 1990, several opposition parties were 
created, though none were capable of building a convincing alternative national 
strategy. In fact, several opposition parties portrayed themselves as significantly more 
nationalistic than the SPS. This “ethnic underbidding,”27 combined with near-exclusive 
control of the media and an electoral system magnifying the gains of the largest party, 
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allo ed the SPS to take 78% of the National Asse bly seats and Milošević to take 65% 
of the presidential vote
28
 in the 1990 elections. As the federal situation became more 
precarious, it became increasingly evident for many Serbians that the SPS was not 
aiming for interethnic peace. In March 1991, there was a clear peak in opposition 
protests and demonstrations,
29
 but these protests came too late to prevent the escalation 
of conflict. 
 
Given the moderate stance of Serbian Serbs, the way for Milošević to  aintain 
authoritarian structures was to adopt a Greater Serbia strategy and concentrate on 
triggering security PRD and violence among the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia.This  also 
allowed him to shift pressure away from Belgrade to the Serb leaders outside Serbia 
proper.
30
 When his attention was directed towards Croatia, another historical reference 
was evoked to provide Serbians a way to make (non)sense of the situation. While the 
Albanians, and even the ethnically Slav Bosnian Muslims, had become Turks in the 
Serbian press, Croats  ere no  repeatedly called Ustaša fascists.31 Since Serb-Croat 
animosity had a shorter history than Serb-Turk animosity and it had been significantly 
diluted during communism, the media had to resuscitate the events of the civil war, 
equating Tudj an’s regi e  ith the NDH32 and inflating the numbers of WWII Serb 
victims. Like the anti-Albanian media campaign, this too drew on an existential threat 
but was equally inefficient in creating large-scale or voluntary mobilisation inside 
Serbia. In late 1991, over half of reservists avoided the draft despite forced mobilisation 
and some 200,000 reservists left Serbia in 1991.
33
  In several regions, 40,000 reservists 
mutinied in protest of  not having been clearly informed of the war aims.
34
 In addition, 
about 50,000 deserted.
35
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Despite the unwillingness of Serbians to mobilise, however, authoritarianism became 
easier to maintain as the wars in Croatia and Bosnia escalated. Mythology and hero-
worship in society increased to absurd levels,
36
 as the “political authorities [ca e to] 
rely almost more on poetry and poets than on state, economic, social, and other national 
interests.”37 Along with this, the Serbian people were radicalising: in the parliamentary 
elections held in the (rump) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1992, the SPS, 
 ith its continued rhetoric of  oderation, received 43% of the votes,  hile Šešelj’s 
ultra-national SRS won 30%,
38
  assuring them a place in a coalition government. As 
increasing numbers of Serbs were forcibly conscripted, dragged into war, and killed, 
and as also the international community became involved, the perception of threat 
among Serbians grew significantly. Deceptive media coverage also aided in the 
manipulation of public opinion: the war was portrayed as defensive; real footage of the 
war was rarely shown in the news; and the atrocities of other parties were exaggerated 
while the ethnic cleansing, massacres, and rapes committed by Serb troops were 
hidden.
39
 As the situation escalated towards security deprivation, support for action-
oriented leaders grew. 
 
The Effect of Ideology in Status PRD 
This section attempted to show that nationalism, even nationalism characterised by a 
“cultural trau a,” has rather little to do  ith  obilisation  hen the population suffers 
fro  status PRD only. Milošević  as successful in creating ideological hege ony in 
Serbia through the exclusion of alternative (more rational) perceptions of reality, 
thereby ensuring his own authoritarian hold on power. The media campaign also helped 
in rendering the asses politically acquiescent to Milošević. The ideological hege ony, 
however, did not automatically transform into wide-scale mobilisation. On the one 
hand, a certain level of mobilisation was achieved among the relatively poorer Kosovo 
Serbs. As opposed to the Serbian Serbs, Kosovo Serbs suffered from security PRD early 
on due to their poverty and the media campaign attacking Kosovo Albanians. Therefore, 
they  ere  ore  illing to rally around Milošević. On the other hand, the Serbs of 
Serbia were more critical and much less radical. As was illustrated, the radicalisation of 
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the Serbians became a reality only in 1992 when the war in Croatia and had been going 
on for some time and the situation in Bosnia was escalating. 
 
The purpose, or at least effect, of manipulation was thus not the mobilisation of 
Serbians as a whole, but the creation of the ideological and structural prerequisites of 
war. Authoritarian use of power and resources enabled the mobilisation of the few 
individuals who wanted to be mobilised, while nationalist identity and ideology 
provided the ex-post facto justification for the activities of such individuals. The Serbs 
who mobilised were thus not to be found among Serbian Serbs at large, for whom status 
PRD was the prevailing needs level, nor from Kosovo, which was annexed to Serbia 
proper in 1989. Instead, they were found among the Serb elites, in particular in the 
professional army, which desired violent action for organisational and status reasons, 
among the volunteers who sought violence for personal reasons (both status and 
security PRD), and perhaps among some of the Serb masses in Croatia and Bosnia, 
among whom the creation of security PRD was still possible. These groups are 
examined below. 
 
 
6.2. The Yugoslav National Army 
 
Of the elites benefiting from and participating in collective violence, perhaps the most 
vital  ere the officers of the Yugoslav People’s Ar y (JNA). The JNA  as the 
successor of Tito’s Partisan ‘liberation’ ar y created during WWII for the purposes of 
resisting German occupation. During and after the civil war, the army participated in the 
elimination of tens of thousands of Party opponents and in the 1950s, after the Tito-
Stalin split, it likewise targeted pro-Soviet party members.
40
 After this repressive phase, 
the JNA played two important roles: it ensured the security of the state against external 
threats, the most important of these being the USSR, and it was an integral part of 
upholding the rule of the Communist Party through military authority. The party 
organisation was strong within the JNA. After the weakening of centralism in the 1970s, 
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the JNA  as transfor ed into the “guardian of the revolution.”41 Favouring continued 
centralism, the JNA assumed a political rather than a mere supportive security role. The 
1974 constitution gave it almost equal say in federal matters as the republics and 
provinces. 
 
The Serb-Montenegrin majority in the JNA,
42
 present from its inception, remained an 
important trait throughout its existence. The legally determined ethnic balance of the 
officer corps and higher commands was never achieved in practice. Instead, throughout 
its history, the JNA officers were about two-thirds Serb and Montenegrin, while the 
least represented nationalities were the Slovenes (who often had better routes of social 
mobility) and Albanians (who were considered ideologically unsuitable).
43
 The ethnic 
balance only worsened in the 1980s, after Branko Mamula in 1982 became Minister of 
Defence.
44
 In addition to ethnicity, JNA officers and soldiers were chosen according to 
their ideological, rather than military, credentials.
45
 The ideology promoted in the JNA 
was originally that of Titoism and socialist revolution, but there was a gradual change 
towards nationalist categorizations that ran counter to this.
46
 After the collapse of the 
LCY, the ideological emphasis shifted towards patriotism and the defence of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
47
 The JNA values that were best preserved in the 
transformation were unity and centralism.
48
 
 
The JNA came to be gradually involved in the political conflicts between Serbia and the 
Western republics, to protect its own existence and the status gratification of the JNA 
officers. During the last decades of the Yugoslav Republic, JNA generals had been 
relatively independent political actors
49
 and benefited from special material benefits and 
awards.
50
 This elitism, not to mention the continued existence of the JNA as a whole, 
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became endangered when the economic crisis of the 1980s forced the JNA budget to be 
cut. The ne  Minister of Defense, Veljko Kadijević, refused to depoliticise the JNA and 
relied on its alleged constitutional role of protecting the existing political system, 
arguing that party pluralis   ould be a “step back ard.”51 The top generals assumed 
that centralism imposed by the JNA was the only way to resolve the Yugoslav problem 
– the ethnic divisions that threatened to tear the country apart.52 Although Kadijević 
himself was a strong proponent of traditional Socialist values, the desire for continued 
centralism caused many of military leaders to side with the Serbian political elites.
53
  
After the collapse of the LCY, JNA soldiers  ere forced to join the ne  Milošević-
affiliated League of Communists – movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ) and spread the 
ideology of Yugoslav unity among the people.
54
 This movement never grew into a 
serious political force. 
 
The JNA began participating in the Yugoslav political conflict from 1990 when it 
denounced the legitimacy of the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) election 
campaign and the HDZ in Croatia.
55
 In early 1991, the JNA seized arms in the republics 
to prevent the formation of republican armies and ordered the detention of the Croatian 
Minister of Defense, Martin Špegelj. It also distributed ar s to Croatian and Bosnian 
Serbs and eventually mobilised JNA troops from Croatia. While it is difficult to say 
whether these actions were meant to support Serb centralism or true Yugoslavism, the 
JNA’s last atte pt to hold on to a Yugoslav identity definitively took place in the 
summer of 1991. At this time, despite official constitutional sanctions, the JNA briefly 
occupied Slovenia after Prime Minister Marković declared illegal the Slovenian and 
Croatian declarations of independence and ordered the securing of federal border 
crossings. The JNA acted immediately because failing to do so would have implied an 
end to its own meaningful existence.
56
 The occupation, however, lasted for no more 
than ten days (27th June to 7th July). The orders given to the deployed troops were 
vague, the new Slovenian army was fighting back, and despite the hopes of a number of 
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JNA officers for a wider intervention (including a putsch of the Slovene leadership), 
full-scale conflict was not supported by Serbian leaders.
57
 
 
After intervention in Slovenia, the JNA became increasingly Serbianised: the federal 
system of mobilisation was replaced by the in-take of Serb volunteers.
58
 The JNA 
mobilised its troops in Croatia and Bosnia, ostensibly to protect the Serb minorities (see 
next sections). The change in policy was also reflected in the army magazine, Narodna 
Armija,  here the civil  ar fra e (JNA Partisans versus Ustaša Croats) became 
prominent.
59
 The Yugoslav-minded Kadijevic resigned in January and many others 
(including Chief of Staff Blagoje Adžić) in the spring of 1992. The Milošević-led 
transformation of the JNA into the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) 
had begun. Both the internal transformation and the violence carried out by JNA troops 
was accepted by the military, for in the context of a collapsing federal system, it was the 
only viable way for the JNA elites to retain their relatively gratifying status roles. 
 
The behaviour of the JNA is an example of how leader personality can determine 
whether a conflict will occur. In the case of Slovenia, much conflict was avoided due to 
the personality of Kadijević,  ho refused to start an all-out war without constitutional 
sanction. Adžić, on the other hand,  ould have been prepared to keep the federation 
together at any cost, including a full war against Slovenia and, in his own words, 
“exter ination of tens of thousands of Croats.”60 For many generals, status gratification 
was more important than the interests of the former Yugoslav citizens, which caused 
the  to follo  Milošević’s orders and to change their identities accordingly. 
 
 
6.3. Serb Identity and Mobilisation in Croatia 
 
The development of Serb nationalism and the difficulty of mobilisation among the 
Croatian Serbs largely followed the model of Serbia as a whole, wherein manipulation 
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of existing identities in status PRD created a new unity among the Croatian Serbs and a 
wide-scale redefinition of collective identity, but did not lead to wide-scale 
mobilisation. Notably, the lack of a cause-effect relationship between ethnic hatred 
(ideology) and violence (mobilisation) in the case of Croatia has already been 
investigated in detail by Sekulić and others.61 These authors show how ethnic hatred 
and intolerance among Croats could not have been the cause of the war, for intolerance 
reached its peak not before, but during and after the war years.
62
 While proving the 
absence of connection between ideology and mobilisation, as well as pointing out that 
identities become more flexible only after the escalation of conflict, these authors leave 
unresolved the question of what, if not ethnic hatred, is the real cause of mobilisation. 
As will be shown in this and the next sections, violence in security PRD was initially 
triggered by the status desires of an alliance of elites and radicals for whom the process 
of escalation provided new opportunities of needs fulfilment. 
 
Creating Serb Unity 
Despite the deep crisis in the federal economic and political institutions, the interethnic 
relations bet een Croatia’s Croats and Serbs  ere cordial until after the HDZ  victory 
in April 1990. Even at the end of 1989, Serbs and Croats perceived interethnic relations 
as generally positive, and there was no general perception of threat to  national rights.
63
 
The events in Kosovo and Milošević’s propaganda created a negative perception of 
interethnic relations in the federation as a whole, but not on the local level. Perceptions 
thus corresponded with reality: there was no actual difference between the needs 
fulfilment of the two ethnic groups. Neither did there seem to be any immediate desire 
for the breakup of the federation, separation of ethnicities, or separate cultural 
orientation.
64
 Also, up to the su  er of 1990, the econo ic refor s of Marković 
remained popular,
65
 suggesting support for some kind of continued federal arrangement. 
 
The liberalisation of political space within the federation did give rise to the Croatian 
branch of the SDS in Knin in February 1990. The party was initially moderate, 
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advocating national equality, cultural autonomy for Croatian Serbs, and Yugoslavism.
66
 
In the republic’s April 1990 parlia entary elections, non-ethnic parties were, however, 
more popular among the Serb minority. The majority of Serbs voted for the reformed 
Communist Party, and the SDS received only 13.5% of the Serb vote.
67
 Due to election 
rules favouring the largest party, however, the HDZ took 67.5% of the seats in the 
Croatian Sabor. As  entioned, the polarisation caused by Tudj an’s policies 
contributed to the demise of non-ethnic parties and politics and the rise in SDS 
popularity. 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the HDZ platform emphasised nationalism over 
the economic liberalism prioritised by the electorate. The nationalistic orientation of the 
HDZ only grew after the elections, arguably causing an increasing number of Serbs to 
take seriously the anti-Croatian propaganda of the Serbian media. The definition of the 
federal political situation in ethnic ter s by both Tudj an and Milošević  eant that the 
Serbs were prevented from identifying with the Croatian state. Also, the material 
support flowing from Belgrade to the SDS caused an increase in SDS authority despite 
its original unpopularity. In the summer of 1990, the SDS was further radicalised when 
Rašković’s negotiations for a political agreement with Tudjman became public. He was 
forced to transfer po er to Milan Babić, the  ore radical leader of the ne ly created 
Serb National Council and preferred recipient of Belgrade’s aterial favours. 
 
The perceived status RD among the Croatian Serbs led not to wide-spread mobilisation 
but only to  support for the SDS. For the Serbs as a whole, security PRD became a 
realistic possibility only after the first violent incidents. These were committed in 
August 1990 by Serb extremists in Northern Dalmatia, where the JNA sided with the 
Serbs by distributing weapons to them, and in Knin and Lika, where Serb extremists 
clashed with Croatian police. Due to the escalation of the conflict, the SDS predictably 
continued to acquire more members and authority during the summer and fall of 1990, 
and according to plans enacted  ith Milošević, initiated the process of declaring 
autonomous Serb regions in the Krajina. This search for autonomy was not initiated by 
the Serb masses, but by the top SDS elites: several local leaders were even unaware of 
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their region’s being autono ous until they read about it the edia.68 After a referendum 
in which allegedly 100% of local Serbs agreed to autonomy, the Autonomous Province 
of Serbian Krajina was created,
 
and independence was proclaimed in March of the 
following year. 
 
Demobilisation and Mobilisation 
During 1990, violent incidents were limited, and despite the actions of the HDZ, the 
threat to Serb security needs was not sufficient to initiate a revolution from below.  The 
Serbs participating in violence against the allegedly Ustašoid Croats  ere only a radical 
 inority,  hile the  ajority  ere si ply kept docile through “constant tension and by 
frequently changing the political fra e ork.”69 The more restrained Serb population 
that opposed SDS policies was demobilised through threats and by destroying the 
reputation of moderate Serb politicians in local papers.
70
 Later on, moderate opponents 
were eliminated by ordering them to the front lines.
71
 Even after the ethnic cleansing of  
Krajina, murders of moderate Serbs continued in order to ensure the consolidation of 
new power relations.
72
 One telling fact is that  hile Babić  as allo ed to lead a violent 
path towards autonomy, enjoying the support of a personal militia and the material 
backing of Milošević, the discredited negotiation-preferring Rašković continued to be 
the slightly more popular leader of the two.
73
  
 
As  entioned, the local Serbs’ perception of  the Croats  as strongly influenced by the 
increasingly derogatory portrayal of Croatians by the Belgrade media. Croats were 
derogatorily referred to as Ustaša, ani als, sadists, de ons, and racially inferior 
barbarians.
74
 Croat actions were continuously misreported and the history of Croat-Serb 
violence was rewritten through exaggerated discourse and documentaries about past 
atrocities,
75
 civil  ar casualties, and the opening of  ass graves of Serb Ustaša 
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victims.
76
 Through this, the impression of a renewed existential threat was created: a 
threat to basic and security needs caused by the “ne  NDH.” Also the local SDS 
leadership used this frame to appeal to the public.
77
 Almost incredibly, this 
indoctrination, while increasing Serb unity and enhancing the perception of Croat 
otherness, was not powerful enough to eliminate the Serb asses’ reluctance to resort to 
violence in status PRD. 
 
Given the rational inaction of the Croatian Serbs, Milošević tried to  obilise the JNA 
instead. The army, however, refused to intervene with full force without constitutional 
sanction. In January 1991, the federal presidency had refused to allow military 
intervention in Croatia by the JNA, and in March a federal state of emergency was 
si ilarly rejected. After this, Milošević gave up on the federal institutions altogether 
and opted for the use of paramilitary groups to trigger an escalation of the conflict. In 
February and March 1991, the violence intensified owing to the activities of local Serb 
radicals as well as volunteers and Serbian paramilitary troops flowing in from Serbia, 
organised and controlled by Belgrade.
78
 Clashes between Croatian police and Serb 
paramilitaries became frequent as the Serbs tried to establish authority in multiethnic 
towns. By this time, some Croat paramilitaries had also become active.
79
 Still refusing 
all-out war, the JNA sent in tanks, while the Belgrade media reacted to the events by 
talking about alleged assacres and genocide by Croat Ustaša ilitias.80 
 
Mean hile, in Knin, the for er local Police Chief, Milan Martić,  ho  as dis issed by 
Croat authorities, developed his personal  ilitia (Martićevci)  ith significant  aterial 
and organisational help fro  the Serbian Security Service. The Martićevci, organised by 
the infa ous Captain Dragan (Vasiljković), later developed into the Krajina Serb Ar y 
(SVK) and came to share a common officer corps with the JNA.
81
 Despite the 
paramilitary activities, however, it was only after the Slovenian and Croatian 
declarations of independence that the JNA sub itted to Milošević’s  ill and the 
sporadic violence became an all-out war. The JNA moved its troops and equipment to 
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Croatia and by June the various Serb paramilitaries attacked in Slavonia and undertook 
massacres in Croatian towns. The actions of the paramilitaries triggered further conflict 
bet een the ethnic groups and initiated ethnic cleansing of the ‘Serb regions.’ By 
September, when the JNA started a large-scale invasion of Croatia, it had largely 
become a homogenous Serb Army. 
 
The Croatian war furthered the transformation of the JNA, separating the true believers 
of a Greater Serbia from the rest. However, while the majority of Serb officers remained 
in the military, troops on the ground were not often motivated by the Greater Serbian 
ideology. Indeed, they were hardly motivated to fight at all. One JNA general admitted 
he  as forced to fire on his o n troops to “ otivate the  in Croatia.”82 For SVK 
troops, cooperation with and payments by the JNA were essential motivators in carrying 
out the ethnic cleansing:
83
 as far as the para ilitary groups  ere concerned, “those not 
on the JNA payroll were evidently angered at not receiving any remuneration from the 
defense [sic]  inistry and engaged in profligate looting by  ay of co pensation.”84 
Clearly, then, in the absence of a real existential threat, individuals participating in 
collective violence were not the masses at large but individuals benefiting materially 
from the chaos. Also, due to the weakness of military command and control, there was 
“enough space for lo er and local  ar ongers to  ake a creative contribution to 
expanding the Serbo-Croatian  ar.”85 
 
 
6.4. Serb Identity and Mobilisation in Bosnia 
 
The story of the development of Serb unity in Bosnia follows largely the pattern seen in 
Croatia. Although Serb mythology was used more intensively in Bosnia than  Croatia, 
indoctrination of the Bosnian Serbs still only ensured large-scale acceptance of the war, 
but not always mobilisation. Unlike in Croatia, however, the ethnification and 
mobilisation process in Bosnia had already begun before the proclamation of 
independence, largely because ethnic polarisation and security PRD was already a 
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reality in neighbouring Croatia. The overall situation thus deteriorated quickly from 
status PRD towards security PRD, allowing a relatively efficient mobilisation of a new 
Bosnian Serb Army. 
 
Elite-led Escalation 
Given the level of federation-wide ethnic polarisation, it was no surprise that the 
November 1990 Bosnian parliamentary elections were characterised by a lack of 
political alternatives to the ethnic leadership offered by Milošević and Tudj an. Serb, 
Croat, and Muslim ethnic parties consequently won near-equal shares of the vote. 
Ethnification progressed rapidly around this time. While a vast majority of Bosnians in 
1989 had seen nationalist divisions as useless and ethnicity as unimportant,
86
 by 1991 
polarisation was complete. Collaboration between the ethnic parties gave way to an 
administrative standstill. The Croats became increasingly racist and radical, taking their 
orders from Zagreb; the Bosnian branch of the SDS became increasingly authoritarian 
under Karadžić (and behind the scenes under Milošević); and the SDA beca e 
increasingly religious. Interethnic clashes became frequent even among the masses,
87
 
resulting in de facto division of multi-ethnic towns, talk of territorial division,
88
 and 
creation of militias. The lack of functioning administration and economic difficulties 
also led to the near-collapse of health and other state services,
89
 causing a further 
deterioration in needs fulfilment. 
 
In early 1991, the Bosnian SDS joined Milošević’s Greater Serbia tea . In favouring 
unity with Serbia and rejecting an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SDS leaders 
hardly stopped to consider whether Serb needs could not be equally well fulfilled in a 
multiethnic Bosnian state. The elites, of course, were interested only in promoting their 
own status gratification through the manipulation of perceptions
90
 and institutionalising 
their leadership through the creation of an independent Serb entity. Preparations for 
secession and war began towards the middle of 1991 and by September, several Serb 
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autonomous regions in Bosnia had been declared,
91
 followed by two Croat areas in 
November.
92
 To legitimise its position, the SDS in November organised a Serb 
referendum on remaining part of Yugoslavia (at this point essentially being only Serbia 
and Montenegro), resulting in an al ost unani ous “yes.” On 19 Dece ber 1991, the 
Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) was declared,
93
 pre-empting 
the anticipated Bosnian declaration of independence. From the end of 1991, the JNA 
redistributed TO
94
 firearms to Serb volunteers,
95
 and by early 1992 it was training Serb 
forces, while several paramilitary groups were also preparing for war.
96
  
 
The Serb representatives at the Bosnian parliament refused to participate in the 
referendum which made Bosnia an independent entity in March 1992. The European 
Community (EC) and the US postponed recognition of the new independent state until 
early April to allow negotiations to proceed – time used by all sides to prepare for war. 
Early preparations for the creation of an independent Serb entity, such as the existence 
of local government and official stamps,
97
 suggests that the declaration of independence 
and the breakup of negotiations were more of an excuse than the actual cause of war.
98
 
Although the Croats and Muslims organised paramilitary troops for their defence in the 
autu n of 1991, the Serb plans for division clearly  ent further than anyone else’s. 
This was no surprise, given that the Greater Serbian cause of the Serb elites, as well as 
the army and volunteer troops in Bosnia, were ultimately in the hands of Milošević,99 in 
whose interests it was to avoid negotiations that could have led to something less than a 
Greater Serbia. 
 
Indoctrination 
From the very beginning, and throughout the war, the Bosnian Serb elites justified their 
actions through propaganda from Belgrade, which had spread to Bosnia. The Serbs had 
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started taking over TV Sarajevo’s trans itters in August 1991, and by March 1992 
Belgrade-based propaganda reached half of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
100
 In 
April 1992, when a new Republika Srpska  News Agency was created, Bosnian Serbs 
had their own source of lies, dehumanisation of potential enemies and misrepresentation 
of the conflict.
101
 Many local radio stations were transformed into sources of 
paramilitary exhortations and Serbian patriotic music.
102
 This perhaps did not mobilise 
the locals on a  assive scale, but it created the illusion of ‘everyone’ supporting the 
war, and thereby excluded voices of moderation within the Serb community. An illusion 
of existential threat and an environment of extreme uncertainty helped ensure the SDS 
remained the only leadership alternative for Bosnian Serbs. As the crisis escalated, of 
course, the threat became reality, and the war strategy became the only real option. 
 
SDS leader Karadžić and VRS co  ander Ratko Mladić, the t o  en responsible for 
the worst atrocities of the Bosnian war, were also transformed into epic heroes, subjects 
of songs and praises.
103
 Karadžić, not only a politician and a psychiatrist but also a 
nationalist poet, likened hi self to Vuk Karadžić, the fa ous Serb national poet.104 
When addressing journalists and troops, both Karadžić and Mladić repeatedly co pared 
the war in Bosnia to the Ottoman invasion of medieval Serbia. The anti-Muslim 
propaganda was not difficult to impress upon Bosnian Serbs, who in 1990 had been 
warned of the imminent Muslim conspiracy to take in four million Turkish Muslims and 
create a Muslim state.
105
 In 1990, Rašković had also held nationalistic  eetings on 
Mount Romanija (close to Sarajevo), a symbol of Serb freedom since it was portrayed 
in Vuk Karadžić’s epics and Vojislav Lubarda’s nationalistic novels fro  the 1980s.106 
For the Serbs, epic and ethnic understanding of the conflict and their role in it was 
widely acknowledged and well established. 
 
Mobilisation 
Despite the higher level of security PRD in Bosnia, the Bosnian war began in a similar 
fashion to the Croatian one, through the actions of Serb paramilitary groups and the 
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JNA. Serb-Croat fighting in Bosanski Brod in early March 1992 spread rapidly across 
the country. Serbs started ethnically cleansing  Croat villages in Herzegovina and the 
Croats reciprocated by cleansing Serb villages in Posavina.
107
 Serbian paramilitary 
forces crossed into Bosnia in early April, resulting in a massacre of Muslims in Bijeljina 
by Arkan’s Tigers (see next section). Only after the recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovinian independence by the EC and the US on 6-7 April did the JNA become 
involved, following the paramilitary groups who had initiated the invasion and ethnic 
cleansing of Musli  villages in eastern Bosnia (Zvornik, Višegrad, and Foča,  ith 
others to follow). As was the case in Croatia, the initial dirty work was done by 
para ilitaries loyal to Milošević – a natural decision considering the inherent 
unreliability of regular JNA troops to undertake extreme violence. 
 
The Serbianisation of the JNA, ongoing from the previous summer, had by March 1992 
increased the Serb composition of the JNA to 90%.
108
 In May, Milošević officially 
divided the JNA into the VRS and VJ, both of them getting about 80,000 members.
109
 
Although the separation of the armies was designed to counter arguments about 
Yugoslavia interfering in the affairs of an independent and sovereign state, the VJ 
supported the VRS war effort by providing troops, salaries, and equipment.
110
 The VRS 
was mostly made up of Bosnian Serbs,
111
 who were generally more willing to fight than 
JNA troops had been in Croatia. Nevertheless, Bosnian Serbs sometimes had to be 
forcibly taken to the front,
112
 and “[v]arious stratage s  ere used by the organisers of 
cleansing operations to involve the local populations in the anti-Muslim campaigns, 
usually by playing on fears that the Muslims would initiate ethnic cleansing of the Serbs 
if the Serbs did not act first. [...] Deliberate efforts  ere  ade to so  distrust.”113 The 
most eager participants were thus again those receiving  financial rewards from their 
actions,
114
 while others had to be mobilised by gunpoint.
115
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Despite being a more down-up conflict than that in Croatia, the war in Bosnia would not 
have been possible without an extraordinary leadership effort of centralisation and 
indoctrination. In the Bosnian conflict, one can see similarities with a security-level 
situation, in which leadership and mobilisation are accepted without question. Yet even 
in the Bosnian case, war was more often not the obvious and best strategy for all Serbs. 
The war was, again, waged mainly by the JNA/VRS and the paramilitary troops who 
benefited directly from the war in terms of salaries, positions, pillaging, and so on. 
Ho ever,  ost others did not benefit, and therefore “[t]he local Serb population  as 
stiffened in its resolve [only] by the influx of Serbs fleeing from adjacent Muslim-held 
areas[...]”116 – in other words, when there was a real threat to security-level needs of the 
ingroup. 
 
 
6.5. Serb Volunteers and Paramilitary Groups: Illusions of Heroism 
 
To understand the process of mobilisation on the status needs level, one must explore 
the radical elements present in both the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts. Who were the 
individuals, who despite all odds, were mobilised? What made them either follow 
orders and/or volunteer to join the JNA, VRS, or paramilitary groups? The answer lies 
not only in material benefits, but in the combination of ideology (superiority, racism, 
heroism) and personal interest (material benefits, relative importance of the self). Given 
that on the status level there were various status roles available and multiple means of 
self-actualisation, it was only natural that the individuals volunteering did so mostly out 
of personal proclivity. 
 
The Paramilitary Groups 
Milošević  anaged to gain control of the state security institutions as he rose to po er 
in the late 1980s, and  towards the end of 1990 his supporters had begun recruiting 
volunteers for the protection of the leadership and their agenda.
117
 Particularly the 
Ministry of the Interior and secret services organised paramilitary groups loyal to 
Milošević. Most of these para ilitary groups received their orders and  aterial backing 
fro  Belgrade and  ere thus directly in the service of Milošević’s Greater Serbia 
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policy. The primary role of the groups was to participate in firing up the conflict in 
designated regions and carry out ethnic cleansing – crimes that regular army troops 
were perhaps unwilling to commit.
118
 Allowing these individuals to commit atrocities 
ranging from rape to mutilation led to the escalation of the conflict, the partial collapse 
of societal structures, and thus in due course served Belgrade’s overall strategy of large-
scale violence. 
 
Željko Ražnatović Arkan’s Serbian Volunteer Guard (better kno n as the Tigers) 
committed some of the worst atrocities during the war, covering perhaps 28 
municipalities.
119
 The Tigers are an ideal example of how individuals with an already 
existing appetite for violence could be easily mobilised to participate in collective 
psychosis. The core of the Tigers  as  ade up of football hooligans, the “Valiants,” 
supporters of the Belgrade Red Star. Following the mood prevailing in Serbian society, 
these individuals as early as the mid-1980s exhibited Chetnik, national, epic ideologies 
and symbols at football matches. They were clear supporters of both Milošević and a 
Greater Serbia, praising “Slobo” and Serb unity in their chants.120 As the Yugoslav 
political crisis escalated, the songs became increasingly hostile and gory, including 
direct threats to opponents’ supporters. 
 
Arkan, an international bank robber, transfor ed the volunteering “Valiants” into the 
Volunteer Guard in October 1991.
121
  Through participation in the Greater Serbian 
project, the rage and hate of the hooligans was directed at an appropriate (government-
sanctioned) target and their desires were rationalised by the prevailing environment of 
crisis and chaos. This was perhaps the sole means of empowerment for these 
individuals, who were either incapable or unwilling to achieve status fulfilment and thus 
the feeling of "meaning" through more ordinary means. The Tigers raped and killed 
people beginning in 1991 in Slavonia and running through the Bosnian war to 1995. 
These actions provided the Tigers with a feeling or empowerment and Arkan became a 
hero, who, like so many Serb leaders, became the subject of songs and hero-worship 
that described him as the new saviour of the Serbs.
122
 Later, he also became a member 
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of parlia ent in Kosovo and a business an, and his  edding  ith Serbia’s  ost 
famous turbo-folk singer in 1995 was broadcast live on state television
123
 – events 
revealing the extent of Serb nationalis ’s irrationality.124 
 
Other para ilitary groups partly organised and  aterially supported by Serbia’s 
Ministry of Interior or secret service included Vojislav Šešelj’s (leader of the Radical 
Party) Chetniks, also active in both Croatia and Bosnia in more than 30 
municipalities;
125
 the Serbian National Rene al’s (SNO’s) Dušan Silni (Dušan the 
Great); and the Beli Ori (White Eagles) led by Dragoslav Bogan, who clashed with 
Croatian police forces from the spring of 1991.
126
 Within the Radical Party, paramilitary 
successes were often the best route towards a political role within the movement.
127
 
This moving from pillaging to politics was a rather second-level strategy of needs 
fulfilment. The Ministry of Interior also created its o n ‘special operations’ 
paramilitary troops, active in both Croatia and Bosnia, sometimes referred to as the Red 
Berets. While the other paramilitaries relied on a combination of ideology and status-
fulfilment, these relied more on the latter: the intensive training, quality equipment, and 
demands for absolute loyalty
128
 created a superior and unique force. 
 
The only important paramilitary group not receiving material backing from the 
Milošević regi e  as the Serbian Guard (SG) of Vuk Drašković, nationalist author and 
leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). The SG’s initial purpose  as the 
protection of Serbs and democracy, but it was led by a number of former criminals 
whose activities degraded into atrocities comparable to those of the other groups.
129
 The 
SPO was openly Chetnik/Greater Serbia-oriented. Both the troops and commanders 
 ere ideologically  otivated: one of the co  anders, Branko Lainović, even openly 
ad itted being  otivated by Drašković’s (in)fa ous novel The Knife, which is filled 
with stories of WWI atrocities against the Serbs.
130
 Since the SPO was opposed to SPS 
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rule, however, SG activities were hindered by the JNA in the initial stages of the war. 
After some activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SG split up into opposing factions.
131
 
 
The interesting aspect of these paramilitaries was the small number of individuals 
participating in the war compared to the size of the movements in general. The Tigers 
had some 40,000 members but only 1,500-5,000  ere active; Šešelj’s Chetniks had 
fe er than 200 active  e bers; and Drašković’s SG only 1,500 active  e bers out of 
80,000 in the SG movement as a whole.
132
 Many members were former criminals or 
actually recruited from prison, although there were individuals with quite ordinary 
backgrounds as well.
133
 The numbers suggest that even among the people supporting the 
most ultra-nationalist and racist policies, only a tiny fraction were prepared to 
voluntarily act on their beliefs and endanger their lives to exterminate the Other. It is 
likely that passive participation in such a movement was fully sufficient to provide a 
feeling of e po er ent for people  hose physiological survival  asn’t really at stake. 
Thus, only the most desperate — or psychologically unbalanced — elements of the 
population chose to become active participants to further their status needs. 
 
The Ideological Justifications 
Not all of the participants in the violence, however, were hooligans or radicals. Many 
were soldiers of the JNA, VJ, SVK, and VRS ordered to the front, and among these 
were individuals who had been forcefully recruited. Some of these, and certainly also 
 any of the para ilitary groups’  e bers, needed a justification stronger than  ere 
status gratification for the atrocities they committed. It was at this point in time, when 
already in war, that the media campaigns and manipulations played an important role in 
mobilising – rather than demobilising – people. For the warriors of Greater Serbia, the 
epic stories and popular literature of Serb victories and suffering was more than just a 
cultural backdrop. If the common Serb was forced to watch documentaries about past 
atrocities on state television, for the soldiers, the past became reality through their 
participation in its revival. 
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One of the main ways of recreating the past and providing an ideological justification 
for horrible and irrational deeds was through the tradition of singing epic stories about 
past battles in the form of a decasyllabic poem accompanied by gusle-playing (a simple 
string instrument). Gusle players had toured Serb (and Croat and Muslim) lands from 
the Ottoman times and modified their songs according to audience. In the 1980s, new 
songs emerged suited to contemporary times, for example about the allegedly 
deteriorating position of Kosovo Serbs and the crimes committed against them,
134
 and 
later about the heroism of Serb warriors in battle. The songs highlighted the Otherness 
of the enemy and created for the soldiers an illusory identity of heroism and superiority,  
thereby justifying the cause. During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, gusle players were 
invited to political meetings and to the battlefield. Songs were played deliberately and 
repetitively to boost the troops’  orale before i portant  ilitary operations.135 JNA 
soldiers the selves ackno ledged that “it  as easier to ake  ar  ith the gusle.”136 
 
Another important element of epic poetry furthering the mobilisation of Serb fighters 
was the hajduk cult. The original hajduks of Ottoman times were outlaws whose 
resistance to authority created a popular romanticised perception of their activities. In 
the 1990s, the Serb media in Serbia and Bosnia cherished and promoted this heroic 
i age of Serb ‘resistance’ outside Serbia proper,137 to the extent that the hajduk framing 
of the conflict was also adopted by the Croatian and Muslim media. While for the Croat 
and Muslim press, however, hajduks were little but criminals and terrorists, on the Serb 
side, hajduks were generally considered physically and morally superior to their 
opponents, furthering the illusion of Serb invincibility.
138
 The fact that members of the 
JNA, as well as paramilitary groups, wore insignia related to the hajduk cult
139
 suggests 
that they indeed were taken in by the suggestion that they were heroic freedom-fighters 
and protectors of the Serb nation.  
 
Many individuals among the Serb leaderships in Bosnia and the Krajina were very 
familiar with the epic traditions – or alternatively, those familiar with the traditions 
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sought to become members of the SDS.
140
 The leaders thus used the traditions to justify 
their actions and the same ideas were spoon-fed to the Serb troops. Although, as 
mentioned, many soldiers deserted due to the lack of clear justification for the war, the 
soldiers who remained were able to make partial sense of the conflict in which they 
were engaged by referring to the Ottoman and hajduk frames. Due to this frame, they 
could perceive the war as defensive and themselves as admirable heroes rather than 
murderers. As the war escalated and increasing numbers of Serb comrades were killed 
by the Croat and Muslims armies, the frame became reality and questioning the moral 
justification of war became increasingly unnecessary. At this point in time, the soldiers 
were no longer imaginary, but real heroes of the Serb nation. 
 
Voluntary Mobilisation 
It thus seems that two different justifications were at play among Serb troops. Some 
were driven by their personal status desires, supported by illusions of superiority that 
were promoted by the media. Others were motivated by the allegedly defensive nature 
of the war – an image increasingly convincing as the security situation deteriorated and 
when highlighted by the manipulation of tradition. Some were thus motivated by the 
particular status benefits they achieved, while others were motivated by a very realist 
belief in a security-level, existential threat. The propaganda, unfortunately, was 
proble atic for its recipients in that it “fatally deceived those [...] thrust into  ar [telling 
them] what an easy job awaited them in their militarily incompetent and stupid 
adversary [...]” and “instilled in the  a self-confidence of almost mythic 
proportions[...]
141
 This, of course, while fatal for Serb soldiers, hardly concerned the 
elites for whom war was merely a means of ensuring continued status gratification, not 
an issue of survival or security at all. 
 
 
6.6. Serb Mobilisation: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to show that collective identity, though capable of ensuring the 
unity of a group and creating ideological hegemony with the effect of hiding real issues 
of power and inequity, does not automatically trigger mobilisation. The conflicts in 
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Croatia and Bosnia, though often defined as ‘ethnic conflicts,’  ere ethnic only in the 
sense that the parties to conflict were defined (through great elite effort) by their 
traditional ethnic and national boundaries; mobilisation was a different issue altogether. 
As has been shown, regarding the masses at large, the manipulation of Serb mythology 
carried out by Milošević and other Serb leaders had the effect not of mobilising people 
but of rendering them passive and acquiescent. Mythology and manipulation had a 
mobilising effect only on the individuals who would have gone to war anyway – those 
forcefully recruited and those choosing to do so for personal and often materialistic 
reasons. Mobilisation thus became possible only among individuals for whom status 
PRD had been transformed into security PRD through ecscalation and intense 
indoctrination, and among specific (violent, criminal-minded) individuals for whom the 
conflict created exceptional opportunities for status gratification. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, making soldiers out of people who have alternative status roles 
and means of physiological needs fulfilment is extremely difficult. In fact, war on the 
status level is so irrational in terms of needs fulfilment that those opposed to it must be 
eliminated or demobilised through threats. The masses at large are willing to participate 
in violence only as the conflict escalates so as to create an actual existential threat. 
Although the further escalation of the Yugoslav conflicts is not examined here, it should 
be mentioned that as the war progressed, it acquired several features characteristic of 
bottom-up conflicts. The most important of these was perhaps the collapse of collective 
identity as the main force defining the boundaries of groups participating in conflict. In 
1993, the Muslims for some time fought amongst themselves and one of the parties 
even signed a peace agremeent with the Serb Other,
142
 although it was a Croat-Muslim 
alliance that eventually curbed Serb aggression. The other bottom-up feature, of course, 
was the creation of a new, stronger, Muslim identity.
143
 As we have seen in the case of 
the Sudan, such phenomena take place only in physiological deprivation. In the Bosnian 
war, escalation and increasing deprivation also made existing identities increasingly 
flexible. 
 
Something can also be said about military behaviour. As hypothesised in Chapter 2, 
mobilisation in status PRD among the masses at large can be achieved only through 
                                                          
142
 See further Žanić, Flag on the Mountain, 304-316. 
143
 Ibid., 139, 196, 470, 484. 
171 
 
exceptional levels of indoctrination and material benefits, best achieved in military 
organisations. It is clear that none of the military organisations examined in this chapter, 
from the JNA to the VRS, managed to indoctrinate troops sufficiently to ensure their 
compete separation from society at large and thus their complete obedience. As opposed 
to the Sudanese case, therefore, where widespread mass mobilisation in the rebel 
movements was automatic as needs strategies collapsed, in the Serbian case only a 
radical  inority  as initially  obilised. As Gagnon argues, these “[...]tended to be 
people whose own interests were also threatened by the proposed changes in the 
structures of economic power, and they represented only a small proportion of the 
overall population.”144 It was thus inevitable that for Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, large-
scale mobilisation was more difficult to achieve than in the Sudan, as also in this case 
the key to mobilisation was not collective identity but personal needs fulfilment. 
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7. Implications for International Relations Theory 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to move beyond the general dynamics of identification 
and collective action and use the findings of the previous chapters to inform the 
systemic and structural theories of IR. Realism, liberalism, and constructivist theories of 
IR are explored only at this last stage because they constitute the highest level of 
analysis in the present framework, where the individual-level model of identification 
and the group-level model of collective mobilisation function as a basis. It is argued that 
although systemic theories of IR are largely persuasive on their own, the needs-PRD 
approaches developed in the previous chapters can provide them with a stronger 
foundation for explaining transformations in the overall international structure. 
Consequently, the aim is not to touch upon all existing strands of IR literature, but to 
show how the needs approach can inform some of them. It should be noted that 
although  any of the previous chapters’ findings are based on the interaction bet een 
groups other than nations (such as tribes), from the social psychological perspective, the 
findings should be directly applicable to groups of any size, and thus also to IR. 
 
Although IR theories are mostly systematic theories, they do, as will be shown, make 
some important ontological assumptions about the nature of individual agency as well 
as the nature of ingroup power. This is the reason why the investigations connected to 
individual motivation / agency and to group dynamics of the previous chapters can be of 
value to IR theory. The aim here is thus to link IR theories and their conceptualisations 
of (individual) agency, (ingroup) power, and (intergroup) hegemony to different levels 
of needs fulfilment, and thus illustrate the connection between different IR theories and 
different levels of development. As in Chapters 1 and 2, the purpose is not to reject or 
replace the existing theories but to suggest that the alternative theories are best applied 
to different situations. Thus, realists may still use their rationalist ontology to analyse 
security dilemmas in the international society and constructivists their more ideational 
ontology to draw new revealing conclusions about norm emergence in the developed 
world. The present chapter is, indeed, of particular interest only to those concerned with 
the evolution of the system structure through time and space – an issue that none of the 
main IR theories purposefully address. 
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The first section of this chapter addresses realist and neorealist IR theories, as well as 
their potential criticisms, in light of the needs approach. The second section does the 
same with theories of liberalism and neoliberalism, while the third section tackles 
constructivism. Although constructivist arguments have, to an extent, been explored in 
connection to theories of conflict in Chapter 2, constructivism in IR is considered in 
more depth at this point because, despite its narrowness, it possesses the greatest 
potential for future development of IR and thus is an appropriate way of concluding the 
discussion. All three sections will first suggest a correlation between the intergroup 
dynamics of various needs levels and the various IR theories, and then connect them to 
the various theories of power and hegemony found in IR theories. To an extent, as will 
be shown, suggestions regarding these connections do already exist in IR literature. 
However, this chapter aims to present a more thorough evolutionary approach to IR 
theory, one in which also the ultimate foundation of evolution is present. 
 
 
7.1. The Realist/Neorealist Worldview 
 
For the realist, the international structure is made up of state units whose internal 
characteristics and domestic structures have little bearing on theory. Since states are 
perceived as interacting but unitary actors, states are also assumed to be rational actors, 
with a clear national interest cohesively promoted by both the masses and leaders.
1
 
Although some neoclassical realists might argue that leadership plays an important role 
in international relations,
2
 the role of leadership, or the nature of the regime, does 
usually not enter into the predictions regarding state interaction. In the international 
arena, the struggle for power, resources, and territory among the units is taken as a 
constant and the main national interest is taken to consist of the accumulation of 
military and economic power. According to classical realists, the competition between 
states derives from the desire of human beings to dominate others and ensure survival; 
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Morgenthau, for example, argues that such drives are caused by the need to compete for 
scarce resources.
3
 
 
Neorealism, in contrast, parts from the Hobbesian premise that the seeking of power is 
natural and inevitable. Neorealists attribute the realist nature of international relations to 
the lack of a common strategy in the international system. According to Waltz, the lack 
of co  on rules bet een states  eans that “anarchy” prevails between states, forcing 
them to seek power for defensive purposes.
4
 According to Mearsheimer, the problem of 
anarchy is that “states can never be certain about other states’ intentions.”5 No common 
agreement exists as to the consequences of anarchy, however, except for the fact that 
states end up competing with one another so as to prevent others from overpowering 
them. For Gilpin, competition amounts to the seeking of military and economic 
hegemony, even though this inevitably leads to hegemonic wars.
6
 Waltz, on the other 
hand, argues that accumulating too much power is irrational and that anarchy leads not 
to repeated wars but to the balancing of power among states.
7
 
 
Consequently, depending on the hypothesised extent of conflict in the international 
system, realism can be divided into so-called ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ theories. Both 
camps argue that their particular theory applies to the states system across time and 
space, including the modern context. It seems clear, however, that neither offensive nor 
defensive realism can account for various objectively irrational or top-down phenomena 
within the international system. For example, the search for power resulting in a power 
balance where mutually assured destruction was theoretically possible goes far beyond 
the limits of rationality and realism. Changes taking place in the system, such as the 
transformation of the bipolar world into a unipolar one through detente,
8
 are equally 
difficult to explain through realism alone. The supposed universal applicability of realist 
theory must therefore be challenged. 
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Realism and Deprivation 
Although realism claims universal applicability, it seems to describe especially well the 
dynamics prevailing in less developed regions of the international system, or, those on 
the lower levels of needs fulfilment. As mentioned, realism traditionally holds that 
people, and therefore states, are driven exclusively by the need to survive or dominate 
others. Equally, in assuming that states are rational actors, realism supposes that the 
interests of the leaders and masses do not come into conflict, or if they do, they have no 
relevance for the functioning of the international system. However, as was illustrated in 
the case studies, leadership tends to be situational and oriented towards a clear goal 
(survival and material benefits) only on the lower levels of needs fulfilment; this does 
not mean that other needs or drives do not exist. Equally, as one moves away from 
severe deprivation, leaders tend to become increasingly transformational, capable of 
manipulating mass perceptions, so that the state can even act in ways that run counter to 
the objective (national) interest of the  asses. The leaders’ and  asses’ interests can 
thus be seen to automatically and materially converge only on the lowest levels of PRD. 
 
Second, realism assumes a state of anarchy, something apparently inapplicable to some 
parts of the world such as modern Europe. In reality, there is reason to believe that 
anarchy does not prevail in the intergroup system through time and space, but only 
when the ingroup structure and its common values are absent or have temporarily 
collapsed. For example, the Sudanese intertribal system in the pre-war period suffered 
from an absence of higher authority capable of reconciling tribal differences. Yet in 
times of relative plenty the tribes managed to create institutions to mediate and lessen 
the frequency of tribal conflicts. The idea that materialistic competition always, or 
inevitably, dominates intergroup relations thus does not apply in all systems, but only in 
systems characterised by physiological deprivation. It is also only in physiological 
deprivation that ideational elements such as identities, values, and ingroup hierarchies 
remain unimportant. Materialistic competition for power and resources thus cannot be 
an ever-present intergroup phenomenon. Indeed if it were, the international state system 
would be/have been in a continuous state of war, quite like the tribes of the Sudan in 
times of drought. 
 
Third, while uncertainty and unpredictability are indeed important determinants of the 
nature of intergroup relations, they are not as unchangeable as Mearsheimer and other 
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realists would like to think. As was illustrated in Chapters 3 and 5, the predictability of 
collective action rises significantly as one moves from a low level of needs fulfilment 
towards a higher level. In severe deprivation, groups and individuals indeed behave  
unpredictably and violently, but on the status level, groups tend to be more predictable, 
given that they are directed by common values, identities, and institutional structures. 
Thus, a rise in the level of needs fulfilment in the international system denotes also a 
rise in predictability. This leads to the possibility of the convergence of habits, values, 
and cultures, denoting again a shift away from pure anarchy. 
 
One can thus argue that while realism accurately describes the rational materialism 
prevailing on the lower needs levels, it erroneously applies such systemic characteristics 
to the evolving state systems, across both time and space. Instead, realism can be said to 
best describe a situation in which at least one actor/group in the interstate/intergroup 
system suffers from severe deprivation and consequently renders the intergroup 
environment insecure, unpredictable, and war-prone, in other words characterised by 
security PRD. Because the dynamics of identity and leadership are connected to the 
needs level, so is the realist nature of the intergroup system. Such an evolutionary 
approach is important in that it allows IR theorists to use different theories (realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism) in exploring different phenomena. This approach also 
allows the two variants of realism to be reconciled as applicable to different historical 
eras. As Tang argues: 
 
Systemic theories [such as realism] are adequate only for understanding a 
particular system within a specific time frame. [...W]hile both offensive 
realists and defensive realists have strived to draw from and explain the 
history of the Great Power Era, they should actually look at two different 
historical periods for supporting evidence. Offensive realists should look at 
the pre-Great Power Era, whereas defensive realists should look at the Great 
Power Era. Consequently, while the two realisms can be unified 
methodologically, they should not be unified because they are ontologically 
incompatible: they are from (and for) two different historical periods.
9
 
                                                          
9
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Realist Power and Hegemony (and beyond) 
If the various theories of IR can be linked to different levels of international 
development, then the same can also be done with core IR concepts of power and 
hegemony. Indeed, each systemic theory of IR includes a recognised or implicit 
assumption regarding the nature of power and hegemony; there are as many theories of 
power and hegemony as there are systemic theories. Power is usually seen as either 
coercive, persuasive, or constitutive.
10
 In realist theory, the coercive, one-dimensional 
view of power developed by Dahl
11
 is usually assumed to prevail. One-dimensional 
power allows one to coerce others to do what they otherwise would not do. Given that 
realism is a state-centric theory, power is generally understood as being held by states. 
The extent of power consequently depends on the material and economic resources of 
the state,
12
 although for some realists, the quality of government and diplomacy matter 
as well.
13
 Such a material and coercive understanding of power has already been seen at 
work in the Sudanese case, where on the lower levels of needs fulfilment only coercion 
and materialism lead to group empowerment. 
 
Like the concept of power, hegemony also can be divided into different types. Some 
authors, for example, distinguish between material and ideological types of hegemony – 
the capacity to coerce Others (usually other states) through the “ anipulation of 
 aterial incentives” on one hand, and through socialization, or the “altering of 
substantive beliefs of leaders” on the other.14 Other commentators prefer to differentiate 
between the agential and structural aspects of hegemony.
15
 Recently, theories of 
hege ony have divided the concept into even  ore categories, for exa ple into “the 
production of coercion, the production of consent, the production of attraction, and the 
production of life.”16 While previously scholars spoke of ‘e pires,’  hose po er 
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depended on military assets alone, in the post-WWII world, one speaks of hegemons.
17
 
On the lower levels of development, or the realist world, however, it is clear that we are 
talking about the first level of hegemony only – namely empire. The only route towards 
intergroup hegemony is through material and coercive hegemony. This was seen in the 
Sudanese case in the refusal of the Sudanese peripheries to accept the ideologies offered 
by the state. As also Scott argues, where clear class grievances exist, the (hegemonic) 
public transcript is always undermined by the hidden transcript of the deprived;
18
  the 
idea of ideological hegemony does not apply on this level.  
 
While coercive power and military hegemony thus apply to the lowest needs level, it 
has also been suggested that the role of coercion decreases and the role of manipulation 
increases as soon as a group moves away from physiological PRD. Although realism 
claims broad applicability, it seems clear that the dynamics of power and hegemony in a 
world made up of security-deprived states is not adequately encapsulated by realist (or 
liberal) theory. As hypothesised, collective action in so-called ‘ iddle situations’ in 
which cohesive collective violence is easiest to achieve, does not depend either on mass 
or leader agency, as the case tends to be at the two extremes of the conflict continuum. 
Instead, the particular form that collective action takes is largely determined by the 
interactions between leader and follower conceptions of the ideal needs strategy. On this 
level, power dynamics can correspondingly be seen to shift from coercion towards the 
“second face of po er”19 consisting of manipulation, agenda-setting, and non-decisions. 
The relatively low level of needs fulfilment implies that while mass interests cannot be 
ignored, the masses are also willing to accept various perceptions and solutions 
regarding their relatively insecure needs fulfilment. It is thus on this level that leaders 
have the power, in Gra sci’s  ords, to ideologically “educate the asses.”20 
 
The reason why the power dynamics prevailing in security PRD are not considered 
either by realist or liberal theory is that in the presence of security PRD the international 
system is not necessarily either realist or liberal. Thus, one cannot talk about power or 
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 Agnew, Hegemony, 22. 
18
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hegemony characterised either by competitive or cooperative dynamics. As was seen in 
Chapter 6 in connection to the history of cooperation of the former Yugoslav republics, 
leadership and insecurity together largely determine the needs strategies and ideologies 
of nations suffering from PRD. At some point in time, nations may want to choose 
cooperative strategies to ensure survival; at other times, they may choose independence. 
It is thus on this level that a “ ar of position” rather than a “ ar of  ove ent” prevails 
and where various competing ideological hegemonies, or Gramscian-style “historical 
blocks,”21 can be created and coexist in the state system. As is also exemplified by the 
Yugoslav case study, however, manipulative power and ideological hegemony are only 
another historically specific phenomenon. Eventually, groups and nations achieve a 
higher level of needs security and ideological hegemony must give way to more liberal 
group dynamics. 
 
 
7.2. The Liberal Worldview 
 
Contrary to the realist position, the liberal view is less state-centric and takes into 
account developments within, and more complex interests of, the state units. Liberalism 
posits that cooperation and peace between groups/nations is possible, and indeed 
increasingly likely, in the modern world. According to neoliberals, an essential element 
of the liberal transfor ation is the change of the international syste  to ards “co plex 
interdependency” bet een states, businesses, NGOs, civil society, and individuals.22 
This renders international conflict increasingly irrational and obsolete. Liberal 
institutionalists, on the other hand, believe that the international system is still 
characterised by anarchy, but that the states’ common economic and political interests 
may nevertheless serve as a basis for the creation of international norms and 
supranational institutions, which in turn can generate greater trust and cooperation.
23
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Quite like the materialism of realism, the cooperation and interdependency of liberalism 
can be connected to the overall level of development and efficiency of needs fulfilment. 
If one  ants to understand  hy co plex interdependency “varies according to region, 
locality, and issue area,”24 one must look towards needs and motivation. As has been 
argued, cohesive cooperation is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve on the lower 
levels of needs fulfilment, for the most natural and adaptive reaction on this level is 
individual mobilisation. On the status level, on the other hand, people and groups are 
more influenced by common values and identities, and thus their actions are much more 
predictable. Thus also liberalism is regionally and historically specific: regionally in 
that it applies only to the Western, developed, world, and historically specific in that it 
applies only to the last half century: 
 
Whereas defensive realism has tried to examine a long period of history of 
international politics (from Westphalia or 1495 to today) and realism in 
general has claimed to apply to an even longer stretch of history (from 
ancient China and Greece to today), neoliberalism has rarely ventured into 
the terrain of international politics before World War II: almost all of the 
empirical cases that neoliberalists claim to support their theory have been 
from the post-World War II period.
25
 
 
Democratic Peace 
A significant aspect of liberalism addresses not only the question of cooperation within 
the system but also the decreasing frequency of conflict within that system: democratic 
peace. According to Kant,
26
 peace is a consequence of the developments in and between 
state units. The first relevant development is democratisation, which allows the masses 
who bear the costs of war to also control decisions regarding war and peace. This, it is 
argued, has rendered states more peaceful. Another development is increased economic 
interdependency, which makes violent conflict more costly. A third development is the 
growing power of international rules and organisations that constrain state and interstate 
behaviour. These elements constitute the basis for explaining democratic peace, as well 
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as for the overall liberal research agenda. Although many of these aspects have been 
examined in the context of conflict theories (Chapter 2), it is worth resolving the 
confusion regarding explanations of peace as well, given their significance for liberal IR 
theory. 
 
Quite like conflict theorists, democratic peace theorists labour under the illusion that it 
is possible and desirable to create one universally applicable theory. Also similar to 
theories of conflict, democratic peace theories offer a dichotomy of explanations: 
material versus structural. Accordingly, some theorists argue that the real foundation of 
peace is not democracy at all, but capitalism and/or socioeconomic development. As 
Gat suggests, peace may be a direct result of the wealth created by capitalism and the 
industrial-technological revolution.
27
 The entrenchment of democracy and peace are 
seen as resulting from the increase in economic production: while “[i]n preindustrial 
times, such growth as there was in overall resources through innovation and exchange 
was so slow as to make resources practically finite and the competition over them close 
to a zero-su  ga e,” such insecurity has now largely been overcome, rendering people 
less willing to engage in conflict both in democratic and undemocratic countries.
28
 Even 
if people are still interested in accumulation, it can now be more easily achieved 
through commerce than territorial expansion. As Gartzke argues in the neoliberal vein, 
capitalism creates common interests between states, causes them to become increasingly 
interdependent, and unlikely to resort to war due to its costliness.
29
  
 
Other theorists explain the existence of the democratic peace through the nature of 
regime/institutional structure.
30
 Democratic institutions arguably constrain collective 
behaviour by forcing leaders to consider the needs of their constituencies. According to 
Bueno de Mesquita and Silverson, for example, the choice between war and peace 
depends largely on whether leaders can hope to retain their positions in times of war, 
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which in turn means that democracies are likely to engage in war only when victory is 
probable.
31
 On the other hand, irrespective of the interests of state leaders, domestic 
institutions can also force people to seriously evaluate whether or not a conflict is 
consistent with prevailing societal values such as liberalism.
32
 Domestic institutions can 
also work in less obvious ways. For example, the enforcement of practices by domestic 
administrators can lead to path dependent interactions between units and give rise to 
“co plex adaptive syste s” in  hich agents interact based on co  on rules,33 for 
example, making states more likely to resort to dispute settlement than aggression.
34
 
 
If one accepts the argument presented in the previous chapters regarding the dynamics 
of conflict, however, it is evident that peace, or democratic peace, can be explained 
mainly by the increase in needs security. It is equally clear that in the case of top-down, 
manipulative leadership, the institutional structure is also of crucial significance if it 
successfully constrains leader behaviour. Since conflict is caused by deprivation and 
manipulative leadership on the various needs levels, peace must accordingly depend on 
abundance (or perceived relative abundance) and structures constraining manipulative 
leadership. The third strand of democratic peace theory, which explains peace only 
through ideational factors such as similarity of values in liberal democracies,
35
 should, 
however, be rejected. As argued in Chapter 2, ideational factors do provide an 
explanation for increasing cooperation within the system, but not for the existence or 
absence of mobilisation. For example, identity and value theorists often point to the 
frequency of military and humanitarian interventions carried out by liberal democracies 
in non-democratic countries.
36
 Such interventions, however, can equally be explained 
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by the failure of democratic structures to constrain elite action which, from the 
mass/national interest perspective, tends to be both maladaptive and irrational. 
 
Liberal Power 
The liberal conception of power is closely connected to the complex interdependencies 
of liberal internationalism and thus differs from the realist perception of power as being 
power “over” other units. Since liberalis  is based on co  on interests and 
interdependencies, liberal power is more sophisticated and based on the capacity of 
units to persuade one another. As discussed above, this non-realist and more ideational 
kind of po er is often called the “second face of po er”37 in which persuasion, agenda-
setting, and non-decisions matter. Thus, while in the context of security PRD the 
element of manipulation was highlighted, from a liberal view one should pay more 
attention to the role of persuasion.
38
 In the IR context, the persuasive aspect of liberal 
po er is elaborated by Nye through the concept of “soft po er,”39 meaning the ability 
to “structure the situation so that other countries [or other actors] develop preferences or 
define their interests [in consistent  ays].”40 Indeed, if security PRD has largely been 
overcome in the liberal world, then individuals are less moved by manipulation and 
more by persuasion. 
 
Soft power can be exercised through various means, for instance through political, 
scientific, and cultural institutions and interactions. Given that soft power is the 
prevailing mode of power in the liberal interdependent world, it can also be carried out 
by actors other than states,
41
 most notably international political and financial 
institutions.
42
 The ones wielding power in the liberal strategy are thus no longer only 
military leaders (as in physiological deprivation) or political ones (as in security PRD) 
but the various experts governing in the interdependent system. It can thus be said that 
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on the status level, power is dispersed to individuals who through competition have 
managed to acquire prominent status roles. Persuasion is the prevailing mode of power 
because no one individual has full expertise or control over the entire needs strategy or 
mass perceptions. Rather than seeking strong solutions and leaders, people desire 
structures that allow competition – which is perhaps also why liberal democracy walks 
hand in hand with global capitalism
43
 and the hegemony of the market.
44
 
 
The importance of status needs fulfilment and the power of intellectuals and experts has 
significant, positive and negative consequences for human communities. On one hand, 
status needs PRD and elite control may induce states to abandon their authoritarian 
values in return for economic well-being and free competition. Making European Union 
membership conditional on the abolition of the death penalty, for example, has led to its 
widespread abandonment in Europe and neighbouring countries.
45
 On the other hand, 
status competition and elitism have also led to the abandonment of more communitarian 
values and the weakening of social welfare and overall ‘togetherness’ in the  arket 
economies of the developed world.
46
 As Münch  rites, “[i]n this  orld of shrinking 
distances, everybody is competing with everybody, which leaves us as the strategies of 
survival nothing but specialisation, even faster product and service innovations and 
cycles, and the corresponding worldwide extension and differentiation of the division of 
labor.”47 Unfortunately, despite leading to feelings of purposelessness (variably called 
anomie, alienation, or ontological insecurity),
48
 the need for status through competition 
is rooted in the needs hierarchy and thus cannot be easily avoided by the individual. 
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Liberal Hegemony 
Like liberalism and realism, also the concept of liberal power is historically specific. As 
Nye argues, “[...]the definition of po er is losing its emphasis on military force and 
conquest that marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, education, and economic 
growth are becoming more significant [...] while geography, population, and raw 
 aterials are beco ing so e hat less i portant.”49 One should add that due to its 
connection to the overall level of development and needs security, soft power is also 
geographically specific.
50
 Indeed, given the frequency of physiological and security 
PRD in many parts of the world, the liberal transformation is far from global. Liberal 
power dynamics are limited to the regions where individuals have reached the status 
level. Even in developed countries, liberal theory applies best to elites who benefit most 
from the global needs strategy and who can thus best afford a more inclusive ingroup.
51
 
 
However, given that Nye speaks of power between states rather than between people, 
his is really a theory of hegemony. Nye concentrates almost exclusively on the 
behaviour of Western democracies, and the United States in particular – the liberal 
hegemons of the modern (if crumbling) unipolar world. Nevertheless, the liberal 
hegemony in a sense stretches further than its power dynamics. This is because power 
no longer resides in the hands of the states but rather in the international political and 
financial institutions promoting global capitalism.
52
 The rise of institutional power has 
meant that liberal hegemony can come to characterize also less developed countries, 
although they have been relegated to an inferior position. Through liberal power, the 
 orld is being transfor ed into “haves” and “have-nots.”53 According to world systems 
theory, in particular, the world is divided into the core, semi-periphery, and periphery 
regions, core countries with developed capitalist economies exploiting peripheral ones, 
which in turn have labour-intensive economic strategies.
54
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Although the present dissertation is more interested in needs than needs satisfiers, and 
thus is uninterested in economic theory per se, a few words should be said about how 
the needs perspective can help understand the dynamics of unequal economic relations. 
The core-periphery relationship provides benefits for both regions on different needs 
levels: for the core actors, the availability of cheap resources and labour promotes status 
competition,
55
 and for the peripheral masses jobs in multinational factories provides 
opportinities of physiological survival. The problem (of exploitation) resides in the fact 
that in the periphery, power dynamics are based on coercion and materialism. As the 
Sudan case study has shown, severe deprivation causes people to opt for immediate 
solutions, including strategies of economic exploitation imposed by the core powers, 
and makes people incapable of cohesively protecting their interests. As physiological 
survival is of prime importance, participation in the global strategy becomes voluntary 
as well as necessary. By accepting simplistic solutions and by obeying authoritarian 
leaders the masses undermine collective empowerment on the local level and thus 
complete the vicious circle of the global system.
56
 
 
In connection to the Sudan, it was also clear that the absence of common fate between 
elites and masses tends to cause elites to adopt justificatory RG ideologies. Such a 
pattern can arguably be detected in the case of the modern global system. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) economists have been widely criticised as driven by simplistic 
neoliberal ideology rather than an awareness of the best possible local development 
strategies,
57
 which in turn is reflected in their inefficient models of economic and social 
development. The developing country elites, in turn, are in a difficult position in having 
to decide whether to serve the needs of the masses and the international society in 
general through persuasive capitalist strategies    or to resort to  ore authoritarian 
methods in improving the living standards of their constituencies. Again the problem 
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arises due to a dicrepancy between power and hegemony. Although liberal hegemony 
extends to the periphery via market structures and through participation in international 
institutions, these structures cannot be utilised in an equitable manner in regions where  
materialism, coercion and manipulation has more power than collective persuasion. As 
long as a significant level of development and needs security remains unattained in the 
periphery, liberal hegemony will continue to have uncontrollable effects in the 
peripheries of the global system. 
 
 
7.3. The Constructivist Worldview 
 
The constructivist worldview overlaps greatly with the liberal conception, but for 
practical purposes it is treated separately. Rather than being a theory, constructivism is 
better described as a sociological and IR approach. Constructivism emphasises the way 
in which intersubjective meanings are used to understand the social world and the ways 
in which change comes about in a system. In the field of IR, constructivists challenge in 
particular the idea that the nature of international relations or structures is somehow 
fixed. Instead, social structures are best seen as being constructed through the practices 
and interactions of actors, whose interests and actions are then recursively shaped by 
that structure – in other words, structures and actors are co-constituted. Critical 
constructivists are also interested in the power relations present in identity, values, 
knowledge, and other ideational constructions held by groups and individuals, and the 
reasons  hy certain identities or values co e to prevail. As Hopf argues, “[ ]hereas 
conventional constructivists accommodate a cognitive account for identity, or offer no 
account at all, critical constructivists are more likely to see some form of alienation 
driving the need for identity.”58 
 
Persistence and Change 
The primary problem of realism and liberalism that constructivism strives to resolve is 
the issue of change in the international system. As has been shown above, both realism 
and liberalism are geographically and historically specific theories, and no theoretical 
bridge exists in IR theory to unite them. Although liberalism has brought into the 
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picture the role of norms and institutions, without constructivist thought one cannot 
properly understand how these enable change. The foundation for understanding change 
can be derived from Kratoch il’s theory of practice and sy bolic co  unication.59 
According to this theory, change, including political change, is possible because the 
symbols groups and individuals use to communicate are always constructed, and 
because there is no way of knowing whether the symbols reflect reality. The outcomes 
of communication and interaction are never fixed and new perceptions of reality can 
al ays co e into being. It is because perceptions can be contested that “deception but 
also persuasion are possible.”60  
 
Due to its emphasis on perception, constructivism leaves more space than other IR 
theories for the possibility of change in identity, ideational factors such as norms and 
values, and leaders and institutions in whose practices these are embedded. Both the 
persistence and change of ideas can be explained by symbolic communication and the 
ways in which ideas are presented and manipulated by leaders. The persistence of 
values, norms, and institutional culture in general is emphasised for instance by 
Katzenstein, who argues that history to a large extent determines national behaviour 
even in the modern world where international norms and institutions are promoting 
legal and political homogenisation.
61
 Differences in traditional values and patterns of 
behaviour between states explain, for example, why even in the interdependent world, 
the United States, Germany, and Japan may retain very different attitudes towards 
international security policy,
62
 or any other type of policy for that matter. In a similar 
vein, Ruggie e phasises the role of “constitutive rules” in defining the content of 
ingroup behaviour.
63
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On the other hand, various constructivist authors are interested in how new norms come 
into being and how value change can be explained. Value change can be seen to occur 
through the agency of the experts already mentioned in connection to liberal theory, or 
in constructivist ter s, by “episte ic co  unities”64 or “nor  entrepreneurs”65 who 
possess special expertise or share a commitment to certain values. Such professionals 
possess the power to construct reality and the perceptions of other decision-makers. 
Barnett and Finnemore, for example, draw attention to the ways in which international 
organisations classify the world and thereby diffuse new norms directing international 
behaviour.
66
 In a similar vein, Risse-Kappen has shown how peace researchers and 
linked epistemic communities influenced Gorbachev in his decision to opt for 
cooperation rather than competition with Western powers.
67
 Collective action is thus 
enabled not only by coercion, manipulation, or persuasion, but also through the creation 
of social reality. 
 
On the systemic level, the possibility of perception and value change means that any 
structure prevailing in the international system is not inevitable. As Wendt famously 
argues, “anarchy is  hat states  ake of it.”68 For him, transformations in the identity 
and interests of nation states results in the transformation of international structure –
from a Hobbesian anarchy to Lockean rivalry to Kantian friendship.
69
 The change 
happens through reflexivity, as groups interact with others and become dissatisfied with 
existing forms of identity and interaction. Given that Wendt still takes states to be the 
main and only clearly relevant actors in the international system, he naturally does not 
thoroughly consider the role of domestic politics and individual interests; he merely 
argues that for states, the “expected costs of international change cannot be greater than 
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its re ards.”70 Even though Wendt does not explain why change should take a certain 
direction, it seems that he is right; international integration is a reality and competitive 
identities are in flux, slowly changing into increasingly cooperative ones.
71
 
 
Constructivist Power and Hegemony 
As opposed to rational theorists who believe that identities follow real interests, 
constructivists tend to believe that socially constructed identities emerge prior to the 
defining of interests.
72
 The constructivist understanding of power follows this idea and 
accordingly gives priority to structures rather than agents. Given that power is often 
exercised through institutions, it may have non-intentional effects.
73
 However, unlike 
liberal power, which is based on persuasion of institutional actors, constructivist power 
is based on the capacity of these institutions to define the ways in which the world and 
social relations should be perceived. As Guzzini argues, constructivist theories of power 
“usually co e as variations of the the e of ‘Lukes-plus Foucault’.”74 Lukes argues for 
a “third face” of po er: the type of thought control  hich creates consensus and 
prevents observable conflicts from arising in the first place.
75
 Foucault goes further, 
suggesting that power resides in the identities people adopt and in the knowledge and 
awareness they possess.
76
 According to this view, people are dominated by existing 
frames of understanding and are blind to alternative versions of reality. 
 
If constructivist power can be said to be based on the presentations of the world 
provided by norm entrepreneurs and institutions, then constructivist hegemony can be 
seen to consist of the prevailing global definitions of reality. Western science, 
capitalism, individualism, and other sources of ideas, knowledge, and practice constitute 
the hegemony of the postmodern world. For example, Burawoy laments the link 
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between capitalism and modern sociology, which he believes is creating narrow but 
popular frames of sociological understanding.
77
 Harvey, on the other hand, seeks a 
“’secret geography’ to theory production itself” – a critical geographical understanding 
of the patterns of kno ledge prevailing in the  orld, in order to create “alternative 
forms of geographical practice, tied to principles of mutual respect and advantage rather 
than to the politics of exploitation and do ination.”78 The problem for these theorists 
seems not to be the frames adopted by individuals living in relative gratification, but 
rather the hegemonic position of those frames, and the fact that individuals living in 
developing countries are willing to adopt knowledge developed by Western elites. It is 
debatable, however, whether this is something to worry about. As has been seen, people 
in low needs fulfilment tend to only hold on to identities and ideologies serving needs 
fulfilment. If postmodern understandings are adopted, then logically it follows that they 
must be of some practical use. 
 
The Need for Needs 
The premise that ideational factors such as identities, values, and practices come prior to 
the definition of interests, while central for constructivist theory, causes some serious 
dilemmas. This can be seen first in the concept of collective identity, where no 
consensus exists among constructivist thinkers. Wendt, for instance, sees identity as 
something that can be changed, yet is fixed enough to direct the behaviour of states at 
any given point in time. Zehfuss, on the other hand, contests this view of identity, 
arguing that collective identities can never be delineated; identities are constantly in flux 
and become real only through interaction.
79
 Indeed, Kratoch il’s theory of symbolic 
communication seems to necessitate this latter view of identity, while at the same time 
rendering the whole concept relatively useless (at least when it comes to predicting 
collective action). Indeed, with regard to national identity, Ko ert la ents that “[f]or 
some it is an ideology, for some a social movement, and for others a mere awareness 
that binds people together.”80 Certainly, without considering the role of human needs 
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and the functional nature of identity it is difficult to make sense of these various types 
of identity – to see how identity as social movement is connected to physiological 
deprivation, identity as ideology to security PRD, and identity as awareness to status 
PRD. 
 
The exclusive emphasis on ideational factors causes also other problems, such as 
overlooking the significance of individual agency.
81
 Although some theorists have 
argued for an amalgamation of rational, individualistic agency and structural, socially 
constructed notions so as to better include political and power considerations in 
constructivist theory,
82
 the two have not yet been successfully combined. Since human 
agency and motivation are not considered, the value of change remains hidden. While 
constructivism explains how change can come about, there is no explanation of how 
individuals choose their values and orientations or why change moves in a certain 
direction. Constructivists tend to be almost exclusively concerned with the emergence 
of emancipatory norms and human rights regimes, yet they do not give any reason as to 
why newly emerging norms would serve emancipation rather than authoritarianism or 
politico-economic stagnation. The constructivist argument that change happens because 
it is “appropriate”83 is just not good enough. As Hopf argues, “[c]onstructivism is 
agnostic about change in  orld politics.”84 
 
An appropriate way to develop constructivism further would be to accept its connection 
to needs and thereby recognise its regional and historical specificity. On a daily basis 
one can perceive people being mobilised to violent and non-violent protest for the 
protection of their interests both in the developing and developed world; merely through 
observation one can deduce that a complete absence of mobilisation and thus a complete 
hegemony of ideational structure and norm entrepreneurs over individual agents can be 
achieved only among the relatively gratified elites around the world. The same is 
reflected in the spread of new collective identities. Cosmopolitan identities are limited 
to specific regions (the European Union for example) and to individuals with high 
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status,
85
 while the majority of people continue to identify either with their nations or 
with new ethnic, political, sexual, and other groups.
86
 Also, although national identities 
are being abandoned, relative deprivation remains a reality and global class relations are 
emerging as an important alternative route to empowerment.
87
 Consequently, despite 
what critical constructivists argue regarding domination through awareness and identity, 
empirically it seems that a constructivist form of power is possible only where relations 
of domination are not present.
88
 
 
The needs approach indeed seems indispensable for the constructivist project, for it 
helps explain where and when the power of knowledge and structure applies, and why 
“do ination” based on such ele ents is so  illingly accepted. As long as the existing 
strategy allows people to remain unconcerned with basic questions of physiological 
survival, as is generally the case in developed countries, it is only natural that people 
will increasingly transfer their power and agency to structures and elites so as to become 
freer to concern themselves with higher needs, such as status and creativity.
89
 The 
existence of real basic needs is thus something worth considering among constructivists, 
and an element which would make possible the development of constructivism into a 
full IR theory applicable to a whole range of situations. This would be an opportune 
path to take especially by those who desire a more scientific basis for constructivism, 
hoping to occupy the “ iddle ground” bet een rationalist and relativist explanations.90 
If one acknowledges that certain patterns exist regarding the adoption and acceptance of 
ideas, values, and knowledge by individuals and groups, and that these patterns are 
connected to human biology and basic needs, one is clearly one step closer to linking 
rationalism and social construction. 
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7.4. IR Theory: Conclusion 
 
The historical evolution of the international systemic structure has been recognized by 
various authors. English School theorists have argued that state systems with fixed 
borders are unlikely to remain the prevailing global structure.
91
 Agnew, more recently, 
has suggested that the world has developed from an ensemble of independent worlds 
(such as tribes), to fields of forces (nation-states), to a hierarchical set of cores and 
peripheries, and is moving towards an integrated world society.
92
 Some authors have 
taken such suggestions further by linking them to different IR theories, arguing that 
theories fro  offensive realis  to liberalis  “are for different periods of international 
politics.”93 Even more significantly, some authors have connected different theories of 
power and hegemony to different historical periods.
94
 Nevertheless, a full explanation of 
systemic evolution has thus far been lacking, for the ultimate source of evolution and 
change has not been studied. As Antodiades argues about his own evolutionary theory 
of power and hege ony: “it should be ackno ledged that the proposed approach is not 
well-placed to offer much insight on what are these material/objective forces in specific 
historical periods [ hich deter ine the types of po er and hege ony applicable].”95 
 
The reason why such an explanation has not been forthcoming lies in IR theorists’ 
disinterest in looking beyond the systemic or group level of analysis for explanation. 
Although the various IR theories contain implicit understandings of individual agency 
and somewhat more explicit understandings of group dynamics, these are mere 
ontological suppositions rather than carefully researched positions. In addition, while 
the various IR theories do e phasise the  ays in  hich actors constitute the syste     
the state in realist theory, fir s and organisations in liberal theory, and classes in  orld 
syse  theory    the actors in these theories are structures in themselves, as they are made 
up of individuals, whose motivations are central in the creation of the system. Despite 
the long-standing debate in sociology and IR between theories prioritising (group/state) 
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agency and those prioritising structure,
96
 the question of how structure, and changes in 
that structure, can be seen to depend on individual-level agency has until now been left 
unanswered. 
 
As the present thesis has argued, the persistence and change of the system structure 
depends ultimately on individual-level motivation. To understand change in the system, 
one must first look at the dynamics of the ingroup, and to understand changes in the 
ingroup, one should look at the interests and needs of the individual. Change comes 
about because individuals are predisposed to fulfilling their needs, and because their 
motivation and behaviour changes depending on the needs level. On the lower levels, 
individuals tend to rely on individualistic strategies, but as they advance on the needs 
hierarchy, they gradually shift their political agency to leaders and buraucrats, whose 
behaviour in turn is increasingly directed by norms, identities, and other ideational and 
structural factors. The shift in the nature of agency in turn influences the nature of group 
empowerment and, by extension, the nature of the intergroup system. 
 
As Table 7.1 below demonstrates, the evolution of the international system can be best 
illustrated by linking the realist, liberal, and constructivist models to the different needs 
levels and by using the notions of agency, power, and hegemony to describe the three 
levels of analysis. Realism can be seen to best describe a relatively undeveloped world 
plagued by scarcity, physiological deprivation, and consequently anarchy. On this level, 
individual agency prevails over structures, group empowerment depends on coercion, 
and hegemony is based on military and material capacity. Security PRD, on the other 
hand, is the level on which strategies and structures are created and contested, where 
ingroup power depends on manipulation, and hegemony in the alternatively competitive 
or cooperative intergroup system depends on ideology. Liberalism in turn describes a 
rather developed world dominated by status concerns, where institutional and ideational 
structure largely trumps individual political agency. In this world peace, cooperation, 
and the domination of markets are made possible through persuasion carried out by 
various experts and bureaucrats, and hegemony depends on access to expertise. Lastly, 
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constructivism describes a somewhat imaginary world where PRD has been overcome, 
where structures dominate agents completely, and where power and hegemony depends 
on knowledge and the capacity to create it. 
 
Table 7.1 International Relations Theory: Agency, Power, and Hegemony 
 
 Nature of 
Agency 
Ingroup power Intergroup 
hegemony 
IR 
Theory 
Physiological 
Level 
Individual 
agency 
Coercive and 
material 
(Military 
leaders) 
Military Hegemony 
(local conflict) 
Realism 
Security level Creating 
structure 
Manipulation 
(Political 
Leaders) 
Ideological Hegemony 
(competition) 
- 
Status level Structure Persuasion 
(Experts and 
bureaucrats) 
Market Hegemony 
(global/regional 
cooperation) 
Liberalism 
No PRD Structure Knowledge  
(Scientists and 
experts) 
Scientific Hegemony 
(unity) 
Constructi
vism 
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Conclusion 
 
 
As stated in the introduction, one of the primary aims of this dissertation has been to 
inform theories of conflict and IR by integrating into these fields concepts from social 
psychology. Social psychological and conflict/IR theories, however, are not easy to 
bring together. Social psychology is mostly concerned with the behavioural tendencies 
of individual human beings, measurable in the small group laboratory context, while 
conflict theory is largely interested in group or intergroup behaviour, and IR theory 
primarily with systemic explanations. Although psychology, social psychology, and 
evolutionary psychology have all been used to inform theories of conflict and IR, they 
have mostly done so in an incomplete manner – without linking the different levels of 
analysis to one another and respecting the sometimes rigid limits and assumptions of 
both fields. In particular, they have not challenged the theoretical boundaries of 
rationalist or ideational theories of conflict, or of realist, liberal, or constructivist 
perceptions of the international system. 
 
The bringing together of social psychology and conflict/IR theories has also been 
hindered because there is an unresolved dichotomy within social psychology itself 
between theories of identity relying on rationalism on one hand (the Rational Conflict 
Theory) and on cognition and categorisation on the other (the Social Identity Theory). 
Thus, if one is to attempt a meaningful integration of psychology into conflict and IR 
theory, one must challenge some of the main premises of modern social psychology. 
More specifically, one must step out of the small group context and acknowledge that 
individual motivation and collective behaviour is not as stable and predictable in the 
real world as in the laboratory; that it inevitably varies depending on environmental 
stimuli, such as the level of scarcity and the availability of points of comparison. 
Scarcity, on the other hand, may only be integrated into theories of social psychology 
by reviving the famous yet generally ignored theory of the needs hierarchy. 
 
Only once it is accepted that individual motivation and collective behaviour changes 
according to the needs level does it become possible to integrate psychology more 
systematically into sociological theories of conflict and IR – which, after all, are more 
interested in real societies functioning in real, changing environments. One can observe 
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that as the level of needs fulfilment affects identification and leadership preferences on 
the part of the individual, so the various levels of needs fulfilment equally affect the 
nature of ingroup dynamics and tendencies towards certain types of collective action. 
This, in turn, affects the nature of the intergroup system. The model of identification, 
however, is simpler than the model of collective violence, which takes into account free 
agency in the group and intergroup context. The model of collective violence, on the 
other hand, is simpler than the systemic model of international relations, which must 
strive to somehow unite all three levels of analysis.  
 
A Framework of Identification 
The first chapter of this dissertation examined the needs hierarchy, theories of 
identification, and theories of leadership. It argued for a three-level needs hierarchy 
made up of physiological, security, and status needs. It also proposed a novel 
understanding of how the level of collective needs fulfilment influences identification 
and leadership. The mechanism which mediates between needs and group dynamics is 
stress, whose strength depends on the level of deprivation. The existence of stress is a 
signal that the needs strategy offered by the group is not conducive to needs fulfilment 
and survival. Severe stress, therefore, renders individuals willing to accept new 
identities and action-oriented leaders, causing collective identities to be flexible on the 
lower levels of needs fulfilment and more stable, and possess more persuasive power, 
on the higher levels of needs fulfilment. The needs level also tends to affect leadership 
preferences in certain ways: on the lower levels action-oriented leaders are preferred, 
while on the higher levels, relations-oriented leaders are respected and have more power 
to define mass interests. 
 
In terms of rational choice and constructivism, one could argue that on the lower levels, 
interests are ontologically prior to identities, and on the higher levels, identities are 
ontologically prior to interests. The rational choice end of this hypothesis is supported 
by the qualitative case study findings of Chapter 3, which examined the nature and 
development of Northern and Southern Sudanese collective identity. The separation of 
the South from the North demonstrates how, in physiological deprivation, collective 
identities tend to be abandoned when the existing group affiliation does not promote 
survival. If alternative identities provide better chances of advancing from physiological 
deprivation to security and status PRD, then these identities may be adopted and 
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become relatively solidified on the status level. The Sudanese case study shows that a 
low level of development in general prevents the development of a stable collective 
identity: even the elites themselves fail to adhere to a shared understanding of identity 
and instead rely on changing ideologies to justify their positions of relative gratification. 
 
On the other hand, the constructivist end of the hypothesis – that identities are 
ontologically prior to collective interests on higher levels of needs fulfilment – is 
supported by the Chapter 5 case study on the development of Yugoslav, Serb, Croat, 
and Bosnian Muslim identities. This case study suggested that in security PRD, identity 
has more persuasive power than it does in physiological deprivation, but also that 
alternative ideologies (in this case, Yugoslavism and Communism) may be used to 
define group interest at this level. In status PRD, on the other hand, collective identities 
have proved their worth and identity categories tend to lose their flexibility. On the 
status PRD level, however, it also seems to be the case that the availability of historical 
material regarding past suffering – so-called ‘cultural trau a’ – largely determines the 
extent to which leaders can manipulate the masses into accepting certain frames of 
understanding regarding intergroup relations. If such material is extensive, leaders often 
rely on it to trigger competitive intergroup relations that justify their authoritarian 
leadership. If such material is absent, leaders tend to accept cooperative intergroup 
relations which respect the status desires of the masses. 
 
While it is fully acknowledged here that the suggested link between needs, identity, and 
leadership, and the reconciliation of rationalist and constructivist thinking is not a 
generally accepted approach in social psychology or sociology, it arguably resolves 
some important debates in both fields. In social psychology, it can resolve the 
contradiction between Realistic Conflict Theory, which argues that collective identity 
depends on real and material intergroup differences, and Social Identity Theory, which 
argues that identity and intergroup bias are innate and ever-present. In sociology more 
generally, in addition to the tension between rational action and social construction, the 
synthesis can reconcile theories of leadership that emphasise the situational and action-
oriented nature of leaders with those emphasising their transformative powers. 
However, the synthesis can do much more than inform existing group psychology. It 
can also serve as a basis for understanding the more complex phenomena of collective 
violence and systemic theories of IR. 
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A Framework of Mobilisation 
The second chapter of this thesis combined the synthesis of needs, identity, and 
leadership with root theories of conflict and argued for a comprehensive framework 
through which to reconcile various conflict theories and types of collective violence. 
According to this framework, all collective action depends on perceived relative 
deprivation, PRD. Like identification, collective violence can be seen as a continuum 
connected to the needs level. Cohesive collective violence, however, is not automatic; 
its nature and extent depends on various external factors. Motivation for collective 
cohesive violence can be said to depend on two factors: deprivation and unity. The 
significance of deprivation suggests that cohesive collective violence should be most 
common in physiological deprivation, while unity suggests it should be more common 
on the higher needs levels. In reality, however, cohesive collective violence may be 
triggered on all needs levels, but the dynamics vary at each level. In physiological 
deprivation, the lack of unity must be compensated for by coercive or materialistic 
leadership. In contrast, in status PRD, the lack of deprivation may be overcome by 
manipulative leadership that manages to create a perception of serious deprivation. In 
security PRD, both deprivation and unity are present and cohesive collective violence is 
perhaps most natural and common. 
 
The physiological end of the PRD hypothesis was developed and verified in Chapter 4, 
which examined the mobilisation of the Southern Sudanese rebels during the second 
civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan. The study shows that the deprivation 
experienced by the Southerners gave rise to a variety of rebel movements with various 
opponents. It confirms the idea that in physiological and security PRD, mass 
mobilisation is easy to achieve while forging unity is not. The case study also confirms 
the idea that identity and ideology play no part in mobilising people or in creating unity 
among them in physiological deprivation; the only thing leading to unity in the South 
Sudanese case was the coercion of the SPLA leadership and their success in acquiring 
resources and ending Northern oppression. Thus, what mattered was their contribution 
to helping the masses escape physiological deprivation. The case study also shows the 
importance of distinguishing between motivation and long-term success of the 
movement: nearly everyone who had lost their traditional livelihood was motivated to 
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fight, but long-term cohesion and eventual success depended on material factors such as 
the leaders’ coercive capacities and external support. 
 
The status end of the PRD hypothesis was developed and verified in Chapter 6, which  
examined the mobilisation of the Serbs of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, including 
paramilitary groups and the Yugoslav National Army, in the early 1990s. Most 
importantly, the case study shows that identity has little to do with mobilisation even on 
the higher needs levels; the effect of identity and ideological manipulation is only to 
render the masses acquiescent regarding elite policies. In status PRD, as the 
investigation of the various Serb entities shows, only a limited number of people are 
initially willing to resort to collective violence. In status PRD, the primary method by 
which elites may trigger large-scale violence is by using violent extremists to create an 
environment of insecurity and exaggerating the actions of Others in order to create an 
illusion of existential threat. Ideology on this level is not a mobilising factor as it only 
provides a justification for elites to remain authoritarian (leadership characteristic of the 
security level) and the masses to remain lethargic, at least up to the moment that the 
illusion of security PRD turns into a reality. 
 
Like social psychological theories of identity and leadership, theories of conflict have 
thus far failed to resolve the rationalist-constructivist dichotomy. At best, theories of 
conflict have argued that large-scale violence is most common in the middle situation in 
which both deprivation and identity categories are strongly present, or on middle levels 
of historical development. However, by looking at the different conflict dynamics at 
both ends of the conflict continuum, one can draw from the findings of other conflict 
theories: for example economic and class theories, which seem to demonstrate relatively 
well the dynamics of conflict taking place in LDCs, or ideational theories that 
emphasise the role of manipulation in top-down conflicts taking place in the more 
developed parts of the world. Looking at the whole conflict spectrum, in any case, is 
helpful when one wants to analyse the historical and regional particularity of certain 
types of conflict, or their overall transformation in terms of dynamics (from automatic 
to manipulative) and actors (from rational rebel groups to professional armies or 
ideologically motivated terrorist groups). 
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A Framework of International Relations 
Based on the frameworks of identification and collective violence, one can also try to 
predict the evolution of the intergroup system. Using a theory of motivation and 
collective action relying on the needs hierarchy, existing systemic IR theories can be 
seen as historically and regionally specific. Chapter 7 argued that the nature of the 
international system tends to evolve so that depending on the time period, it can best be 
described by realist, liberal, or constructivist theory. The overall change in the 
international system, on all levels of analysis, has been and can be best described in 
terms of agency, power, and hegemony in the manner described below. 
 
On the lowest needs level, physiological deprivation, the importance of survival, and 
weakness of identity have been shown to lead to the collapse of structures and 
hierarchies, which is why the individual possesses full agency on this level. On the 
ingroup level, this means that empowerment is possible only through coercive and 
materialist strategies, and on the intergroup level, that hegemony can only be achieved 
through material and military superiority. The level of security PRD, on the other hand, 
was shown to be the level on which needs strategies are created. On this level, 
individuals are looking for functioning group structures or seeking to build new ones to 
partially replace their free agency. This was seen in the cases of South Sudan and the 
former Yugoslavia: the identity which best served needs fulfilment was eventually 
accepted on the security level and developed as immediate security PRD subsided. 
Since no obvious answers exist regarding group identifications and strategies in security 
PRD, manipulation is the key to collective empowerment. The (cooperative or 
competitive) nature of the intergroup environment consequently depends on the nature 
of leadership and chosen ideologies, which is why the system may even include various 
“historical blocks” at once. 
 
As the group advances onto the status level, individuals are no longer concerned with 
mere survival but rather with their own positions in the community. In order to 
concentrate on such a high level of needs fulfilment, they must first accept the transfer 
of most of their political agency to group institutions and experts. Because people are 
only concerned with competing for status roles, they limit themselves to certain fields of 
action and let others control other aspects of the needs strategy. The dynamics of 
ingroup interaction and power consequently shift from manipulation to cooperation and 
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persuasion, while hegemony in the system is achieved only by controlling the elites who 
govern the various markets, institutions, and other systems of the liberal, interdependent 
world. One can also imagine a situation where the relatively gratified people of the 
liberal world have largely overcome PRD. Such people may choose to give up all their 
(political) agency to leaders and structures and are unlikely to ever resort to even 
peaceful mobilisation. Ideational factors, such as knowledge, ideas, (humanitarian) 
values, and cosmopolitan identity would define their interests. Power in such a world 
would consist of constructed knowledge and awareness, and hegemony of being able to 
create that knowledge and to share it with others. 
 
Although the present framework reconciles the opposing theories, ongoing debates 
within the IR field between realist, liberal, and constructivist theorists illustrates how 
the rationalist (realist)-constructivist divide continues to confuse issues even on the 
highest, systemic level of analysis. As was mentioned in Chapter 7, the contradictions 
between IR theories and concepts suggest that IR cannot afford to remain a purely 
systemic theory, at least if one wants to factor in the element of evolution of the system. 
In fact, the field’s o n great debates, such as the dichoto y bet een structure and 
agency, and the various types of power and hegemony, can only be resolved by 
integrating into IR theory the lower levels of analysis. By connecting the various IR 
theories and the changing nature of agency, power, and hegemony to different levels of 
needs fulfilment and development, the existing contradictions make sense. There can be 
no one systemic theory of IR –  there can only be one framework in which the various 
theories are seen as historically and regionally specific. 
 
Limitations and Implications 
Both the greatest strengths and the greatest limitations of the present study derive from 
the fact that it has been primarily developed through theoretical deduction and only 
secondarily on qualitative analysis. It is a broad – and thus parsimonious – meta-theory, 
which develops the big picture somewhat at the expense of richness in the theories of 
identity, conflict, and IR found on the various levels of analysis. Its emphasis on 
intangible and almost un-measurable variables such as identity and perception also 
renders it more powerful as a general explanatory theory rather than as a model capable 
of predicting conflict, or one that can be definitively proved through fieldwork. Indeed, 
especially the "low needs" end of mobilisation in Chapter 2 might be almost impossible 
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to prove or disprove, given the difficulty of acquiring sufficient data from undeveloped 
countries suffering from conflict, and of carrying out interviews in the midst of conflict. 
(Interviews of a later date might suffer from the group bias and categorisation effects 
that develop on higher needs levels.) Accurate measurement techniques are, of course, 
available in the laboratory context, but not as far as severe deprivation is concerned. 
 
What value the present work has thus inevitably lies in the suggested meta-theoretical 
connections between different fields of scientific inquiry. In 1998, Pettigrew argued that 
an effective application of social psychology to international social issues must fulfil 
certain conditions:
1
 the model must link the micro-individual, meso-situational, and 
macro-social levels; it must attend to issues not covered by social psychology alone, 
such as large-scale conflicts; it must operate across cultures and societies; it must apply 
to the whole social hierarchy rather than to the elites alone; and it must avoid victim-
blaming. The present framework fulfils these criteria. The needs hierarchy and the way 
in which needs fulfilment affects behaviour provides the link between the various levels 
of analysis. While based on a psychological model of motivation and identification, the 
framework also addresses large social and systemic issues. The model is respectful of 
historical and regional specificity and thus applies globally. It is also interested in the 
behaviour of both leaders and masses. Finally, by showing how universal psychological 
tendencies result in different group dynamics in different environments, it avoids 
blaming anyone. 
 
It can, of course, be argued that the value of the present thesis as a comprehensive 
framework is undermined by the fact that its logic has been achieved at the expense of 
many well-established suppositions of social psychology, conflict, and IR theory. In the 
course of this dissertation it was suggested, for example, that the needs hierarchy should 
be revived to make sense of theories of identity and leadership; that the understanding 
of identity as a ‘need’ by the  ost  idely used social psychological approach (SIT) is 
misleading; that IR theory should comprehensively include three levels of analysis; and 
that constructivism should abandon its main premise regarding the ontological priority 
of identity over interests in order to become a complete theory of collective action. At 
the same time, however, as the present framework poses an ontological challenge to the 
                                                          
1
 Thomas Pettigrew, "Applying Social Psychology to International Social Issues," Journal of Social 
Issues 54, no. 4 (1998): 663-675. 
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various theories, it does not attempt to wholly invalidate or replace them. The main aim 
is only to limit their applicability so as to provide some common ground through the 
concept of evolution for those interested in systemic change. 
 
Interestingly, however, Pettigrew also offered a warning for anyone desiring to integrate 
psychology into broader social issues by pointing out that the public policy arena is “hot 
and controversial.”2 It is possible that the identity-conflict framework will be rejected 
by conflict practitioners whose worldviews cannot incorporate the idea that deprivation 
inevitably leads to collective violence,
3
 or that the general connection between the 
different levels of analysis will be rejected by IR theorists unwilling to broaden their 
field of inquiry to less familiar fields of science. If this is so, then it is hoped that the 
present thesis will at least contribute to further literature on, and awareness of, the 
connection between needs and identity in general. Even a low level of awareness on this 
connection among the public could promote general tolerance among people and 
nations. In particular, among relatively gratified Westerners for whom awareness plays 
a greater role, it might limit the feelings of moral outrage caused by sometimes violent 
collective  ove ents in the developing  orld. If one accepts that hu an collective 
reactions to particular stressors or triggers    ovies or cartoons disparaging Isla  being 
a recent exa ple    depend on the level of needs fulfil ent, then one is a step closer to 
abandoning misplaced moral righteousness and to becoming a more tolerant and 
understanding person. 
                                                          
2
 Pettigrew, “Applying Social Psychology,” 664. 
3
 Especially the idea that the power of persuasion and democratic leadership are unlikely to work in 
developing countries may be difficult for some to accept. 
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